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Banking the Poor
Michael S. Barr†
Low-income households often lack access to banking accounts and
face high costs for transacting basic financial services through check
cashers and other alternative financial service providers. These families
find it more difficult to save and plan financially for the future. Living
paycheck to paycheck leaves them vulnerable to medical or job
emergencies that may endanger their financial stability, and lack of
longer-term savings undermines their ability to improve skills, purchase a
home, or send their children to college. Additionally, high cost financial
services and inadequate access to bank accounts may undermine widely
shared societal goals of reducing poverty, moving families from welfare to
work, and rewarding work through incentives such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit. This Article calls for the transformation of financial services
for the poor. The Article first explores the dual financial services market in
which insured depository institutions largely serve middle- and upperincome persons, and check cashers and other alternative service providers
largely serve low- and moderate-income households. The Article argues
that the social benefits of breaking down barriers between these markets
exceed the costs of doing so. The Article also contends that network
externalities in electronic payment systems help explain why some
technologies that would help low-income consumers have not been as
rapidly adopted as would be socially beneficial. In response to this
problem, the Article recommends governmental incentives for private
sector financial and technological innovation to help lower banking and
savings barriers for the poor. Better access to financial services is critical
for low-income persons seeking to enter the economic mainstream.
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Introduction
Access to financial services is critical to success in the modern
American economy. Most households can take access to a bank account
for granted. Yet 22% of low-income families—over 8.4 million families
earning under $25,000 per year—lack the most basic financial tool, a bank
account.1 These “unbanked” households and other “underbanked” lowand moderate-income individuals face high costs, relative to their income,
for basic financial services. For example, a worker earning $12,000 a year
would pay approximately $250 annually just to cash payroll checks at a
check cashing outlet.2 Low-income workers often turn to tax preparation
services and costly refund loans to access their government tax refund
check under the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The costs of these
basic financial transactions can undermine public initiatives that help
families move from welfare to work, and can diminish the effectiveness of
the EITC in lifting families out of poverty and encouraging workforce
participation.
Low-income families, particularly those without bank accounts, often
lack any regular means to save. These families, often lacking alternative
forms of financial resources, need to save, however, as a cushion against
short-term crises, such as injury or job loss, as well as for longer-term
goals, including buying a home, sending their children to college, or
retirement. Of course, a central reason that low-income people find it
1
Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 9-11 (2000); see also Ana M. Aizcorbe et
al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, tbl.5 (2003) (noting that the percentage of unbanked decreased to
9.1%, though data based on dollars of income are not fully comparable across surveys). The term
“bank account” is used here to refer to an account at an insured depository institution, including thrifts
and credit unions. A word on scope: This Article focuses largely on basic transactional services and
short-term consumer credit. I take up the related question of savings policies in a work in progress with
Michael Sherraden, MICHAEL SHERRADEN & MICHAEL S. BARR, INSTITUTIONS AND INCLUSION IN
SAVING POLICY (Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Working Paper, 2003), and the
matter of access to home mortgage credit in another work in progress, MICHAEL S. BARR,
DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL (Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Working
Paper, 2003). The boundary between these topics is permeable.
2
See DOVE CONSULTING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SURVEY OF NON-BANK
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 34 fig.6.5 (2000) [hereinafter DOVE REPORT] (finding that fees for cashing a
$500 check ranged from $8 to $14).
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difficult to save is that they have low incomes, but evidence suggests that
low-income people can save if they have structured mechanisms to do so.3
The unbanked are also largely cut off from mainstream sources of credit,
whether for short-term consumer borrowing or home ownership, because,
without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to establish
credit or qualify for a loan. Even those low-income persons who have an
account may, in effect, be “underbanked”: They may rely on check cashers
to cash their payroll checks; they may lack an institutionalized means to
save, such as through payroll deduction plans; or they may not have, or
may have tapped out, credit cards, and turn to relatively high cost forms of
short-term credit, such as payday loans, to meet their liquidity needs.
Alternative financial service (AFS) providers—including check
cashers, money transmitters, payday lenders, title lenders, and tax
preparation services that provide refund anticipation loans—are providing
a wide range of financial services in low-income communities.4 For
example, check cashers provide a means for unbanked employees to
convert their paychecks to cash. Payday lenders provide short-term credit
to borrowers who cannot access credit cards or are already at credit limits.
There are benefits to this market segmentation, and for low-income
consumers, it is likely that without such services, they would be even less
able to fulfill their financial services needs. Still, such services often come
at a high cost to low- and moderate-income borrowers. Some portion of
these high costs may be endemic to the nature of the transactions. These
are paper- and labor-intensive transactions involving small dollar amounts,
conducted on behalf of consumers with low wealth and often uncertain or
poor credit history. These transactions are undertaken largely by financial
service providers, which, unlike insured depositories, lack direct access to
the payments system for check clearance. Moreover, the fixed costs of
lending show up in higher prices for loans of short duration and small
amounts. Yet some portion of the costs—and consumer problems—can be
traced to the patchwork of state and federal law that governs these
providers.
While the mainstream financial system works extraordinarily well for
most Americans, many low- and moderate-income individuals face a
number of barriers to bank account ownership. First, regular checking
accounts may not make economic sense for many lower-income families.
For example, consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums pay
high monthly fees, and most banks levy high charges for bounced checks,
which families living paycheck to paycheck can ill afford. Second, many
3
See infra Section I.B.
4
The “AFS” label comes from Roger Swagler et al., The Operations, Appeals and Costs of
the Alternative Financial Sector: Implications for Financial Counselors, 6 FIN. COUNSELING &
PLANNING 93 (1995).

124

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

4

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
unbanked persons may not qualify for conventional bank accounts because
of poor credit history or prior problems with managing a bank account.
While some persons undoubtedly pose undue risk for account ownership,
many could responsibly use bank accounts structured for their needs. In
particular, accounts that do not permit overdrafts would reduce the risk
associated with customers despite previous problems with the banking
system and would diminish the need to sort out customers who had
bounced checks in the past, except for those who were judged to have
committed fraud. Third, while many low-income communities contain
both banking institutions and alternative financial services providers, in
some communities, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not as readily
accessible as in higher-income areas. Fourth, financial institutions may be
reluctant, given low expected returns, to invest in research, product
development, account administration, bank personnel training, marketing,
and financial education necessary to expand financial services to lowerincome clientele. That is, banking the poor is unlikely to be seen as
sufficiently profitable for many banks to incur the up-front costs of
entering this market, particularly because most banks are not institutionally
organized to focus on this market segment. Fifth, the technologies that
would make it less costly for low-income persons to use banking services
are subject to positive network externalities. These externalities may slow
the adoption of electronic forms of income receipt and payment.
The legal literature on issues regarding access to financial services for
the poor focuses largely on debates over usury laws and consumer
protections in the alternative financial services sector.5 In this Article, I
hope to shift the debate toward ways in which governmental incentives can
harness market and technological forces to expand access to financial
services for the poor. The Article begins by systematically exploring the
demand for financial services, building on John Caskey’s foundational
study of the alternative financial services industry6 and the work of a few
other sociologists who in recent years have begun to explore the financial
services usage of the unbanked population.7 I examine the supply of
financial services by the alternative financial services and banking sectors.
5
See, e.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the
Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) (arguing for usury laws). But see
James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000) (arguing that usury laws are
illusory given federal pre-emption and ill-advised in any event). For studies of the economic effects of
usury laws, see, for example, Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1998).
6
See JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR (1994) [hereinafter CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING].
7
See, e.g., sources cited infra note 20. Until recently, there has been little research focused
on the financial service needs of low-income households. I will contribute to this research in a survey
that I will be undertaking in 2005 as the faculty investigator for the Detroit Area Survey.
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I next analyze changes in payments and distribution systems that influence
the provision of financial services for the poor.
On this empirical foundation, I argue that the federal government
should act as a catalyst in encouraging the private sector to transform
financial services for low-income persons. The case for governmental
intervention rests primarily on four arguments.
First, bank account ownership contributes to optimal income
redistribution policies. Bank account ownership (or a similar means of
receiving income) can be thought of as logically prior to the receipt of a
governmental transfer of income. The Article takes as a given that our
society has a goal, as evidenced by such policies as the 1996 Welfare
Reform law8 and the EITC, to increase workforce participation and reduce
poverty among the working poor.9 Generally, providing government
assistance in the form of income enhances social welfare more than
providing assistance in kind, both because administration is likely to be
less costly and because income assistance provides the recipient with the
freedom to spend the income however she desires.10
Given the high cost of converting income into liquid form, however,
promoting bank account ownership for the poor is probably more efficient
than simply transferring income. The form in which “income” is
transferred changes its value. A governmental check is worth its face value
less the cost of converting it to cash. In addition, one unit of in-kind
assistance, in the form of sufficient governmental incentives to induce a
bank to offer a bank account to a low-income person, would provide the
benefit of liquidity to all subsequent income transfers whether from
government programs, wages, or other sources. Thus, the concept of
income transfers being more efficient than in-kind assistance breaks down
when one needs to deliver that income to people in the real world.
Moreover, the government saves money by transferring funds
electronically, rather than by paper check.
Although paternalism forms the basis of much savings policy, and
may be justified under some circumstances, paternalism is not the impetus
for favoring subsidizing account ownership. The thrust of the argument in
8
The Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
9
See, e.g., V. JOSEPH HOTZ & JOHN KARL SCHOLZ, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8078, 2001) (summarizing evidence that EITC
increases workforce participation and reduces poverty); George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery
of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994). But see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV 533 (1995) (questioning use of tax
code).
10
See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 167-71 (4th ed. 1995). On income transfers as a
means of redistribution, see, for example, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 989 (2001). I defend my argument more fully in Part V.
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favor of subsidies for bank accounts is to increase the supply of bank
accounts tailored to the needs of the poor, not primarily to change demand
of the poor for existing types of traditional accounts that many of them
currently do not want or for which they may not qualify.11
Second, high-cost financial services reduce effective take-home pay
and thus may undermine employment incentives contained in such
measures as the EITC and the Welfare Reform law, although further
empirical research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. The costs of
changing the delivery system for financial services for the poor are small
relative to the likely gains to be had for these programs. More broadly,
improved access to bank accounts can reduce the costs of financial
services for the poor, expand access to lower-cost forms of credit and
increase opportunities for saving—all key to reducing poverty and
expanding social mobility.12 Evidence to date suggests that low-income
people can save, but lack the institutional mechanisms available to middleand upper-income Americans to do so. Providing a better opportunity for
the poor to save is likely both to reduce their short-term exposure to
liquidity shocks, and to increase their long-term prospects for building
their human capital and saving for homeownership or other assets that can
help them get out of poverty.13
The positive network externalities in payments systems that the
Article identifies as promising for expanding access to the banking system
for the poor—online debit at automatic teller machines (ATMs) and
merchant point of sale (POS) terminals, and the automated clearinghouse
(ACH) system for direct deposit and bill payment—provide a third
justification for governmental intervention.14 The social benefits of wide
adoption of these systems exceed the private benefits that can be captured
by their owners. While many of the network externalities inherent in these
systems have already been internalized, further government policies to
11
See infra Sections I.A, III.A, & V.A (discussing financial services needs of unbanked,
inadequacy of existing accounts, and need for reform).
12
Government policies to promote financial services for the poor may also have expressive
benefits, by helping to promote the sense that basic instruments for success in our economy are open to
the poor. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks at the U.S. Conference
of Mayors (Jan. 18, 2000) (describing bank accounts as the “passport” to the modern American
economy), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls356.htm. On “expressive” benefits
generally, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1503 (2000). But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000). The content of the “expressive” benefit, if any, depends in part on how its
intended beneficiaries view the nature of the benefit. How low-income households would view the
benefit of increased access to banking services is one aspect of the questions I will pose in the Detroit
Area Survey, see supra note 7.
13
See infra Section I.B (discussing lack of savings mechanism as one cost of being
unbanked). I take up the broader question of savings policy for low-income households in a working
paper. See SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1.
14
See infra Part IV.
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reduce these externalities would have wide social benefits and should be
adopted. With distributive goals for the poor in mind, I also suggest
additional steps. These electronic payment and delivery systems matter in
expanding financial services for the poor because they are lower risk and
lower cost to consumers, employers, and financial institutions than checks
or off-line debit forms of payment systems.
Fourth, the patchwork of state laws governing the alternative financial
services sector, gaps in federal law, and complicated regulations governing
federal programs may also increase the costs and problems associated with
providing financial services for the poor. Regardless of one’s views about
the merits of income redistribution, one ought to favor certain legal
reforms. For example, state geographic restrictions on locations of check
cashers needlessly inhibit competition among check cashers in low-income
communities. In another vein, complicated federal rules governing the
EITC and delays in tax refund processing may drive low-income taxpayers
to take out expensive refund anticipation loans offered by paid preparers.
Thus, the Article recommends changes in several regulatory areas.
The Article rejects two common approaches to thinking about
financial services for the poor. First, the Article disputes the proposition
that the financial services currently provided in low-income communities
are necessarily efficient or desirable. That is, while there are benefits to
market segmentation, there are also social costs to the current system.
Second, the Article disputes the proposition that the remedy for perceived
problems in the alternative financial services sector is a return to usury
laws. Rather, the Article contends that the financial service system could
serve at least some segments of low- and moderate-income households
better with modest governmental incentives to the banking sector to spur
innovation in serving the poor.
The Article makes several key policy recommendations to help
transform financial services for the poor.
First, governmental incentives should be offered to encourage
financial institutions to offer electronically based transaction accounts
designed for low- and moderate-income persons. For example, debit-cardbased accounts accessed at ATMs and at merchant POS terminals can be
offered at much lower cost, and with lower risk to banks and consumers,
than checking accounts. Such electronically based accounts may be
particularly suited to low-income unbanked persons. Yet the fixed costs of
offering these accounts may currently be too high to be borne by banks
and their low-income customers, and banks have been largely unwilling to
take on the opportunity costs of shifting bank resources toward serving
low- and moderate-income persons. Further technological and financial
innovation spurred by these incentives can help to drive down costs,
reduce risks, and increase competition.
128
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My view, which I defend in Part V, is that tax credits to financial
institutions would be the preferable means for delivering the subsidy.
Although tax credits could most readily be employed to create a larger
scale initiative, other helpful steps short of a new tax credit could be taken.
For example, the Treasury Department’s “First Accounts” pilot could spur
experimentation, but needs to be funded on a multi-year basis. The
incentives that I propose could also build on revamped governmental
programs designed to move federal and state-run government benefit
recipients from receiving certain government income transfers by paper
check to electronic benefit transfer (EBT). State EBT programs—focused
on welfare recipients and other beneficiaries of state-run benefit
programs—should shift away from electronic benefit cards towards
provision of debit-card based bank accounts that could be used to receive
all forms of income transfer as well as privately earned wages. Treasury
should enhance the incentives in the federal Electronic Funds Transfer
(EFT) initiative—currently focused on moving Social Security recipients,
federal retirees, and other beneficiaries of certain federally run programs to
direct deposit—for banks to offer low-cost, electronically based bank
accounts to a wider range of low-income households, including those who
receive the EITC.
Second, taking account of the positive network externalities
associated with online debit cards, direct deposit, and bill payment, while
recognizing the risk that government intervention in these networks may
miss the mark, adjustments may be needed in Federal Reserve Board
pricing of both check and ACH services. ACH services are likely still
priced too high in relation to checks. In addition, now that VISA and
MasterCard have settled the suit brought by Wal-Mart and other merchants
alleging antitrust violations arising from the credit card companies’ “honor
all cards” policies, federal antitrust officials and the courts should pay
particular attention to ensuring that the terms of the settlement foster
competition among different electronic payment methods. Depending on
how the market evolves in the wake of the settlement, there may also be a
case for subsidizing the further expansion of online debit infrastructure.
Third, regulatory reform could play a secondary but useful role in
altering the provision of financial services to the poor. For example, both
the elimination of anti-competitive restrictions and the more consistent
regulation and enforcement of disclosure could reduce some of the costs
and problems associated with alternative financial service providers.
Moreover, simplification of state welfare-to-work programs and the
federal EITC, and IRS steps to facilitate the timely direct deposit of tax
refunds, could help to reduce transaction costs, lower barriers to account
ownership, and reduce demand for costly tax preparation and refund
anticipation loan services. Furthermore, federal banking regulators should
129
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increase attention on how the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could
encourage banks and thrifts to provide innovative financial services to the
unbanked under the existing regulatory framework.
Lastly, studies show that financial education, if coupled with
structured opportunities to save, can increase participation in saving plans
and increase the level of saving, particularly for low- and moderateincome persons.15 Financial education is costly, and the benefits of a
financially-educated consumer cannot be captured by a financial institution
offering education because the consumer may shop for financial services at
other institutions. Further, the positive externalities created by the
provision of financial education make it unlikely that such education will
be offered in a socially optimal quantity by private parties. Although
financial education is unlikely to be successful against the backdrop of
existing high-cost alternatives, such education focused on new banking
products designed to meet the financial needs of the poor may be helpful.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the low- and
moderate-income population who use alternative financial service
providers as a substitute for, or in addition to, banks, and explores the costs
and benefits to consumers of using this sector. Part II analyzes the
alternative financial services industry in depth and proposes changes to
regulation of that sector. Part III explores barriers to low- and moderateincome persons using financial services at insured depository institutions
and proposes strategies to lower these barriers. Part IV analyzes changes in
the payments system and electronic financial services networks that could
enhance financial services for the poor. Part V focuses on the Article’s key
policy recommendations for financial services, savings, and financial
education. The Article then concludes.
I.

The Unbanked16

A. Patterns of Account Ownership
Twenty-two percent of low-income families—over 8.4 million
families earning under $25,000 per year—do not have either a checking or
15
See infra note 567.
16
Throughout this Article, I use the term “unbanked” to refer to individuals who do not
have an account (savings, checking, or otherwise) at a depository institution. Despite the scope of the
title, I also discuss problems of the “underbanked,” those with an account at a depository institution but
who also rely for their financial services on other financial services providers (such as check cashers,
payday lenders, auto title lenders, refund anticipation lenders, and rent-to-own companies) that largely
serve low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Problems faced by the “unbanked” and
“underbanked” overlap significantly but diverge in important respects that I explore throughout the
Article. I use the term “bank” generically to refer to all depository institutions, including commercial
banks, thrifts, and credit unions. Where differences among these types of depository institutions
matter, I use the specific terms.
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savings account.17 Most of the unbanked are low-income: 83% of the
unbanked earn under $25,000 per year.18 The unbanked may be especially
concentrated in low-income neighborhoods; in low-income areas of Los
Angeles the unbanked represent nearly a third of the population, and the
unbanked represent over 40% of the population in low-income
neighborhoods in New York.19
Among low- to moderate-income families, households are more likely
to be unbanked when they have lower incomes, less wealth, less education,
are not working, are younger, have more children, rent their home, and are
a racial or ethnic minority.20 Broadly speaking, the most common reason
persons cite for lacking a checking account is not having enough money to
be able to afford the costs of account ownership.21 Other factors cited by
17
Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 2, 12; see also Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1. The GAO,
using the 1998 and 1999 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) estimated that “about 11
million benefit recipients, over half of all federal benefit check recipients in 1998, were unbanked. This
estimate is substantially higher than Treasury’s 1997 estimate, which showed that 24% of federal
beneficiaries (5.2-6.5 million) lacked bank accounts.” GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC
TRANSFERS, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, GAO-02-913, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02913.pdf. GAO extrapolates from its SIPP estimates to suggest
that among all U.S. adults, 22.2 million households, or 55.9 million individuals, are unbanked,
representing 20% of all households, and 28% of all individuals. Id. at 55-56.
18
TODD VERMILYEA & JAMES A. WILCOX, WHO IS UNBANKED, AND WHY (Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2002).
19
Constance R. Dunham, The Role of Banks and Nonbanks in Serving Low- and ModerateIncome Communities, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 31 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Dunham.pdf.
20
Findings from demographic surveys of the unbanked are generally consistent with one
another. See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6; WILLIAM H. GREENE ET AL., THE IMPORTANCE
OF CHECK-CASHING BUSINESSES TO THE UNBANKED: RACIAL/ETHNIC DIFFERENCES (Fed. Reserve
Bank
of
Chicago,
Working
Paper
No.
2003-10,
2003),
available
at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2003-10.pdf; Jeanne M. Hogarth &
Kevin A. O’Donnell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income Families and the Government Trend
Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 463 (1999); John P. Caskey, Reaching Out to the
Unbanked, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 81 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Caskey, Reaching Out], available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Caskey.pdf;
Sherrie Rhine et al., The Role of Alternative Financial Service Providers in Serving LMI
Neighborhoods, in CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM COMMUNITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE 59 (Jackson L. Blanton et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Rhine.pdf; Jeanne M. Hogarth et al., Who Has a
Bank Account? Exploring Changes over Time, 25 J. FAMILY & ECON. ISSUES (forthcoming 2004). But
cf. Dunham, supra note 19 (containing some different analysis but generally consistent with other
studies). These descriptions of the unbanked do mask heterogeneity of the population. For example,
mentally ill unbanked persons or prisoners face a host of problems making it difficult to bring them
into the banking system that I do not address here. Nor do I address policy responses to persons who
choose not to use banks because the individuals are engaged in illegal activity, or wish to hide their
income from spouses, for example.
21
See John Caskey, Reaching Out to the Unbanked 22 tbl.2 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript]. The most commonly
cited reasons for lacking a bank account are “do not have enough money” (about half of respondents in
BOOZ-ALLEN HAMILTON, SHUGOLL RESEARCH, U.S. TREASURY, MANDATORY EFT DEMOGRAPHIC
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respondents include distrust of banks, not wanting to deal with banks or
privacy concerns.22
Efforts to reach the unbanked also need to pay attention to the racial
and ethnic composition, and immigration status, of segments of the
unbanked. Recent evidence suggests that, irrespective of the race of the
individual, families living in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of
Blacks or Hispanics are less likely to own a checking account.23 Among
the banked, low-income minorities are less likely than whites to have a
checking account, but more likely than whites (all else being equal) to
have savings accounts.24 By contrast, proximity to a bank branch seems
not especially predictive of being banked.25 Low-income immigrants are
more likely than other low-income persons to be unbanked. Moreover,
significant immigration in the late 1990s may have contributed to the
persistence in the size of the unbanked population.26
STUDY OMB 1510-00-68, at 56 (1997)), “no savings” (53% of respondents in Caskey, Reaching Out
Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “do not write enough checks to make it worthwhile” (28.4% of
respondents in Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 9), “do not have enough money” (12.9% of
respondents in Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 9), “bank fees are too high” (23% of respondents in
Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “bank minimum balance requirements are too
high” (22% of respondents in Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra, at 22 tbl.2), “the bank requires
a high balance (to avoid fees)” (VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at tbl.6), and unfavorable
account features and costs (62% of respondents in Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 13). Coupled with
data about actual costs of existing bank services, see infra Section I.B., which are relatively high for
low-income persons, this suggests that the driving force behind the lack of account ownership is not
consumer ignorance of available options. That is, many low-income persons are not able to afford
existing bank products. I contend in this Article that it is worth changing the account options available
to low- and moderate-income households.
22
See, e.g., Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 13 (reporting that 30% of respondents cited
distrust of banks, an aversion to dealing with banks, and privacy concerns). These factors counsel
caution about new types of accounts in and of themselves being attractive to all of the unbanked, and
only some of these concerns might be addressed with increased financial education or exposure to
positive experiences with banks. Some portion of the unbanked population may, of course, choose to
remain unbanked even if faced with additional options. Still, as I explore more fully below, any
bankers’ hesitancy, whether legitimate or not, about having low-income people using bank branches,
or low-income consumers’ cultural aversion, if any, to the imposing nature of bank branches, can be
mitigated by focusing on all-electronic accounts, which use ATMs and merchant POS terminals to
provide access to accounts. See infra Part V. For those seeking to avoid attachment of funds by
creditors, or who have privacy concerns, bank account ownership is likely to remain unattractive.
23
See VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at 17-18. Data are insufficient to determine
whether the racial neighborhood effect is related to any reluctance by neighborhood merchants to
accept checks from minorities or from any person in minority neighborhoods, or is related to consumer
preferences, which suggests the need to explore whether discrimination, or shared community-wide
practice in poor neighborhoods, may influence the availability of, or individual decisions about,
account ownership. See id.
24
Id. at 19.
25
Id. at 16. This suggests the need to look beyond “bricks and mortar” for explanations of
banking patterns, including at the structure of accounts offered.
26
See Kennickell et al., supra note 1. Immigrants may face linguistic barriers to becoming
banked, in addition to concerns about their immigration status. Surveys of the unbanked thus far have
tended to focus more on English- and Spanish-speaking persons than on other immigrant communities.
In particular, the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances may not fully reflect the high
number of immigrants without accounts. As I explore below, low-income immigrant families rely
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While important challenges remain, some progress has been made in
recent years in expanding access to financial services. The period 1995 to
1998 marked a decline in the percentage of low-income families who are
unbanked from 25% to 22%.27 This decline in the percentage of unbanked
may reflect, in part, strong economic growth during the late 1990s that
improved the incomes of households at the bottom of the income
distribution for the first time in decades (although these gains eroded in the
last two years).28 Increases in the EITC increased the take-home pay of
low-income workers and helped to increase labor force participation.
Welfare reform, beginning with waivers for states to use welfare-to-work
strategies and culminating with the 1996 Welfare Reform law, increased
the percentage of welfare recipients entering the workforce. Greater
workforce attachment and higher incomes may have increased the benefits
of bank account ownership and also may have provided more low-income
persons with the wherewithal to meet bank minimums or afford bank fees.
Account ownership grew most quickly among groups at or below the
poverty threshold and the next largest gains came from those just over the
poverty line.29
In addition to these economic gains, advances in technology, the
spread of ATMs and POS terminals, and improvements in payments
system efficiencies have lowered the cost and improved the distribution of
payments systems that could benefit the poor. Some small-scale
governmental and private initiatives may have contributed to this trend.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s efforts to increase electronic
payment of federal benefits and a Treasury “First Accounts” pilot project
to reach the unbanked have also helped to spur innovation.30 Recently,
partly in response to these government initiatives, some banks, thrifts, and
credit unions, as well as community-based organizations, have begun to
experiment with products designed to serve the needs of low-income
individuals, and to serve the growing Hispanic market in ways that may
benefit low-income persons generally. These nascent efforts provide the
heavily on financial services (in particular, wire transfers) to send remittances back to family members
in their country of origin. Recent efforts to expand financial services for Hispanic immigrant
communities, therefore, may be critical to expanding bank account ownership to some segments of the
poor. See infra Subsection III.B.4.
27
See Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 2, 12. The percentage of unbanked families
continued to decline somewhat through 2001. See Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1, at 9.
28
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLE-FAMILIES, TABLE F-3, MEAN
INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH FIFTH AND TOP 5 PERCENT OF FAMILIES (ALL RACES): 1966 TO 2001,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f03.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002).
Median household incomes dropped, and the poverty rate increased, in 2001 and 2002. See Carmen
DeNavas-Walt et al., Income in the United States: 2002, 2003 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU P60-221;
Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, Poverty in the United States: 2002, 2003 U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU P60-222.
29
Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 19.
30
See infra Subsection III.B.1.
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context for understanding the challenges that lie ahead.
B.

The Costs of Being Unbanked

The consequences of not having access to mainstream financial
services can be severe. High-cost financial services reduce disposable
income for those least able to afford it. Such services reduce the value of
government transfer programs, including the EITC, and may undermine
federal and state initiatives to improve workforce participation and reward
work. Lack of access to mainstream financial services also undermines the
ability of the poor to save and to access credit, reducing their long-term
wealth. Low-income people using check cashers may be more susceptible
to robbery because they tend to cash their entire paycheck at regular time
periods. Additionally, reducing inefficiencies in the payments system for
the poor may have modest positive effects on the economy.
First, the “unbanked” face high costs for basic financial services.31
For example, a 2000 Treasury study found that a worker earning $12,000 a
year would pay approximately $250 annually just to cash payroll checks at
a check-cashing outlet,32 in addition to fees for money orders, wire
transfers, bill payments, and other common transactions.33 Almost all of
the checks cashed at check cashers pose relatively low risk: Payroll
payments—with low credit risk that could be directly deposited by
electronic means, instead of by check, into bank accounts, at significantly
lower costs to the payment system—constitute 80% of checks cashed at
these check cashing outlets. Another 16% are government benefit checks,
which again pose low risk.34 A large portion of these checks could
31
Total estimated fringe banking transaction costs, including check cashing, payday
lending, pawn loans, rent-to-own transactions, and auto title lending are $5.45 billion annually. JAMES
H. CARR & JENNY SCHUETZ, FANNIE MAE FOUND., FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES 10 (2001).
32
See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34 fig.6.5 (finding that fees for cashing a $500 check
ranged from $8 to $14).
33
The use of check cashers may vary considerably by region and by urban or rural location.
Compare Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 76, and Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 10-11 (nearly threequarters of unbanked but less than a fifth of banked use check cashers in Chicago) with Dunham, supra
note 19, at 53 fig.5 (greater use of check cashers by banked individuals in New York and Los
Angeles), and MICHAEL A. STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, WELFARE, WORK, AND BANKING: THE
NORTH CAROLINA FINANCIAL SERVICES SURVEY 54 (2001) (reporting that only 1.4% of unbanked
low-income households in North Carolina use check cashers). In North Carolina, some 12.5% cashed
checks at grocery stores. Id. at 54. Caskey notes that most grocery stores in that state charge fees for
cashing checks and that those stores constitute 600 of 1,000 check cashing licenses issued in that state.
Thus, a much higher proportion of unbanked households pay to cash checks, either at grocery stores or
check cashers. E-mail from John Caskey, Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, to Michael S.
Barr, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Apr. 8, 2003) (on file with
author).
34
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. Direct deposit is discussed in more detail below. See
infra Section IV.D. Check cashers focus on these checks to reduce credit risk. These operations,
however, often also require additional efforts to reduce risk of fraud, and to reduce credit risk from
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presumably be directly deposited into bank accounts at relatively low
cost—if low-income people had bank accounts.35
The costs of these basic financial transactions reduce the effectiveness
of federal income transfer programs such as the EITC and may undermine
public initiatives to move families from welfare to work. High cost
financial services reduce effective take-home pay. Moreover, studies of the
EITC suggest that higher take-home pay from the EITC helps to induce
labor force participation.36 One survey found that forty-four percent of a
sample of EITC recipients in inner city Chicago used a check cashing
service to cash their government refund check.37 Nationwide, in 1999,
nearly half of the $32 billion in EITC refunds provided to over 18 million
low-income families were distributed through refund anticipation loans,
costing EITC recipients $1.75 billion for tax preparation services,
electronic filing, and loan fees.38 The high price of converting income
checks into liquid form (e.g., cash) may reduce the efficacy of the EITC in
encouraging workforce participation because it reduces take-home pay
(and reduces it more, the more the person earns), or at the very least these
transaction costs significantly increase the taxpayer’s costs (the
“compliance” costs) of the program.
Similarly, although the jury is still out on the long term effects of the
1996 Welfare Reform law, some studies suggest that welfare programs
that encourage work, coupled with policies that let families keep more of
their earnings before benefits are reduced or eliminated, have helped to
increase workforce participation and job retention.39 The positive effects of
welfare reform on workforce participation and income generation,
however, may be undermined by high-cost check-cashing services that
reduce the effective income of those who are beginning to earn wages.40
checks from unknown and/or small employers.
35
See infra text accompanying notes 401-402 (discussing conversion of checks to direct
deposit).
36
See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 49-50 (summarizing wide range of studies finding
consistent evidence that EITC increases labor force participation and hours worked, particularly for
single mothers). Empirical work is needed to document the labor force effect, if any, of high-cost
financial services. In addition to the federal EITC, seventeen states (including the District of
Columbia) have state EITCs, usually structured as a percentage of the federal credit. See CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A HAND UP: HOW STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP
WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2003 1 (2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/3-3-03sfp.pdf. The
federal EITC was responsible for lifting 4.3 million individuals out of poverty in 1997. See COUNCIL
OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 114 (1999).
37
Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use and Economic and
Social Mobility, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1187, 1202 tbl.5 (2000).
38
ALAN BERUBE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. & PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., THE PRICE OF
PAYING TAXES: HOW TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF THE EITC
(2002). See infra Section II.D (discussing tax preparation services).
39
See Rebecca Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the U.S., 40 J. ECON. LIT. 1105
(2002).
40
There is some evidence that check cashers may see the welfare-to-work population as a
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Even in the bulk of states that have moved to EBT for welfare
payments, welfare recipients may still face high costs for financial
services: First, administrative problems in some state programs make it
hard to withdraw sufficient funds for bill payment (e.g., monthly rent).
Second, most EBT programs do not link recipients to bank accounts,
which means that these recipients need to find other means to convert their
work income to cash, to pay bills, to save funds, and to access credit.
Third, once welfare recipients are working, payroll checks and EITC
refunds to these individuals would push them towards high cost transaction
services. In turn, welfare recipients may be dissuaded from opening a bank
account because they believe, sometimes mistakenly and sometimes
correctly, that their bank account balances will cause them to exceed state
welfare program asset limits.41
Second, low-income families need to save to cushion themselves
against personal economic crises, such as injury or loss of a job, and for
key life events, such as buying a home, sending their children to college,
or entering old age.42 Low-income households face key barriers to
increased saving,43 and their low income leaves them little opportunity to
save. Because they are poor, they face higher opportunity costs for putting
their funds toward savings rather than current consumption. In turn,
because the poor accumulate little, financial institutions face high costs in
collecting their savings relative to the amounts saved, and will thus be
reluctant to expend the resources to open accounts for them or will offer
them low returns on their savings, further reducing any incentives the poor
have to save. Low-income families, particularly those without bank
accounts, often lack any regular mechanism to save, such as payroll
deduction plans, further reducing the likelihood that they will do so.44
new market. See JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S. PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: THE 2001 PAYDAY LENDER SURVEY
AND REPORT 6 & n.15 (2001) [hereinafter CFA/PIRG REPORT].
41
JOHN CASKEY, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., BEYOND CASH-AND-CARRY: FINANCIAL
SAVINGS, FINANCIAL SERVICES, AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN TWO COMMUNITIES, at i (1997);
Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 8. In some states, account balances will cause recipients to lose
eligibility under some circumstances. See CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., 2002 FEDERAL IDA BRIEFING
BOOK: HOW IDAS AFFECT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 3-5. Where asset limits are a barrier
to account ownership, they should be reformed; in other states, financial education for welfare
recipients should be undertaken. Similarly, the federal food stamp program, the Supplemental Security
Income program of Social Security, and Medicaid contain counterproductive asset limits.
42
I address further policy responses to these issues in an article in progress, see
SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1.
43
For a fuller exposition of this argument, see generally ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE,
CONTRACTING CONSTRAINTS, CREDIT MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (MIT Dep’t of
Econ., Working Paper No. 02-17, 2001).
44
See generally Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of
Saving: Implications for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. SOC. ECON. 4 (1999). One
means of changing this pattern is for foundation or governmental programs to provide matching funds;
increasing the size of funds saved will make account provision more cost effective for financial
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In a survey of New York and Los Angeles low-income
neighborhoods, 78% of the banked held some form of savings, broadly
defined, while only 30% of the unbanked had savings.45 Obviously, the
ability to save is a function of income. But differences remain even after
controlling for income. Across income ranges, being banked is highly
correlated with saving.46 Of course, bank account ownership may well be
correlated with willingness and ability to save. Thus, one would need to
measure differences in propensity to save in order to determine whether
and to what extent account ownership itself is a strong factor in increasing
savings.47
Bank accounts can be important entry points for the provision of
regular savings plans for low-income workers through payroll deduction.
Still, most low-income workers work for firms without savings plans or
are themselves not covered by such plans even when their employers have
savings plans. Even the tax system, through which the bulk of government
savings benefits are provided, disproportionately subsidizes savings for
higher- rather than low-income households. The Treasury Department
estimates that more than two-thirds of tax expenditures for pensions go to
households in the top 20% of the income distribution, while the bottom
40% get only 2% of the tax benefit.48
Promoting low-income household savings is critical to lowering
reliance on high-cost, short-term credit, lowering risk of financial
dislocation resulting from job loss or injury, and improving prospects for
longer-term asset building through homeownership, skills development,
and education. Evidence to date suggests that low-income individuals can
save if given the opportunity to do so, at least if offered a significant
matching contribution. Some 73% of federal employees earning $10,000
to $20,000 annually participated in the federal government’s Thrift Saving
Plan, which provides a government matching contribution, and over half of
those earning under $10,000 also participated.49 The 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances found that 30% of families in the bottom income
quintile saved in the prior year, and 53.4% of those in the next quintile

institutions and may increase the level of personal saving by low income households. See infra Section
V.A.
45
See Dunham, supra note 19, at 39-40.
46
Id. at 41.
47
For evidence that financial planning influences wealth accumulation, see JOHN AMERIKS
ET AL., WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND THE PROPENSITY TO PLAN (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8920, 2002).
48
Peter Orszag & Robert Greenstein, Toward Progressive Pensions: A Summary of the U.S.
Pension System and Proposals for Reform, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS,
POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-10 (Michael Sherraden & Lisa Morris eds., forthcoming 2003).
49
U.S. TREASURY, TSP PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION RATES SHEET (1998) (on file
with author).
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saved.50 Savings account features have an appeal for the unbanked. In a
Treasury survey of unbanked federal check recipients, respondents were
aware that an ETA savings feature would only pay a nominal rate of
interest (explicitly posed in the survey as “$2 annually on a $100
deposit”), but this feature would account for approximately 25% of the
typical respondent’s decision on whether to enroll in the ETA.51
Some lower-income individuals use alternatives to bank accounts to
facilitate savings. Anecdotal evidence exists that low-income people
purchase money orders with their paychecks at the beginning of the month
and hold them for later use. In so doing, they convert their income and
benefits into a more illiquid and protected form, either for bill payment
later in the month or as “savings” for planned and unplanned expenditures
in the future.52 Researchers have also found that low-income taxpayers
over-withhold their income taxes more frequently than higher income
taxpayers; some economists suggest that these taxpayers use withholding
as an automatic savings mechanism. This may suggest that demand for
savings products among the poor is high enough that some will accept a
zero or negative interest rate.53
Third, without a bank account, it is more difficult and more costly to
establish credit or qualify for a loan. A bank account is a significant
factor—more so, in fact, than household net worth, income, or education
level—in predicting whether an individual also holds mortgage loans,
automobile loans, and certificates of deposit.54 After controlling for key
factors, one study determined that low-income households with bank
accounts were 43% more likely to have other financial assets than
households without bank accounts.55 Low-income persons without bank
accounts face higher costs of credit than low-income persons with
accounts,56 and in any event, low-income households generally face higher
50
Aizcorbe et al., supra note 1, at 5, tbl.1.
51
ED BACHELDER & ISABELLE AGUERRE, DOVE ASSOCS., ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH 60
(1999) [hereinafter ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH].
52
Postal savings orders offer protection if lost or stolen and are backed by the USPS.
53
See Jannett Highfill et al., Tax Overwithholding as a Response to Uncertainty, 26 PUB.
FIN. REV. 385 (1998).
54
Hogarth & O’Donnell, supra note 20, at 463. There may be personal characteristics of
those owning bank accounts—such as propensity to plan, budget, be thrifty, and save—that are not
fully captured by this analysis and that may account for better savings and credit outcomes.
55
See WILLIAM G. GALE & STACIE CARNEY, ASSET ACCUMULATION AMONG LOWINCOME HOUSEHOLDS 22 (Benefits and Mechanisms for Spreading Asset Ownership in the United
States, Ford Found. Conference, 1998), available at http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/views/papers/
gale/19991130.pdf.
56
Credit scoring innovations may increase the benefits of account ownership for low- and
moderate-income persons. For example, Experian has developed a credit scoring system using
transaction account records. Given the limited credit histories of low-income customers, they are often
turned down for loans even though they might be good credit risks, simply because their credit
histories are “thin.” If the credit-worthiness of low-income customers with bank accounts can be
assessed based on transaction performance, they will have increased access to credit. Thus far,
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costs of credit than households with higher incomes.57 In effect, lowincome individuals must pay more to transform their labor into productive
capital and are thus “under-rewarded for their talent.”58 Moreover, as noted
above, the savings products, including bank accounts, that low-income
persons can access generally provide low levels of return, which reduces
their income growth and may lower incentives to save. This lower saving
rate is a problem itself and further increases the cost and reduces the
availability of credit to these households, which is at least in part a
function of their savings.
Low-income families find it difficult simply to make ends meet each
month and lack access to short-term credit at a reasonable cost to smooth
out earnings. The main complaint of low-income families, for example, in
Caskey’s study, was the “insecurity and stress associated with living from
paycheck to paycheck.”59 Most low- and moderate-income households
manage to spend all their income each month.60 Bank account ownership
will not suddenly change that, but account ownership may make it easier
for low-income households to manage their finances, save even if in
modest amounts, and access lower-cost forms of credit.
It is difficult to determine causation, but a lack of account ownership
is correlated with credit problems. Either unbanked low-income persons
have lower propensities to plan financially than other low-income
households, or lack of a bank account makes it harder to plan and save. In
turn, once credit problems emerge, credit-impaired individuals have a
harder time getting access to bank accounts.61 In Caskey’s survey of lowincome households, 42% of unbanked households were two months late on
bills in the last year, compared with 28% for banked households; 41% of
unbanked households were contacted by a debt collection agency in the
past year, compared with 25% for banked families.62 When low-income
unbanked families need to borrow, they must turn to expensive forms of
credit. Only 14% of unbanked poor families carry credit cards that might
help them smooth out payment for short-term increases in consumption or
to weather occasional dips in income, while 59% of low-income banked
Experian reports that its credit scoring system is only half as predictive of credit behavior as traditional
scores but still provides better information than would otherwise be available for loan applicants with
“thin” files, who without more credit information would be turned down for a loan. See W.A. Lee,
Debit Scores May Gauge Subprime Market, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 2002, at 10.
57
BANERJEE, supra note 43, at 8-9.
58
Id. at 27.
59
Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 83.
60
Hogarth et al., supra note 20, at 23 (75-83% of low and moderate-income households
reported spending all their income each month); Sherrie L.W. Rhine et al., The Role of Alternative
Financial Services Providers in Serving LMI Neighborhoods 17-18 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (noting that 22% experienced financial distress in past year).
61
See infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing ChexSystem and related barriers to
account ownership).
62
Caskey, Reaching Out Manuscript, supra note 21, at 5.
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households carry credit cards.63 Again, we do not know whether unbanked
households without credit cards would be able to handle such cards if they
became banked.
Account ownership in and of itself is no panacea, however; even lowand moderate-income individuals with bank accounts often lack savings
and turn repeatedly during the year to payday lenders (who charge on
average 474% APR), and to other forms of high-cost credit.64 Low-income
families often lack health insurance, and those without savings or access to
informal networks of family and friends often use payday loans when
faced with expenses related to birth or illness.65 Individuals may also
borrow, of course, for less basic reasons, such as entertainment, splurges,
gambling, and the like. Policy cannot, even if it were desirable, easily
distinguish between the two kinds of borrowing. In my view, it is
appropriate to increase opportunities for low-income persons to borrow at
lower cost, even if some portion of the borrowing is taken out for reasons
some may disfavor. Thus, I argue in Part V that strategies to bring lowincome persons into the financial services mainstream need to include
initiatives designed to increase savings for short-term financial stability
and to improve access to less expensive forms of credit where
appropriate—for example, with overdraft protection, account-secured
loans, credit cards or loans with automatic withdrawals from pay directly
deposited into accounts, but with significantly longer terms than payday
loans.
Fourth, low-income families who cash their paycheck may face high
risk of robbery or theft.66 By transitioning into bank accounts where they
can store a portion of their earnings, withdraw funds in smaller amounts,
63
Id. See also Giving Consumers Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 12, 12-14
(2001) (statement of Delores S. Smith, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs,
Federal Reserve Board) (noting that 28% of families in lowest income quintile have credit cards);
Kennickell et al., supra note 1. Low-income holders of credit cards may also be at the maximum limit
for those cards.
64
See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 3. This APR is the equivalent of a $36 fee for a
two-week, $200 loan. Indiana’s Department of Financial Institutions found that consumers took an
average of thirteen loans per year, ten of which were rollovers of earlier loans, IND. DEP’T OF FIN.
INSTS., SUMMARY OF PAYDAY LENDER EXAMINATION (1999), available at http://www.in.gov/dfi/
legal/paydaylend/Payday.pdf, and an Illinois Department of Financial Institutions survey found an
average of 12.6 loan contracts over an eighteen to twenty-four month period, WOODSTOCK INST.,
Unregulated Payday Lending Pulls Vulnerable Consumers into Spiraling Debt, REINVESTMENT ALERT
No. 14, at 3 & n.6 (2000). Payday lending and alternative forms of credit are discussed in more detail
infra Sections II.B-D.
65
Rhine et al., supra note 60, at 18 & tbl.12 .
66
See, e.g., Rick Badie, Hispanics Frequently Targeted for Robbery; Fear of Banks, Police
Raises Vulnerability, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 14, 1999, at 1JJ; Richard Craver, Safety and
Numbers: Hispanics Caught Between Risks of Carrying Cash and Banking It, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan.
22, 2003, at D1; Christian Davenport, Seeking a Secure Financial Foothold; Banking Barriers Leave
Area Immigrants Vulnerable to Crime, Economic Disparities, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at T12; Joe
Sexton, Report Shows Check Cashers Filling a Void, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at B1.
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pay for goods or services directly using debit, and withdraw funds outside
of the concentrated time periods during which benefit checks and
paychecks are commonly cashed, these families can decrease their
exposure to risk of crime.
Fifth, inefficiencies in the payments system impose costs on the
national economy. Increasing the efficiency in the payments system for the
poor could have modest positive effects on the economy as a whole. A
Federal Reserve Board study suggests that the U.S. economy would save
over $1 for each check that is converted to an electronic payment.67 The
study estimates savings of $30 billion per year if one-half of current check
volume is converted to electronic payment.68 Check processing costs
between 0.25% and 1% of U.S. GDP, in addition to losses from fraud.69
While low-income check volume is only a small fraction of the total,
electronic payments for the poor could help, and, because of positive
network externalities, funds spent converting the poor to electronic
payment might speed conversion to electronic payments more generally.
Helping low-income households to leapfrog over checking to electronic
payments, just as some poor countries have been able to leapfrog over
conventional telephone lines to cell or satellite phones, may thus have
broader societal benefits. These effects, though positive, are of course
likely to be quite small in relation to the overall economy.
II.

The Alternative Financial Sector

The previous Section summarized the costs of being unbanked. This
Part explores in depth the growing number of AFS providers, offering a
wide range of services, including short-term loans, check cashing, bill
payment, tax preparation and rent-to-own consumer goods, in low-income
urban neighborhoods.70 These AFS providers, and others like them, are
currently the only means available for many low-income persons to access
67
See Deborah Matthews, Financial Institutions Partnering with Corporations: Innovative
Strategies for Promoting Direct Deposit, in NACHA, EBT IN THE STATES: SURVEY RESULTS, 2002
ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND BUYER’S GUIDE 46 (2002).
68
Id.
69
Governor Laurence H. Meyer, The Future of Money and of Monetary Policy, Remarks at
Swarthmore College (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2001/20011205/default.htm.
70
See Swagler et al., supra note 4. I focus on check cashers, payday lenders, auto title
lenders, and refund anticipation lenders. AFS also include pawnbrokers. See generally CASKEY,
FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6. This Part is largely focused on urban areas. Rural areas have different
characteristics. See, e.g., CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6; Michael A. Stegman, Banking the
Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities for North Carolina’s Financial Institutions, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 23 (2001). Most Native American reservations are essentially devoid of insured
depositories. See U.S. TREASURY & HUD, ONE-STOP MORTGAGE CENTER INITIATIVE IN INDIAN
COUNTRY:
A
REPORT
TO
THE
PRESIDENT
(2000),
available
at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pubasst/onestop.html.
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basic financial services. Understanding the costs and benefits of such
services is critical to assessing the need, if any, for alternatives.
A. Check Cashers
1.

Industry Overview

For many years, check cashers have been used by low-income
individuals who seek to conduct basic financial transactions such as
cashing checks, paying bills and wiring funds. John Caskey referred to
these customers as employing the “cash and carry” method of financial
management. Upon receiving a paycheck, they cash the check and pay
their bills immediately. While check cashers offer essential services, the
fees involved in converting paper checks into cash are high, relative to an
alternative world in which low-income households would be able to rely
more on direct deposit into bank accounts.
The check-cashing industry grew dramatically during the 1980s and
1990s. Today, there are almost 10,000 stores in the U.S. that classify their
primary line of business as check cashing, about double the number there
were six years ago, and almost five times the number there were fifteen
years ago.71 The industry reports that it processes 180 million checks
totaling $55 billion annually, generating $1.5 billion in fees.72 Most of
these checks are low-risk payroll or government benefit checks: 80% of
checks cashed at surveyed check cashers in the 2000 Treasury study were
payroll checks, while 16% were government benefit checks.73 While even
payroll checks are not without some credit and fraud risk, average losses
from “bad” checks at check cashing firms are low. For example, Ace Cash
Express (ACE) reports that 0.5% of the face value of checks bounce, but
net losses after collection are 0.2%.74 By comparison, 0.64% of the face
value of interbank checks were returned in 2000.75
Like the banking industry, the check cashing industry has undergone
consolidation in recent years. Larger players are benefiting from greater
71
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14. This figure excludes the many thousands of
convenience stores, liquor stores and grocery stores that offer check cashing services, for a fee or with
purchases, to their customers. While these alternative providers are important financial service points
for much of the low-income population, this Section focuses largely on the growing industry
represented by “full-time” check cashers that offer a broader variety of financial services.
72
See Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am. (FiSCA), About FISCA, at http://www.fisca.org/about.htm
(last visited Dec. 8, 2003).
73
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
74
See ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 19 [hereinafter ACE ANNUAL
REPORT].
75
There were 42.5 billion check payments in 2000 for a total of $39.3 trillion; 0.85% were
returned for insufficient funds (some checks were returned more than once). The average value of a
returned check was $700. Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks and Other NonCash Payment Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 360, 364-65 (2002).
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economies of scale, shared technology platforms, and their ability to
negotiate alliances with service providers (lenders, money transfer
services, and ATM networks, among others).76 ACE, the largest check
cashing chain in the country, grew from 452 outlets in 1995 to 1,163
outlets in 2001, largely through acquiring independent stores and smaller
chains. While check cashing remains a fragmented market overall, with
80% of the market divided among independent operators and small
regional chains, national chains such as ACE capture a disproportionate
share of check cashing revenues with their strategic and numerous
locations, broader product lines, higher volumes, and generally higher
prices for check cashing.77
The industry’s growth has been accompanied by growing
diversification of the products and services offered. Nearly all respondents
to the 2000 survey provided a core of services: check cashing, money
orders, and wire transfer.78 Many also provided an array of other products
including lottery tickets, postage stamps, prepaid telephone cards, payday
loans, bill payment, municipal services (such as the paying of parking
tickets), and distribution of state benefits. These ancillary services increase
revenue per customer while also broadening the industry’s customer base
beyond the unbanked population. For instance, Dollar Financial claims
that 50% of its customers have bank accounts.79 The most notable
development in recent years has been the rapid growth in check cashers
offering payday loan products.80 For ACE and Dollar Financial, revenues
derived from loan products increased from an average of 4% of total
revenue in fiscal year 1997 to an average of 29% of total revenue in 2001.
Nearly 45 to 50% of revenue growth at these two firms over that period
was attributable to the expansion in payday loan originations.81
Check cashers typically have high transaction volumes and high profit
margins, but often on a relatively small revenue base. The average chain
outlet in 2000 processed over 8,000 transactions per month, for estimated
76
For instance, Ace Cash Express has an exclusive agreement with MoneyGram, and
Dollar Financial with Western Union, for transmission and receipt of wire transfers. Information on
Dollar Financial and Ace Cash Express in this Subsection is drawn from the companies’ annual
reports. See ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5; DOLLAR FIN. GROUP, INC., 2001 ANNUAL
REPORT 10 [hereinafter DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT].
77
See DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 15 (noting that chains control only 20%
of the market); see also DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 64-65 (revealing that, compared to
independently owned outlets, surveyed chains charged on average of 25% more for check cashing and
generated two-and-half times the check-cashing volume). For money orders, surveyed chains charged
20% less than independently owned outlets, and generated over three times the revenue, id. at 37
fig.6.9, 40 tbl.6.8.
78
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
79
DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 6-7.
80
For more on the payday lending industry generally, see infra Section II.B.
81
Author’s calculations based on DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 22, and ACE
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5.
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annual revenue of $242,500. The estimated pre-tax return on sales for
these chain outlets was 28.5%. On average, revenues and returns for
independent check cashers were far lower.82
2.

Customers

Check-cashing industry clientele are drawn, for the most part, from
lower-income urban households. ACE describes its core customer group as
having annual family incomes of approximately $30,000, and Dollar
indicates that its check-cashing customers’ median household income is
$22,500. In most cities, check cashers locate in neighborhoods with belowmedian incomes and above-average minority population shares.83 Dollar
describes its store base as a “mix of urban sites, which are located in hightraffic shopping areas, and suburban sites, which are located in strip malls
near multi-family housing complexes.”84
Check cashers do not provide financial services to only unbanked
consumers, nor do all unbanked consumers obtain their financial services
primarily through check cashers. The story is much more complex, and
local context seems to matter greatly. In lower-income neighborhoods of
New York and Los Angeles, for instance, 71% of unbanked individuals
who cashed checks primarily used check-cashing outlets, as did 28% of
banked individuals.85 In Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and eastern
Pennsylvania, only 17% of unbanked individuals cashed checks at a check
casher; almost half used a bank.86 In Chicago, about two-thirds of all
households who accessed some form of financial services at check cashers
were found to have bank accounts, but, as one would expect, unbanked
households are much more likely to use check cashers than are banked
households.87 Banco Popular reports that 38% of the customers at Popular
Cash Express own a checking account, and 33% own a savings account.88
82
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
83
DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, 19; see also Check Cashers: Moving From the
Fringes to the Financial Mainstream, COMMUNITIES & BANKING, Summer 1999, at 2, available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/pdf/summer99.pdf.
84
DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 4.
85
Dunham, supra note 19, at 36-37.
86
JOHN CASKEY, FILENE RESEARCH INST., LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST
FINANCIAL SERVICES 22 (1997) [hereinafter CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT]. This finding that
half of the unbanked cash their checks at a bank is echoed in a survey of current and former North
Carolina welfare recipients. See STEGMAN & FARIS, supra note 33.
87
Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 68. Unbanked households are 14.6 percentage points more
likely than banked ones to use check cashers. Unbanked households in LMI areas are 7.6 percentage
points more likely to use check cashers than unbanked elsewhere. Unbanked black households are 17.8
percentage points more likely than unbanked white households to use check cashers. Unbanked
Hispanic households are 7.5 percentage points more likely than unbanked white households to use
check cashers. Id.
88
Banco Popular, Presentation to the Financial Access Planning Group, San Juan, Puerto
Rico (Jan. 11, 2002) (notes on file with author).
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Not all of the unbanked use or pay for these services or pay high fees.
While there is great regional variation and much further study is needed, a
large portion of the unbanked manage to avoid paying high costs for at
least some of their financial services. For example, in one study, Caskey
found that only 20%-40% of unbanked survey respondents paid fees to
cash checks.89 In another study, in New York and Los Angeles, more than
half of the unbanked reported incurring no cost to cash checks, either
because they receive their income in cash or have no income (33%) or
cash their checks for free at banks and grocery stores (16%).90 The
unbanked mostly use check cashers to cash checks. When low-income
households use banks to cash checks, they usually use the bank of issue,
rather than their own or some other bank.91 Most likely, these represent
efforts by workers to cash payroll or personal checks “on-us” at the
employer’s bank. For the portion of such checks that are payroll checks,
rather than personal checks, direct deposit could become an alternative to
check-cashing, or to the costly use of bank teller and processing time (for
which some banks are beginning to charge non-customers).
Check cashers appear to capture both some portion of the unbanked
population and some portion of the banked population as customers. Why
might individuals with bank accounts be drawn to check cashing outlets?
Some may be living from paycheck to paycheck, do not have direct
deposit offered by their employer(s), and find that they lack sufficient
liquidity to wait the two-to-three days for their bank to clear access to
funds from a deposited check. Others might regularly wire money to
relatives abroad, which, until recent adoption of dual ATM-technology at
some banks, was generally less expensive at check cashers than at banks.92
Still others may not be able to afford the fees or minimum balances
associated with checking accounts and thus might own only a savings
account without any capacity for transactional services. Some may need to
make bill payments by purchasing money orders at a check casher, either
because they live in a neighborhood where personal checks are generally
not accepted, or because they do not have a checking account. A portion
may favor the more convenient hours, locations, culture, or languages
spoken at check cashers, and not be willing to use ATMs.
One attribute that may distinguish some users of check cashers, both
banked and unbanked, from other low-income workers who use banks,
may be the nature of their work arrangements. Dollar Financial states that
“many of its customers are workers or independent contractors who
receive payment on an irregular basis and generally in the form of a
89
90
91
92

See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 83.
Dunham, supra note 19, at 53 fig.6.
Id. at 36-37.
See infra Subsection III.B.4.
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check.”93 Although little independent analysis exists to corroborate
Dollar’s assertion, it makes sense on its face.94 These workers do not have
the benefit of a steady relationship with an employer that would tend to
support a direct-deposit relationship with a bank, nor do they generally
have the employment references that are often required to open a bank
account. In addition, many undocumented immigrants work within this
informal economy and, in many cases, their undocumented status makes it
less likely that banks will open bank accounts for them.95 A Treasury study
found a significant correlation between outlet location and the percentage
of working adults in the neighborhood who annually worked less than fifty
weeks total, although the report also found such a connection between
outlet locations and low neighborhood income; the two variables are likely
correlated rather than independent.96 Given that 80% of checks cashed at
check cashers are payroll checks, and another sixteen percentage points are
government checks, it should be possible to convert a large portion of
these checks to direct deposit if low-income workers had access to bank
accounts. Even for part-time workers, large employers or temporary
employment firms can convert income checks to direct deposits.
3.

Costs

As with most businesses in the retail sector, regional variations
abound in the prices that consumers pay for services offered through check
cashers.97 The Dove survey revealed that, across the four markets studied
(Atlanta, Boston, San Antonio, and San Diego), check cashing prices were
sensitive to differences in cost-of-living and level of competition. In San
Antonio, where wages were lower and AFS competition greater, fees to
cash payroll and government checks averaged about 1.5% of the check
face value. In Boston, where higher costs of living prevailed and one chain
dominated the AFS market, average fees were 2.5% of the check value.
Atlanta and San Diego fell somewhere in between these figures. Fees to
cash personal checks were much higher, but most outlets refuse to cash
such checks given their greater risk. Across the four markets, chain outlets
charged a higher percentage fee on average than did independent
93
DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.
94
There is, however, a great deal of evidence that users of check cashers are much more
likely to be unemployed than those who use banks. See John Caskey, The Future of Commercial
Check-Cashing (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
95
For progress in this regard, however, see infra text accompanying notes 298-301
(discussing matricular identification and growth of competition for delivery of remittances).
96
See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49, 54, 57, 60.
97
Available sources focus on large chains of stand-alone check cashers and do not reveal a
great deal about the variability in pricing for check casher products, nor do they reflect the differential
effects of state regulation on check casher prices. However, they are sufficient to give a sense of what
some consumers pay to access basic financial services in the AFS.
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operators.98 ACE’s fees for cashing payroll checks average 2.2% of the
face amount of the check, and Dollar’s fees average 3.3%.99
Chain check cashers processed an average of 3,400 money orders per
month. Fees for money orders were only fifty to sixty cents, and were
lower at chains due primarily to the favorable contracts they are able to
negotiate with money order suppliers.100 Money order fees at check
cashers are lower than those charged by most banks, whose customers
mostly do not use them. In addition, the U.S. Postal Service, for purposes
of comparison, charges ninety cents for a domestic money order under
$500, and $1.25 for money orders of $500 to $1,000.101
Overall costs for using check cashers vary dramatically by patterns of
usage. With respect to bill payment services, only 36% of the unbanked
surveyed in New York and Los Angeles overall incur money order or bill
payment fees from check cashers.102 Many of the unbanked in that survey
received cash income, had no income, or were able to cash their income
checks at banks or stores, often at little or no fee.103 Of those paying check
cashing fees at check cashers, two-thirds incurred costs of less than $100
annually. The one-third of those surveyed who incurred more than $100
annually comprise only 11% of the total unbanked participants in the
survey. Thus, the study suggests that, at least in New York and Los
Angeles, the highest cost of using alternative financial service providers
may be relatively concentrated among a portion of the unbanked.104
To get a sense of the costs to a consumer who conducts most of his
financial business through a check-cashing outlet, however, consider a
customer that Dollar might describe as among its typical clients—a young,
immigrant day laborer with intermittent income and a family at home in
Mexico. He perhaps earned about $18,000 last year, but some of it was in
cash, and some of it was paid in checks that he could cash for no fee at a
local issuing bank. Altogether, he used a check casher to cash $12,000 in
checks, at an average fee of 2% of the check face value—$240 total. Once
a month, he wires $500 home to his family, at an average fee of $20, or
98
See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34, 48-61, 64.
99
See ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 4; DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
76, at 8. ACE’s average fee has remained flat, while Dollar’s has grown over the last five years. ACE
paradoxically imposes surcharges to cash tax refund checks, ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at
5, which are often large and low-risk; ACE’s ability to surcharge for cashing these checks may be
derived from its relationship with major tax preparation services. See infra Section II.D.
100 The Dove finding is corroborated by data from ACE, which indicates an average fee of
57 cents per money order in 2001. DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 fig.1.3, 33 tbl.6.5, 38 tbl.6.6;
ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 24-25. Dollar’s average fee was higher, at 93 cents. DOLLAR
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 10.
101 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 816.0 (2002). Because postal money
orders are replaced if lost or stolen, they may also be used by the unbanked simply as a store of value.
102 See Dunham, supra note 19, at 55 fig.9.
103 Id. at 35-36, 43-44, 53 fig.6, 56 fig.11.
104 See id. at 14.
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$240 annually. His share of the rent is paid in cash, but he purchases three
money orders a month to pay the apartment’s electric bill, his cellular
phone bill, and his car insurance. At fifty-five cents each, he pays $20 for
money orders annually. All together, these fees would add up to $500
annually for this low-income consumer, nearly 3% of his annual income.
4.

Regulation

The regulatory structure governing check cashing may have some
influence on fees. A number of states cap fees that may be charged by
check cashers. However, check cashers also partner with national banks,
which are permitted to set non-interest charges according to “sound
banking judgment”; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
takes the position that state laws limiting or prohibiting such charges are
pre-empted.105 Other state laws governing check cashers may have an
effect on fees. For example, to the extent that they are enforced, state rules
limiting the number of check cashers that can operate in a given area may
decrease AFS competition and increase check cashing fees.106
5.

Reforms

Given the high cost structure of a paper- and labor-intensive industry,
it is doubtful that costs of check cashing can be brought down significantly
with existing technology.107 Reduced state regulatory barriers to entry may
help enhance competition if they are accompanied by consistent disclosure
requirements and enforcement that would make it easier for consumers to
shop for financial services. Some have suggested that banks themselves,
with cheaper (direct) access to the payments system, might effectively
compete for check-cashing services.108 This Article argues that it would be
cheaper, and the services provided more useful, if banks were to compete
105 The OCC’s position on non-interest charges is functionally similar to a national bank’s
authority to “export” the interest rate permissible for the national bank to charge in its home location to
the state where it is making the loan. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2003); see also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)
(defining permissible rates of interest as determined by state where bank is “located”); Marquette Nat’l
Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (finding that national bank may “export”
usury law of state in which bank is headquartered to customers in another state). Exportation is also
available to state-chartered banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (2003). Interest rate exportation is discussed in
further detail below, infra Sections II.B (discussing payday lending) and II.C (discussing title loans).
106 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:15A-41.e (West 2003) (determining check casher may not
be licensed to operate within 2,500 feet of another check casher); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 369 (Consol.
2001) (determining check casher may not be licensed to operate within three-tenths of a mile of
another check casher).
107 See infra Section IV.B (discussing technological developments). Many of the
technological developments thus far employed by payday lenders and check cashers do not seem to
have brought down prices for consumers.
108 See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20.
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with check cashers by offering electronically based banking services,
instead of competing with them as check cashers. Advances in direct
deposit, debit card infrastructure, and electronic bill payment will also be
required to bring down the costs of income conversion.
B.

Payday Lending

Payday lenders provide short-term consumer loans to low- and
moderate-income working people who have bank accounts. In the
traditional “payday loan” transaction, the borrower writes a postdated (or
undated) personal check to a lender. In return, the lender advances the
borrower a cash amount equivalent to the face value of the check minus a
finance charge. The lender holds the check before either depositing it or,
more commonly, receiving cash repayment directly from the borrower,
usually on the borrower’s payday. In an updated form of the traditional
transaction, no check is written; instead, the borrower signs an
authorization that permits the lender to debit his bank account on a future
date for the amount of the loan plus the finance charge. Loan terms are
typically two weeks. Payday lending has become controversial because of
concerns that the loans are expensive; that the structure of the product—a
short term loan with a balloon payment and high fees—leads to defaults or
borrowers falling into a “debt trap” as they repeatedly “roll over” the loan;
and that payday lenders use misleading disclosures and aggressive
collection.
1.

Industry Overview

Commercial check-cashing outlets have been in the United States
since the 1930s. Payday lenders, on the other hand, did not operate as a
formal industry until the early 1990s, although the short-term lending
function has long been filled by pawnshops, auto title lenders, retail
installment credit, and loan sharks, to name a few.109 As Caskey notes,
most payday lenders prior to the 1990s were check cashers that made
payday loans as a casual extension of their core business; he estimates that
there were probably fewer than 200 at the time.110 By 2000, there were
more than 10,000 payday lenders doing business in the U.S., with $2

109 As an illustration of payday lenders’ recent emergence as a formal sector, the Nexis news
search service finds no occurrences of the word “payday loan” prior to a few articles in 1994 in some
newspapers in the southern U.S. (although as noted in the text, other forms of short-term lending were
certainly available). By contrast, the word “check casher” turns up in New York Times articles dating
back to the late 1960s—as far back as the database goes.
110 JOHN CASKEY, FILENE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 4
(2002) [hereinafter CASKEY, PAYDAY LENDING].
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billion in revenue.111 Major pawn chains recently have entered the payday
lending business.112
Payday lenders annually make about sixty-five million loans to
between eight and ten million households, totaling more than $10 billion in
loan value in recent years.113 The industry reports gross margins of 30%45% of revenue, with losses at 1%-1.3% of receivables and return on
investment of 24%.114 As in the check-cashing industry, consolidation has
created a few large payday lender chains with an important presence
across markets, although the industry overall remains rather fragmented.
The three largest “monoline” chains have 2,600 outlets combined.115 While
the payday loan industry nationwide grew significantly in the 1990s, its
growth was uneven, with widely varying penetration rates in different
states. Florida and Illinois, for instance, are each home to about 500
outlets, while the smaller states of North Carolina and Missouri have 900
and 800 outlets, respectively.116 The State of California, home to about one
in eight persons in the U.S., is home to about one in five of the nation’s
payday lenders. As Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., has
noted, “California alone has more payday loan offices—nearly 2,000—
than it does McDonalds and Burger Kings . . . .”117 This patchwork of
growth and concentration may be related to divergent and changing state
regulations governing payday lending.118
Payday loan prices in a number of states would have routinely
exceeded the statutory limits on permissible interest rates codified in state
usury laws. In the 1990s, however, the industry focused on carving out
exceptions from these laws for their loans.119 Moreover, payday lending
has occurred at rates above state usury ceilings through arrangements
111 Jerry L. Robinson & G.L. Lewis, Stephens, Inc., The Developing Payday Advance
Business (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
112 See CASH AM. INT’L, INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter CASH
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT] (anticipating 2002 payday loan volume of $100 million, representing 2025% of Cash America’s loan volume). Two other major pawnbroking chains, EZCorp and First Cash
Financial, also now derive significant revenue from payday lending. See EZCORP, INC., 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT 35 (2002) (reporting payday lending at 4% of total revenue); FIRST CASH FIN. SERV., INC.,
2002 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2002) (reporting significant growth in payday lending).
113 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 4-5; Robinson & Lewis, supra note 111, at 9;
Deferred
Deposit/Pay
Day
Advance
Fact
Sheet,
available
at
FiSCA,
http://www.fisca.org/defdepfacts.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2003).
114 See Robinson & Lewis, supra note 111, at 10.
115 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 4.
116 Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That
Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 9, 11 (2003).
117 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the ABA National
Community and Economic Development Conference (Mar. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-24a.txt.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (discussing state check cashing laws) and
infra notes 163-87 (discussing state payday lending laws).
119 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.

150

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

30

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
between out-of-state banks, thrifts, and payday loan originators. Generally
speaking, under the National Bank Act, the payday lender may arrange a
loan between the bank and the borrower at terms that are subject to the
interest rate ceiling (if any) in the home state of the bank, not to interest
rate ceilings of the state in which the payday lender is located.120 Under
many of these arrangements, however, once the loan is booked, the payday
lender immediately purchases the entire loan from the bank, with the bank
retaining little or no risk. In effect, the lender has “rented” the bank’s name
for purposes of making a legal loan.121 State-level efforts to restrict payday
lending had been stymied by partnerships between national and statechartered banks and thrifts, and payday lenders, many of which have now
been shut down by banking regulators.122
The advent of bank-nonbank partnerships in payday loan origination
has led to increased technological sophistication to compete with payday
lenders that approve loans “on the spot.” When a potential borrower
completed a loan application at an ACE location, ACE transmitted the
borrower’s data electronically to its former partner Goleta National
Bank.123 If Goleta approved the loan, it opened a bank account in the name
of the borrower, and activated a debit card and PIN connected to that
account. ACE delivered the card and PIN to the borrower, who could
withdraw the funds at the store or at another retail ATM. The annual report
states that this process, from start to finish, took only twenty minutes.
The drive towards consolidation in the payday lending industry might
be expected to improve industry standards. Smaller independent
businesses may be more likely to write out loan forms manually, which
may increase the likelihood of error and violation of truth-in-lending laws.
Smaller firms also may not have access to the TeleTrack service, a tool
that many lenders use to reduce their risk by determining whether the
applicant has other outstanding payday loans or credit problems.124 In
theory, partnerships with insured depositories could have improved
standards, but evidence to date suggests the opposite. For example, a
120 See supra note 105.
121 In January 2002, the OCC directed Eagle National Bank, partner with Dollar Financial
Group in such an arrangement, to cease its payday lending operations. News Release, OCC, OCC
Orders Eagle To Cease Payday Lending Program, NR 2002-01 (Jan. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-01.doc. Comptroller John D. Hawke, Jr. said: “The bank
essentially rented out its national bank charter to a payday lender in order to facilitate the nonbank
entity’s evasion of the requirements of state law that would otherwise be applicable to it.” Id. For a
similar arrangement under which the payday lender assumes most of the loan risk, see CASH AMERICA
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 27 (“The Bank assigns each advance that remains unpaid after its
maturity date to the Company at a discount from the amount owed by the borrower.”). The OCC has
essentially shut down payday-national bank partnerships. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
122 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 18-20.
123 ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 5.
124 TeleTrack is a credit-reporting agency specializing in subprime credit transactions. See
CASKEY, FILENE REPORT, supra note 86, at 6.
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central basis for the OCC’s termination of one bank’s payday lending
partnership was that the bank was rolling over payday loans multiple times
without any assessment of the borrower’s ability to repay.125
What explains the incredible boom in payday lending in the 1990s? A
combination of factors was at work, probably not dissimilar from the
factors that Caskey found were responsible for the rise in check cashing in
the 1980s and early 1990s.126 Deregulation in the banking industry
increased competition and decreased the availability of less-profitable
products, such as short-term, small loans.127 Retailers have largely
replaced sales installment contracts with sales by credit cards, limiting
financing options for those without credit cards.128 Finance companies,
while once essential providers of small loans, over the last decade have
focused on home equity financing,129 which can be an important source of
liquidity for consumer purchases or debt consolidation, but only for those
who are home owners and have equity in their homes. A number of studies
in the 1980s and early 1990s found that nearly 20% of U.S. households
were credit-constrained.130 Moreover, a growing number of individuals
have little to no liquid savings. In a financial emergency, they have no
“backup” funds to meet their immediate needs, and may see a payday loan
as the only viable solution.131 Moreover, the number of borrowers with
adverse credit histories is on the rise.132 Some payday borrowers may be
bad risks. Despite the rapid growth of credit card availability, even among
low-income families, many of these credit-impaired borrowers are not able
to take advantage of credit alternatives such as credit card advances or
overdraft lines on their checking accounts. For some credit-impaired
individuals, establishing a history of managing a bank account, coupled
with financial education may permit them over time to gain access to
credit. For others, such access is unlikely ever to occur.
On the supply side, payday lending is a highly profitable enterprise,

125

See In re First National Bank in Brookings, OCC Consent Order No. 2003-1 (Jan. 17,

2003).
126 See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6, at 7.
127 See FIN. SERV. CTRS. OF AM. (FiSCA), FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS: THE
TRUTH ABOUT DEFERRED DEPOSIT SERVICES (1999), at http://www.fisca.org/ddresponse.htm (last
visited Dec. 8, 2003) [hereinafter FISCA REPORT] (noting that less than 0.1% of California bank loans
in 1996 were for less than $1,000).
128 See White, supra note 5, at 449.
129 CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6, at 108.
130 See, e.g., Tullio Jappelli, Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?, 105 Q.J.
ECON. 219 (1990).
131 See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR.,
GEORGETOWN UNIV., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND
54-55 (2001) [hereinafter CFSA STUDY].
132 See Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 26 (noting rising percentage of families with
payments late by more than sixty days).

152

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

32

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
with a return on sales of 30%.133 Check cashers may see payday loans not
only as a profitable product, but also as a way to diversify their customer
base, especially in light of a long-term relative decline in the market for
checks (as compared to electronic payments).134
2.

Customers

The first thing that distinguishes payday loan customers from many
check casher customers is that the former must, by definition, have bank
accounts. Lenders are generally unwilling to advance funds to individuals
who cannot provide them with proof of account ownership. While payday
loan consumers are not unbanked, they could well be referred to as
“underbanked”: They may lack the savings, credit history, or financial
know-how to avoid purchasing a high-cost credit instrument.
Customers that use payday lenders tend to be low- or moderateincome, younger than the average age of the population, and otherwise
credit constrained. One study found that half the customers surveyed had
household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000.135 Average annual
income for customers in studies done by several states was consistently
lower, around $25,000 in each case.136 Most customers were below the age
of forty-five.137 While younger than the U.S. population as a whole,
customers were well into their working life.
With respect to ownership of assets and access to alternative forms of
credit, the CFSA study reported that 42% of respondents indicated that
they owned their home,138 consistent with the Illinois finding. In
Wisconsin, 26% of respondents were homeowners. Some payday
borrowers could tap into their home equity for emergency credit, but bad
credit records may preclude that option for others, and the sub-prime home
equity loans held by some of these homeowners have their own high costs

133 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 10.
134 See generally FED. RESERVE SYS., RETAIL PAYMENTS RESEARCH PROJECT: A SNAPSHOT
OF THE U.S. PAYMENTS LANDSCAPE (2002) [hereinafter RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY] (noting the
relative decline of checks as compared to electronic payments, despite continued growth in the
absolute number of checks cleared).
135 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 28. Results from the survey should be treated with
caution. From a random sample of 5,430 payday loan customers, the study surveyed only 427
individuals—not a representative sample. The study was sponsored by the Community Financial
Services Association of America (CFSA), the industry trade association for payday lenders. The
survey was conducted during the Christmas shopping season.
136 See CASKEY, PAYDAY LENDING, supra note 110, at 10-12. Caskey notes that because the
CFSA study interviewed only customers of monoline payday stores, it may have captured a higherincome population than if payday borrowers from check cashing outlets had been included. Id. at 11
n.24.
137 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 29.
138 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 42.
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and risks.139 In the Illinois study, only 11% of customers had a bank-issued
revolving credit card,140 much lower than overall rates reported for the
general population even at the lowest income levels.141 In one study, 56%
of payday customers had credit cards, but payday borrowers were three
times as likely to have debt payment-to-income ratios of 30% or higher,
and four times as likely to have declared bankruptcy, as compared to the
adult population at large.142
Another study, controlling for socioeconomic variables, indicated that
African-American families, families who had bounced one or more checks
in the past five years, and families in neighborhoods where new check
cashers and payday lenders had opened were significantly more likely to
borrow from a payday lender.143 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that
the decision to use payday loans may be influenced more by past credit
problems than by income.144
In summary, payday loans are not products for the poorest of the
poor. But they seem to be an increasingly popular credit tool among a
growing moderate-income working population that has credit problems,
often has little savings, and may view payday loans as a convenient, or
perhaps only, option for accessing cash in a financial crunch.
3.

Costs

Payday loans carry high implicit annual interest rates. A 2001 survey
of payday lenders revealed that nearly all charged APRs in excess of
300%. The most common APR quoted by lenders was 390%—the
equivalent of a $15 fee on a two-week $100 loan.145 Nearly a third,
however, quoted fees that amounted to APRs of at least 500%; the average
APR was 470%. At an average loan size of about $300, the average fee for

139 See BARR, supra note 1 (addressing the problem of sub prime home equity lending).
140 ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING FINAL REPORT 22 (1999), available at
http://www.state.il.us/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Shorterm.pdf (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter ILLINOIS
REPORT].
141 Those holding credit cards constitute 28% of the lowest income quintile, 58% of the next
income quintile, and 68% of the adult U.S. population. Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and
Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 623, 626 (2000). Credit card holding among lowincome families has been increasing, with the advent of risk-passed credit card pricing, at the same
time as payday lending. Bank-type credit card holding increased from 2% in 1970 to 17% in 1989 and
28% in 1995, where it remained in 1998; but the share of outstanding balances of those in the lowest
income quintile increased only slightly, from 2% in 1970 to 5% in 1998. In the second lowest income
quintile, bank-type credit card ownership increased from 9% in 1970 to 36% in 1989, 54% in 1995,
and 58% in 1998; the share of outstanding balances increased from 9% to 13% over the period. Id.
142 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 44-46.
143 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 18 tbl.5.
144 Peter T. Kilborn, New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on Workers with Debts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A1.
145 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 3.
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the average loan is about $54.146
These APRs are, of course, high compared to more traditional credit
options like credit cards.147 This is due, in part, to the higher transaction
costs associated with underwriting and servicing payday loans compared
to other forms of credit. Payday loans, unlike credit cards, require lenders
to interact face-to-face with borrowers each time they originate a new
payday loan. They need to conduct more follow up with borrowers than
other lenders, and must charge enough to cover loan losses.148
Notwithstanding these differences, high store profitability indicates that
prices may be higher than one would expect in more efficient segments of
the financial services market. Further research is warranted on possible
barriers to further price reductions, including the possibility that variations
in state laws raise the costs to national chains seeking to pursue payday
lending on a national basis; the possibility that disclosures are not
adequately policed so that consumers are not fully informed of prices; and
the possibility that these price structures are inherent in the labor-intensive
nature of the transaction.
Payday lenders argue that their prices are comparable to one possible
alternative for a cash-strapped consumer—bouncing a check.149 Bounced
check fees, according to a Federal Reserve study, averaged $20.73 at
banks in 2001,150 so depending on the face value of the bounced check, a
payday loan could be a more or less expensive short-term option.
Moreover, bouncing a check is not the only response other than a payday
loan to the problem of credit constraints.151 Payday lenders also argue that
an annualized percentage rate is not a fair tool for assessing the price of
short-term credit.152 APRs are widely used for other short-term credit,
146 In its annual report, Ace Cash Express notes that its average loan amount in fiscal year
2001 was $269. ACE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 4.
147 Rhine reports that 68% of payday loan customers in Chicago had credit cards. Rhine et
al., supra note 60, at 17. Credit card interest rates averaged between 13-16% during 1997-2002. BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 7 (2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
rptcongress/creditcard/2002/ccprofit.pdf.
148 The high APRs and balloon payments that payday lenders charge and their loan losses are
mutually reinforcing. That is, costly credit induces loan losses. Loan losses increase the cost of credit.
See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
149 The consequence of not being able to pay when a payday loan comes due—unless a
rollover occurs—is either bounced check fees paid to one’s bank (and the payday lender) or other
forms of collection that are even more costly to borrowers.
150 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/2002fees.pdf [hereinafter RETAIL FEES STUDY].
151 See infra Subsection II.B.5.
152 See FISCA REPORT, supra note 127.
Computing charges on an annual basis simply does not make sense in evaluating
the real cost of a short term product whose anticipated usage will seldom exceed
14 to 30 days at the most. . . . [T]here is a theoretical APR for a deferred deposit
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however, such as the monthly balance on bank-type revolving credit cards,
even though nearly 60% of card holders pay off their balances at the end of
each month.153
Many borrowers, moreover, take out payday loans repeatedly
throughout the year. The high incidence of loan renewals, or “rollovers,”
in the payday loan industry is one of its most salient features. Upon
maturity of the loan, many borrowers find themselves unable to repay the
loan principal in full. As a result, the lender allows them to pay the finance
charge on the loan, and to roll the remaining principal—plus a new finance
charge—over into a new loan. A “same-day advance” is a functional
equivalent of the rollover. The borrower pays the loan in full, but that
same day takes out another payday loan in an amount equivalent to the
balance paid earlier. Still other borrowers pay off the loan with proceeds
from another payday lender.
Evidence from multiple states points to the fact that significant
proportions of payday loan consumers roll their loans over on a frequent, if
not habitual, basis.154 A study of payday borrowers in Illinois found that
the median borrower had more than ten loan contracts over a two-year
period, and that one-fifth of borrowers had twenty or more contracts in that
time.155 In Wisconsin, 56% of payday borrowers took out at least eleven
loans in one twelve-month period.156 In Indiana, 77% of all payday
transactions were rollovers, and the average annual number of loan
renewals was ten.157 In North Carolina, the typical payday loan customer
took out seven loans in one year from one lender.158 The CFSA study
found that three-quarters of payday borrowers rolled over their loan at
least once, and that 30% had seven or more rollovers.159 Using the
service advance, but nobody enters into a transaction with the intent to pay or
receive anything like that amount.
153 Durkin, supra note 141, at 625 (noting that 58% pay balance in full); see also Thomas A.
Durkin, Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BULL.
201 (2002) (finding that consumers are generally aware of APR disclosures on credit cards and find
disclosures useful).
154 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 7. These statistics may understate the number
of rollovers, because the states capture information only on same-lender rollovers, not on customers
using multiple lenders. Id. at 8.
155 See WOODSTOCK INST., supra note 64.
156 WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN WISCONSIN (2001). This
study, among others, does not account for the fact that by only looking within a specified time period,
rather than at a specified group of borrowers over time, it discounts the experiences of first-time
borrowers who begin borrowing near the end of the period. To the extent that they have similar
borrowing patterns to those who borrowed throughout the period, the prevalence of rollovers may be
understated. See Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20.
157 Senate Forum on High-Interest Paycheck Loans, 106th Cong. (Dec. 15, 1999) (opening
statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).
158 Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 20-21. This statistic does not take into account the
frequent use of multiple lenders by one consumer either for simultaneous borrowings or for serial
borrowing—borrowing from firm B to pay firm A.
159 CFSA STUDY, supra note 131, at 39.
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Wisconsin statistic as an example, the typical payday loan consumer, who
takes out eleven two-week payday loans per year, for the average loan
amount of $300, at the average 470% APR from the Consumer Federation
of America (CFA) survey, spends nearly $600 annually in fees.
Frequent-use customers are the revenue drivers for payday loan
businesses. In North Carolina in 2000, 40% of all payday loan revenues
were generated by the 18% of customers who took out an average of at
least one loan per month.160 Each 1% increase in the share of customers
who borrow at least monthly from the company increased the outlet’s
bottom line by $790.161
The frequent use of payday loans should perhaps not come as a
surprise. On its face, the typical transaction appears to be the product of
underwriting that assumes that the borrower will not be able to repay the
loan within two weeks, but will have to rollover the loan. Most lenders
would be rightly skeptical that a moderate-income borrower who turns to a
payday lender for $300 would be able to afford an additional $50 out of
her next paycheck to cover the finance charge, beyond the $300 balloon
payment she must make to repay the principal, a mere two weeks hence. If
she is in fact able to repay the loan principal and the fee on time, the
amount she pays may be enough to send her back to a payday lender when
cash runs short before her next pay day.
Over time, one would expect a market with returns on sales exceeding
30% to attract new entrants who charge lower prices, or to convince
existing participants to lower prices to attract new customers. Currently,
competition takes place for location, convenience, and, perhaps, size of
loan. Price competition would lead to downward pressure on prices
marketwide, presumably making these loan products more affordable for
credit-constrained families. At the same time, however, the available
evidence indicates that frequent users of payday loans account for a
disproportionate share of industry revenues, and that stores in search of
greater profits would market repeated use to more of their clients. If
product prices were lowered by an appreciable amount, more customers
would be able to repay their loans, and the number using the products
frequently to repay prior loans would decrease. However, the number of
customers using payday loans for other uses would presumably rise with a
decline in loan costs. Consolidation in the payday loan industry suggests
that the large chains would increasingly use proprietary technology to
160 Stegman & Faris, supra note 116, at 21.
161 Promoting rollovers was also uncovered in the OCC’s action against Eagle National
Bank: “The OCC also found that Dollar actively promoted rollovers of the Bank’s payday loans—
without the Bank’s knowledge—by providing an incentive to Dollar’s employees, which resulted in a
higher volume of rollovers than new loan originations and a misuse of the loan product for long-term
credit.” Press Release, OCC, Fact Sheet: Eagle National Bank Consent Order (Jan. 3, 2002), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-01a.txt.
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deliver loans faster and reduce losses.
Even with greater competition among payday lenders, however, loan
prices might remain high, given that borrowers usually are not able to
develop positive credit histories. Payday lenders usually do not report
these histories to the credit bureaus. Positive credit histories could
otherwise be used to lower their cost of borrowing by seeking better rates
from competing lenders based on their solid credit history.162 Moreover,
lower prices alone would not address the basic problem created by these
short term loans—the debt trap most borrowers find themselves in as they
repeatedly rollover payday loans during the course of the year.
4.

Regulation.

The regulatory landscape for payday lenders is evolving, as states
react in divergent ways to the growth of payday lending, and as the OCC
and other federal bank and thrift regulators respond to partnerships
between AFS providers and insured depository institutions.
The evidence on the prevalence of rollovers has led many states to
adopt limits on the number of consecutive times a payday lender may
renew a loan, and has led the industry’s trade association to adopt a fourrollover limit in its “best practices.” But these efforts have been to little
effect. These rules leave open a big loophole: They do not bar lenders from
accepting cash or a check from a borrower to “pay off” the existing loan
and then immediately providing a “new” payday loan. Same-day advances
do not appear to be covered under state laws, and the industry “best
practices” are silent on the matter. Moreover, the rules do not prevent
another firm from providing a payday loan to pay off the first firm’s loans.
State-enacted rollover limits, perhaps as a consequence, do not appear to
affect the percentage of payday borrowers renewing loans or the average
number of loans taken out.163
State regulation of price has not fared any better. There has been a
great deal of state legislative action over the last few years regarding
payday lending, but no clear trend in state laws is emerging; some states
tightened restrictions while others loosened them to permit greater
flexibility for payday lenders.164 Seventeen states, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have small loan interest rate caps or other usury limits that
effectively prohibit payday loans;165 five states have no small loan or usury
162 See BANERJEE, supra note 43, at 15 (noting that competition for the provision of loans
reduces ex ante rents, but once loan performance information is captured and not shared, the borrower
cannot cheaply switch to a competitor, so ex post rents remain).
163 See CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 7.
164 Id. at 9.
165 Id. at 26-31 (summarizing all state laws relating to payday lending). Since the report,
three more states have enacted laws authorizing payday lending. Deferred Presentment Services Act,
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cap but require licensing of lenders;166 and twenty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have specific laws or regulations authorizing payday
lending.167
Of the twenty states and the District of Columbia in CFA’s survey,
six states have usury laws governing small loans; two states had no laws
governing payday lending; and twelve states (and the District of
Columbia) have implemented payday lending laws or regulations.168

Table 1. Average Payday Loan APRs by State Regulatory
Environment, 2001
Regulatory Environment

States Surveyed

Usury ceiling on small loans
prohibits payday lending
No usury ceiling, payday lending
permitted
“Safe harbor” permits payday
lending, caps fees

GA, MA, MD, NY, PA, VA

Avg.
APR
606%

NM, WI

504%

AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, IA, IL,
KY, NC, OH, OR, SC, TX
National average

443%
470%

Source: CFA/ PIRG, 2001

In the states surveyed in which usury ceilings were low enough to
effectively prohibit payday lending, rates on payday loans to residents of
that state were, paradoxically, the highest. Payday lenders in these states
were either violating state usury laws or had partnered with insured
depository institutions that “exported” the regime of the bank’s home state
to originate payday loans, effectively operating outside state usury laws
but with added costs incurred to form partnerships with out of state
lenders. In the states surveyed that had no usury ceilings for small loans—
and therefore effectively lacked any price regulation for payday loans—
payday lenders generally charged higher-than-average interest rates on
loans. In states in which safe harbor laws or regulations permitted payday
lending but capped fees, interest rates were somewhat below average. State
usury laws seem to have perverse effects on payday loan pricing and
2003 Ala. Acts 359 ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 961, 976, 2227, 2235A (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1444 (Michie 2003).
166 CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 26.
167 Id. at 27.
168 The CFA/PIRG REPORT survey sample was not representative. Many states were
excluded from the survey, different numbers of lenders were surveyed in each state, and within a given
state surveyed lenders were often concentrated in one or more geographic areas. The survey
nonetheless remains the most comprehensive source of information on interstate pricing differences for
payday loans. See id. at 1.
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operations, while states with licensing laws fare somewhat better than
average in terms of surveyed prices.
State usury and payday lending laws collided with federal bank and
thrift regulation as a result of partnerships between payday lenders and a
small number of depository institutions. Initially, a handful of national
banks were exporting high interest rates to payday lending companies in
states with usury laws,169 thus circumventing those states’ implicit
restrictions on payday lending.170 Some small, state-chartered banks had
also become involved in payday lending,171 as had some thrifts. At first,
the regulators issued guidance explaining the risks involved in payday
lending.172 After about a year of experience supervising these partnerships,
the regulators became increasingly concerned with the risks involved. The
OCC,173 and then the OTS174 and Federal Reserve Board,175 in turn, all
effectively ended these partnerships. Today, only FDIC-regulated
depositories are still engaged in this market.176 One state-chartered bank,
after being ordered by the Federal Reserve to end payday lending,
169 Under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994), a national bank may charge interest
at a rate permitted by the state in which it is located, notwithstanding rates set by the state in which its
customers reside. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (holding late payment fees are interest
for purposes of § 85); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp, 439 U.S. 299 (1978);
Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1205060 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (applying Marquette
to uphold export of national bank’s interest rate to transactions conducted with payday lending
partner).
170 See Nicole Duran, OCC Orders Bank To Exit Payday Biz, AM. BANKER, Jan. 4, 2002, at
1; see also CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 21.
171 See Press Release, CFA, Local Groups Target State Banks That Rent Their Charters to
Payday Lenders (Apr. 10, 2002), at http://www.consumerfed.org/fdic_pr041002.PDF; see also
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 15-17.
172 See Payday Lending, OCC Advisory Letter, AL 2000-10 (Nov. 27, 2000) (alerting
national banks to OCC concerns over payday lending programs, including the involvement of thirdparty vendors); Payday Lending, OTS Memorandum for Chief Executive Officers No. 132 (Nov. 27,
2000), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/25132.pdf; Third-Party Relationships, OCC
BULLETIN, OCC 2001-47 (Nov. 1, 2001) (advising national banks on establishing procedures to
analyze
and
manage
risks
of
dealing
with
third
parties),
available
at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2001-47.doc [hereinafter OCC, Third-Party Relationships].
173 See, e.g., In re Peoples National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2003-2 (Jan. 30, 2003);
In re Advance America, Cash Advance Centers, Inc., OCC Consent Order No. 2003-3 (Jan. 24, 2003);
In re First National Bank in Brookings, OCC Consent Order 2003-1 (Jan. 17, 2003); In re Eagle
National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (Dec. 18, 2001) (ordering bank to cease payday
lending in partnership with Dollar Financial Group); News Release, OCC, OCC Takes Action Against
Ace Cash Express, Inc. and Goleta National Bank, NR 2002-85 (Oct. 29, 2002).
174 See FIRST PLACE FINANCIAL CORP., Form 10-Q, for the period ending Dec. 31, 2002,
dated Feb. 14, 2003, at 12 (noting that OTS had directed it to discontinue making payday loans in
partnership with another company).
175 See REPUBLIC FIRST BANKCORP, Form 8-K, June 27, 2003, at 1 (noting that it ceased its
payday lending partnership because of heightened regulatory requirements).
176 The FDIC has issued guidance on how state chartered, FDIC-insured banks can partner
with payday lenders consistent with safe banking practice. See FDIC, Guidelines for Payday Lending
(Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday/index.html (last accessed
Dec. 19, 2003); see also Press Release, CFA, New Guidelines Allow Payday Lenders To Ignore State
Laws
(Mar.
17,
2003)
(criticizing
draft
guidelines),
available
at
http://www.consumerfed.org/031703fdic.html.
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withdrew from the Federal Reserve System and was approved by the FDIC
for federal insurance as a state non-member bank in order to continue to
operate its payday lending.177 What is the basis for shutting down these
partnerships? Regulators have cited three basic reasons. First, the OCC has
explained that banks should not “rent” their names to payday lenders to
evade state usury and consumer protection laws,178 but should take
responsibility as the lender for ensuring proper underwriting and
disclosure, as well as appropriate consumer protections.179 Second, the
OCC argued that firms engaged in such partnerships are exposed to
“significant reputation, strategic, transaction, and compliance risk” when
“nonbank vendors may target national banks . . . in order to avoid state law
standards that would otherwise apply to their activities.”180 Third, the OCC
warned that payday lending could be unsafe and unsound. The OCC put
national banks on notice that it reserved the right to examine and regulate
both the bank and the third party service provider and to assess special fees
for such supervision.181 Using its safety and soundness supervisory
authority—rather than any consumer protection rationale—the OCC has
now shut down all known national bank-payday lending operations, and
the OTS and Federal Reserve have followed suit. It remains to be seen
whether the FDIC will find similar safety and soundness concerns after it
has experience in supervising banks engaged in these partnerships.
In the meanwhile, questions regarding federal pre-emption are
unlikely to go away. Before it had ended national bank-payday
177 See Jonathan D. Epstein, First Bank To Continue Payday Loans, Switch to FDIC Keeps
Practice Alive, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 15, 2003, at 10B.
178 See In re Eagle National Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (Dec. 18, 2001)
(ordering bank to cease making payday loans in partnership with Dollar Financial Group); Paul
Beckett, Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt State Laws on High Interest Rates—
”Payday Loans” Are a Big Hit with Many Consumers, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A1; Duran,
supra note 170 (“‘The bank essentially rented out its national bank charter to a payday lender.’”)
(quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.); Michele Heller, OCC Crackdown on
“Lending” of Charters, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 8 (“‘National banks should not be renting out
their charters to third parties for the purpose of allowing the third party to evade some state law that
otherwise would be applicable to them.’”) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.);
News Release, OCC, OCC Files Notice of Charges Against People’s National Bank of Paris, Texas,
NR 2002-26 (Mar. 18, 2002) (charging national bank with unsafe and unsound practices in rapid
expansion of its payday lending operation with Advance America without adequate capital,
underwriting, and appropriate safeguards); see also supra note 173.
179 The OCC warned that:
[S]ome product vendors engage in practices that may be considered predatory,
abusive, or unfair and deceptive to consumers. . . . National banks should be
extremely cautious before entering into any third party relationship in which the
third party offers products or services through the bank with fees, interest rates,
or other terms that cannot be offered by the third party directly. Such
arrangements may constitute an abuse of the national bank charter.
See OCC, Third-Party Relationships, supra note 172, at 6.
180 Id.
181 Id.

161

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

41

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 49 [2004]
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 21:121, 2004

partnerships, the OCC had taken the position that the National Bank Act
did not pre-empt state usury claims against the payday lending partner of
national banks.182 Plaintiffs had sued the payday lender under state law.
The District Court remanded to state court for lack of federal question
jurisdiction183 and ACE settled, agreed to pay $1.3 million in restitution,
cease its relationship with Goleta National Bank and comply with
Colorado’s licensing and usury laws.184 By contrast, in another case, the
same parties successfully argued that the National Bank Act pre-empted
state law claims against both the national bank and the payday lender.185
Furthermore, in Anderson v. H&R Block,186 the court held that plaintiffs’
claim that H&R Block and Beneficial National Bank’s refund anticipation
loans were usurious was governed by the National Bank Act, but since
there was no complete pre-emption, the claims could be heard in state
court. The Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit in Beneficial
National Bank v. Anderson,187 holding that the National Banking Act fully
pre-empted state law claims for usury pleaded against national banks and
thus provided a basis for removal of the case—including supplemental
state claims against other defendants—to federal court, where presumably
the defendant believes the claims will bear less weight.
5.

Reforms

With respect to any remaining bank or thrift partnerships with payday
lenders,188 given the bank and thrift regulators’ strong assertions of preemption of state payday lending laws affecting insured depository
institutions, it is incumbent on the regulators to use their authority under
the Federal Trade Commission Act to take action against banks and thrifts
that are engaged in “unfair and deceptive trade practices” in the course of
182 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Comptroller of the Currency, Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace
Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2001) (No. 01-1576) (successfully
arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction); see also Long v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. 3:00-CV1306-J-25TJC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24617 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2001) (remanding case to state court
on the grounds that National Bank Act pre-emption does not apply to state law claims against ACE).
183 Salazar, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86.
184 Press Release, Colorado Attorney General, Ace Cash Express To Pay $1.3 Million in
Restitution to Consumers (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.ago.state.co.us/PRESREL/
presrl2002/prsrl40.stm; see also supra note 182.
185 Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C HS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226
(S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (holding that National Bank Act pre-empted Indiana usury law as applied to
ACE and Goleta despite ACE’s 95% participation in loan).
186 287 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 2002).
187 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
188 Although only FDIC-regulated banks currently engage in payday lending, with
heightened regulatory focus on “renting” charters, at least one payday lender sought to own a bank. See
Ben Jackson, Can’t Rent? Payday Shop Files To Buy a Charter, AM. BANKER, July 9, 2002, at 1
(noting that Cincinnati BancGroup, a subsidiary of CNG Financial Inc. and an affiliate of Check’nGo,
applied to the Federal Reserve Board to buy a bank).

162

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

42

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
payday lending activities.189 Regulators should pay particular attention to
the problem of short-term balloon payments, repeated refinancing, and
inadequate or misleading disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA).190 In addition, greater attention to the CRA service test could help
to shed light on bank practices.191 For example, if repeated rollovers
indicate that the lender failed to underwrite the payday loan by
determining a borrower’s ability to repay, contrary to safety and soundness
guidelines,192 then the bank may have engaged in an “illegal credit
practice”193 for purposes of the CRA. Such an illegal practice should
adversely affect the bank’s CRA rating. Congress should also consider
legislation mandating that payday lenders report borrowers’ performance
to the credit bureaus, so that responsible borrowers have the opportunity to
pursue alternative credit products based on their credit history.
With respect to state regulation, the picture is mixed. Although a
number of states have sought to invalidate bank-payday lender
partnerships,194 given the Court’s strong interpretation of the pre-emptive
effect of the National Bank Act on state usury laws,195 these laws are
unlikely to withstand legal challenge. State regulators are likely to be more
successful in directly acting against the non-bank partner in such
arrangements.196 Given the ineffectiveness of state rollover laws, some
states are now focusing on legislation that would provide for longer
minimum terms for payday lending to prevent short-term balloon loans
that are repeatedly refinanced from becoming a “debt trap.”
In my view, over the long term, banks could compete with payday
lenders by offering alternative, lower cost and lower risk products. In
principle, one such alternative might be bank overdraft protection.
Although there is currently much controversy surrounding the adequacy of
189 Cf. In re Providian National Bank, OCC Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a
Consent Order (June 28, 2000) (asserting violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Truth in
Lending Act and its implementing Regulation Z, and state law concerning credit card abuses),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-49c.pdf.
190 See, e.g., Brown v. Payday Check Advance, 202 F.3d 987 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that
TILA covers payday loans).
191 See infra Subsection V.A.2.
192 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B.
193 12 C.F.R § 25.28(c).
194 Indiana has passed a law barring such partnerships. North Carolina has filed suit arguing
that its usury laws bar payday lending. See Jackson, supra note 188.
195 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003) (holding that usury cause
of action against national bank necessarily arises under federal, not state, law); see also Ass’n of Banks
in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding pre-emption of Ohio law banning sale of
title insurance by banks); Metrobank v. Foster, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (finding that
Iowa ATM fee prohibition pre-empted); Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588
(W.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that Texas law bars banks from charging fees to non-account holders for
cashing checks drawn on bank pre-empted by National Bank Act).
196 See Brown v. ACE Cash Express, CA No. 24-C-01-004036 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2001);
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 21.
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disclosures and the cost of current bank overdraft policies,197 in theory
overdraft policies could be provided at lower cost than payday loans
because, since there is no need for face-to-face interaction, the transactions
can take place electronically and automatically at low risk and cost to
banks. Moreover, repayment of the overdraft could be scheduled so that
regular minimum payments (through automatic debiting of the customer’s
account) repay the overdraft over a reasonably long time period, rather
than the current payday loan of two weeks or bank overdraft practice of
thirty days. Overdraft protection should also be disclosed as an extension
of credit using APRs consistent with the requirements of TILA.
C.

Title Lenders

Title lenders represent a variation on payday lenders.198 Instead of
holding a check or a debit authorization until payday, title lenders hold
collateral—in most cases, an automobile title (and/or the keys to the car, or
in some cases a device permitting the title lender to disable the car)—for a
typical term of one month.199 Some title lenders loan money collateralized
by other household assets, such as appliances.200 Title loans range from
$250 to $1,000, and are generally over-secured. If the borrower fails to
repay the loan at maturity, the lender will often extend the loan for another
fee, in the same way that a payday loan is rolled over. Should the borrower
be unable to make payment, or should the lender decide to stop renewing
197 See Michele Heller, Amsouth Wins Latest Fight in Check-Fee War, AM. BANKER, Aug. 2,
2000, at 1; Laura Mandaro, In Brief: Wamu Overdraft Policy Legal, Court Says, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7,
2002, at 19; Laura K. Thompson, Overdraft Play Looks Better to Small Banks, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2,
2001, at 1. Compare Tom McGrath, Overdraft Coverage Preys on the Weak, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6,
2001, at 17, with Paul Nadler, Comment: In Defense of Check Overdraft Coverage Policies, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 29, 2003, at 7, Letters to the Editor: Bounce Coverage Ensures Equitable Treatment for
All, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 2001, at 16, and Comment: Don’t Be Afraid To Charge Fees for
Overdrafts, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 2000, at 6. See also Federal Reserve Board Proposed Revisions to
Regulation Z, Truth in Lending Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,618 (Dec. 6, 2002) (soliciting comments on
disclosures required for overdraft or “bounced check” services), and Final Rule, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/board/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030328/attachment.pdf
(noting
that rules for such disclosure are still under advisement at the Federal Reserve Board).
198 See Payday Lending, AL 2000-10, supra note 172 (advising national banks about the
risks of partnerships with payday lenders); Title Loan Programs, OCC Advisory Letter, AL 2000-11
(Nov. 27, 2000) (advising national banks about the risks of partnerships with title lenders), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-11.doc; see also Joint Release, Office of the Comptroller
of Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, Agencies Urge Banks and Thrifts To Evaluate Risks
with Vendors Engaged in Practices Viewed as Abusive to Consumers, NR 2000-88 (Nov. 27, 2000)
(discussing title lending and payday lending supervisory concerns), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-88.doc.
199 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 598.
200 See Holden Lewis, Sale Leaseback: A Dangerous New Form of Consumer Debt,
BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 24, 2001, at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/pf/20010424a.asp. Appliance
title loans often take the form of “sale-leaseback” arrangements, wherein the borrower transfers
ownership of the appliance to the lender and then either “repurchases” the item at loan maturity or
renews the “lease” by paying the finance charge for an additional fifteen days or one month.
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the loan, the lender repossesses the collateral, sometimes “retain[ing] the
proceeds of the sale, even if the value of the automobile exceeds the loan
amount.”201 Some auto title lenders sell repossessed cars in the retail
market.202
The title industry grew out of pawnbrokers’ efforts to lend larger
amounts than televisions or jewelry could collateralize.203 In a traditional
pawn transaction, the pawnbroker makes a fixed-term loan to a consumer
who leaves collateral in the hands of the broker. If the customer does not
repay the loan at maturity, the collateral becomes the property of the
broker.204 Given the similarity between pawn transactions and title loans,
title lenders have been able to claim the advantage of pawnbrokers’
exemptions from, or special limits under, many states’ usury laws,205 while
using quite different underwriting processes.206
The title loan industry originated in the southeastern United States,
and burgeoned most rapidly in Florida. Between 1995—when legislation
was adopted to legalize the industry—and 1999, 600 title loan outlets
opened in Florida. In 2000, however, the state passed a new law limiting
allowable interest to 30% annually, and the practice has all but disappeared
since then.207 Yet it still thrives in Georgia and Tennessee, the two states
that legalized the practice early.208 Title lenders have sprouted up in other
states—for example, in Missouri, Illinois, and Oregon. While no title
lenders are publicly held, Title Loans of America is the largest lender. In
1999, the firm had 300 outlets.209
Prices for title loans appear to be similar to those for payday loans.
201 Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198, at 2.
202 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 600.
203 See Joseph B. Cahill, License To Owe: Title-Loan Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution
That Often Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at A1. The average pawn loan size is $70. See CASH
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 6.
204 See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 6. Cash America International reports that
39% of its revenue is derived from the sale of merchandise not redeemed by customers. CASH
AMERICA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 7.
205 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 598.
206 Pawnbrokers tend to be smaller in scale than the other financial services providers
discussed in this Article, although a few large pawnbroking chains exist. Given the need for laborintensive and judgmental decisions about pawn collateral, pawnbrokers may play a role in the lowincome financial services marketplace that is unlikely to be replicated by mainstream financial service
providers. See White, supra note 5. Because pawnbrokers are unlikely to be fundamentally equivalent
to banks, I do not discuss pawnbrokers in detail. The pawnshop sector stagnated in the late 1990s with
the rise of payday and title lending alternatives. See John Caskey, Fringe Banking a Decade Later 12
(Apr. 8, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
207 Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Licensing and Registration: Title Loan Companies, at
http://www.dbf.state.fl.us/licensing/titleloanco.html (last modified Jan. 2003); Cahill, supra note 203,
at A13. The Florida Department of Financial Institutions has licensed only three title lenders under the
new law since enactment. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Currently Licensed Title Loan Companies, at
http://www.dbf.state.fl.us/licensing/titleloancocurrent.html (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
208 See Cahill, supra note 203, at A13.
209 See id.
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The OCC has found that rates often exceed 25% per month,210 for an APR
of 300%. In Illinois, for instance, a 1999 survey revealed an average APR
of 290% on title loans.211 In Florida, the typical fee in 1998 for a onemonth $400 loan was $88, or 264% APR.212 Some title lenders have
developed partnerships with national banks, raising concerns similar to
those raised by partnerships with payday lenders.213 Several lawsuits and
articles document the fact that problems with rollovers are just as prevalent
as in the payday lending industry.214 As with payday lending, title lending
is often undertaken without an assessment of the borrower’s ability to
repay (other than by seizure of the collateral).215 With title lending,
however, the borrower risks losing her car, which may be her regular way
to get to work, and to transport children to and from school or child care.
Alternative credit products or savings might help low-income families to
reduce reliance on title lenders.
D. Tax Preparers and Refund Anticipation Lenders
The EITC provided a critical supplement to income for twenty
million low-income households this year. While tax preparation firms
provide important services to low- and moderate-income persons, tax
refund anticipation loan (RAL) fees lower take home pay from the EITC,
cutting against the distributive goals of the program, and may somewhat
reduce its effectiveness as a work incentive for RAL borrowers, although
further empirical research is needed to explore this question.
1.

Industry Overview

Tax preparation services can be distinguished from other AFS
services in a few important ways. First, they are the only type of provider
examined in this Part whose core functions are not usually thought to be
providing services for income receipt, conversion of income into cash, bill
payment, saving, or credit. Tax preparers do, however, play important
roles in each of these financial services. Tax preparers facilitate the
taxpayer’s receipt of income tax refunds; they help to convert tax refunds
owed to taxpayers into liquid form. They transmit payments to Treasury
210 Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198, at 2.
211 ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 140, at 26.
212 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 5, at 599.
213 See Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198 (alerting national banks to OCC
concerns over title loan programs, including the involvement of third parties).
214 In 2000, John C. Bersia of The Orlando Sentinel won a Pulitzer Prize for an editorial
campaign attacking title lending and other practices in Florida. Pulitzer Board, Pulitzer Prize Winners,
2000, Editorial Writing, available at http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2000/editorial-writing (last accessed
Dec. 17, 2003).
215 See Title Loan Programs, AL 2000-11, supra note 198.
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for sums taxpayers owe on their tax returns. They arrange for credit to be
provided to many taxpayers in the form of refund anticipation loans.
Second, tax preparers also cater to middle or upper-income clientele, as
well as the lower-income population that is the focus of this paper. Third,
they generally cost less on an average annual basis for lower-income
clients than check cashers or payday lenders cost for the typical client they
serve. In large part, this is because most customers seek their services only
once a year, at tax time. Fourth, low-income client use of tax preparation
services and refund anticipation loans offered by such preparers appears to
be higher among recipients of the federal EITC than other taxpayers,
although almost all taxpayers earning under $30,000 per year who file tax
returns would need to file a return even absent the EITC.
The federal EITC is a wage subsidy provided to families who earn
under about $35,000. In tax year 2001, the credit provided over $30 billion
to over eighteen million families through refundable credits against federal
income tax. The average family with children that year earned a credit of
nearly $1,800. Unfortunately, the credit and its rules can be difficult to
understand for families who have complicated living arrangements, such
as children who spend time living with a parent and another relative, who
have low levels of education, or who do not speak English as their first
language.216 Conflicting and complex rules governing different tax
provision rules for determining household status, dependents, and the like
make tax preparation services attractive. Additionally, low-income
families may not understand the refund process or timing, or may worry
about increasing IRS audits of EITC claimants.
For the low-income population, tax preparers provide two major
products and services. The first is return preparation and filing of what has
become for some a complicated task of filing a tax return, including an
EITC claim. Typically, preparers will fill out a client’s federal return, the
accompanying Earned Income Credit (EIC) schedule, and a state return, if
the client is required to file or is eligible for a refund from the state. In
most cases, preparers file low-income clients’ returns electronically, so as
to expedite the processing of the refund by the IRS. As many as 67 to 68%
of EITC recipients hired a commercial tax preparer to prepare their returns,
and more than half of all EITC recipients filed their returns
electronically.217
216 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 13-14, 32 (stating that most EITC errors result
from family status issues). The problem of tax complexity is, of course, not confined to low-income
taxpayers, nor are the complexities facing low-income taxpayers confined to the EITC. See generally
Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Complicated Lives: Tax Administrative Issues Affecting LowIncome Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION (forthcoming 2004).
217 See BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2, 10; see also HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 31
(finding that 56.5% of claimants used paid tax preparers in 1996); Michael A. O’Connor, Tax
Preparation Services for Lower-Income Filers, 90 TAX NOTES 231, 232 (2001) (finding that 60% of
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Second, many EITC recipients also use refund anticipation loans
(RALs) and similar products marketed by many tax preparation services,
including the two large national chains, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt.
RALs are quite similar to payday loans in that they provide advances on a
borrower’s anticipated income—in this case, a tax refund. In the case of
the RAL, the loan is repaid when the IRS issues the borrower’s expected
refund. RALs serve three main purposes: First, customers are usually able
to receive cash proceeds from their loans within two days or less of
electronically filing their tax returns,218 which is eight to ten days sooner
than if they had requested direct deposit of their refund to their bank
account, if they had one. They may need the funds for daily needs, to catch
up on recurring payments on which they have fallen behind, or to repay
other short-term loans. Families who receive the EITC may live from
paycheck to paycheck and may be unable to save for large purchases such
as a car, and thus many seek assistance in getting quick access to the
relatively large refund dollars.219 Second, RALs also permit taxpayers
without bank accounts—and, consequently, without direct deposit
capabilities—to obtain their refunds without waiting approximately four to
six weeks for a paper check from the IRS.220 Third, taxpayers who do not
EITC recipients used paid preparers in 1999). Holtzblatt & McCubbin report that in 2000, 64% of
EITC claimants reported using a paid preparer (compared to 53% of all filers), and 55% of EITC
claimants filed electronically (compared to less than one-third for all filers). Holtzblatt & McCubbin,
supra note 216, at 11-12.
218 Some preparers are advertising instant refund loans. See, e.g., 2001 Tax Filing Season:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 107th Cong. 77, 79
(2001) (testimony of Mark A. Ernst, President and CEO, H&R Block) [hereinafter Ernst 2001
Testimony] , available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/43-01/43erns.htm.
219 Eligible EITC recipients may use an “advance payment option” under which they receive
up to 60% of their EITC refund spread throughout the year through reduced withholding in their
regular paycheck; but, perhaps because of the fact that 75% of EITC filers have more than one source
of income and setting advance EITC up with multiple employers would be complicated and might
result in incorrect overpayments that would later be subject to recapture, or perhaps because of a desire
to have a form of enforced savings for larger purchases using the lump sum refund, only 1.1% of
eligible EITC recipients used this option in 1998. See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 27-28, 54, 61;
see also Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 10 (describing household status and multiple
income sources as barriers to using advance EITC payments easily). If the need to speed up the refund
to pay for daily needs were the prime motivation for RALs, it is somewhat unclear why more EITC
filers do not opt for advance payments, even given the administrative difficulties.
220 The estimate of four-to-six weeks for refunds is from the testimony of Nina Olson, IRS
Taxpayer Advocate, before the House Ways & Means Committee in 2001. See 2001 Tax Filing
Season: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 107th
Cong. 42, 47 (2001) (testimony of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Taxpayer Advocate
Service, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter Olson 2001 Testimony], available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/4-3-01/4-3olso.htm
(last
visited Mar. 15, 2003). Tax preparation services also offer a product variously known as “refund
transfer,” “accelerated check request,” or “refund anticipation checks,” by which unbanked EITC
recipients can have their refunds direct deposited to the bank partnering with the tax preparation
service, which then cuts a check to the recipient, after deducting tax preparation, administrative, and
bank fees. The service permits the recipient to receive his check much earlier than if the IRS were to
mail the recipient a check. See BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2.
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have the funds to pay for tax preparation services up-front, but believe that
they need help filing for the EITC, find RALs and similar products
necessary simply to pay preparers to file for their refund. Tax preparation
fees are deducted from the proceeds of the RAL, encouraging tax preparers
to work with low-income customers, who in turn can more easily pay for
the services provided.221 Thus, the complexity of the EITC and the desire
to have forms professionally prepared may itself drive some decisions to
take out RALs independent of a desire to obtain a quicker refund. The
need for commercial preparation could be reduced for some EITC
recipients, who could request that the IRS calculate the credit based on
their EIC schedule.222 This is an option that few currently pursue, however,
and EIC schedules are quite complicated.223
Tax preparation services and refund loans can consume a nontrivial
portion of an EITC recipient’s refund. A survey of providers in
Washington, D.C. in 2002 found that the preparation and electronic filing
of federal and state returns, and associated schedules, cost low-income
taxpayers about $100 on average.224 The purchase of a RAL for an
anticipated $1,500 refund added roughly $90 to this amount. Thus, for
EITC recipients filing electronically and choosing to take out a RAL, total
fees would consume an average of 13% of the EITC or nearly 8% of the
total refund from the EITC and other credits.225 Annual percentage rates on
RALs are generally in the 150% to 300% range, depending on how
quickly the IRS processes the refund, and thus how quickly the loan is
repaid.226 In addition, for the estimated 22% of EITC recipients who lack a
bank account, or four million households, the additional fee to cash a
$1,500 RAL check issued by the bank partner of the tax preparer would be
221 See Michael A. O’Connor, Tax Preparation Services for Low Income Filers, 90 TAX
NOTES 231 (2001); Roger Russell, Products That E-Preparers Can Take to the Bank, ACCT. TODAY,
June 4, 2001, at 10.
222 See Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 25.
223 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 59. Calculations became more complicated in
2002, when many low-income families became eligible for a federal child credit with definitions of
eligible children that are different from the EITC.
224 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 5. These fees cover preparation of the whole tax return,
of which the EITC schedule is only a small part.
225 Id. This is consistent with other estimates. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. &
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., REFUND ANTICIPATION LOAN REPORTS (2002) (reporting range of total
fees from $129 to $429).
226 A recent study reports that APRs are often calculated and posted by some tax preparation
services as if the RALs were demand notes, on the basis of repayment in one year, thus significantly
understating APRs. WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 6; see also Regulation Z Official Staff
Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I, at 226.17(c)(1)-17 (describing special rules for tax refund
anticipation loans and providing that disclosures of APRs be based on the “creditor’s estimate of the
time the refund will be delivered”). Banks offering RALs in partnership with tax preparation firms may
charge interest at rates permitted by the bank’s home state, which permits the banks to make RALs at
rates that would exceed state usury caps in the customer’s state. See supra Section II.B. (discussing
payday loans).
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at least $30 on average at a check casher, despite the low-risk nature of the
checks.227 Another study found EITC recipient use of check cashers to be
double that rate, at 44.5%,228 and CFA reported double that cost for
cashing refund checks, at $67 on average.229
The refund anticipation and electronic tax preparation and filing
industry is growing.230 The commercial tax preparation firms earned $357
million in fiscal year 2001 from refund anticipation loans, more than
double the amount they earned in fiscal year 1998.231 Given the high
demand for tax preparation services by EITC claimants, electronic tax
filing and preparation services are disproportionately represented in
neighborhoods with concentrations of EITC recipients.232 Tax preparers
that emphasize refund loans are concentrated in low-income
neighborhoods. In zip codes with relatively high concentrations of EITC
recipients, there are 50% more electronic tax preparation services per filer
than in low-EITC zip codes.233
RALs are used by a significant portion of EITC recipients. In 1999,
38% of EITC recipients received a refund loan, compared to only 4% of
other taxpayers. Seven and one-half million EITC recipients took out
RALs. Nearly half (47%) of all EITC dollars were received through a
227 This assumes a check cashing fee of 2% of the face value, lower than the average charged
by the two national chains, and the $1500 figure is higher than the net amount that would remain after
deducting tax preparation, RAL and administrative fees. In 2002, H&R Block stores began installing
Ace Cash Express self-service check cashing machines. See David Cay Johnston, A Tax-Refund Check
That Just Keeps Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, at L2. Tax preparation firms are reportedly
making cross-marketing deals with check-cashing organizations. See Press Release, Ace Cash Express,
Inc., Ace Cash Express Partners with H&R Block (Jan. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.acecashexpress.com/investor/press/2002/H&RBlock02.html. Tax preparation firms could
instead use technology that is cheaper for check conversion for this purpose. H&R Block has recently
installed check truncation machines in most of its 9,300 offices. See David Breitkopf, Rollout Points to
H&R Block’s Diversification, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1. These machines could be used to
cheaply convert checks to payments. But see I.R.S., PUBLICATION 1345, E-FILE HANDBOOK 33 (2001),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1345.pdf (restricting cashing of refund checks by tax
preparers). Some tax preparation firms are offering debit or stored value cards for unbanked customers,
but with high fees and no bank accounts. See Tax Preparers Add a Stored-Value Option for Refunds,
ATM & DEBIT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2001, at 1.
228 Smeeding et al., supra note 37, at 1202 tbl.5. Smeeding et al. also find checking account
ownership among EITC recipients to be around 40%. Id.
229 WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 9.
230 The industry is dominated by two firms: H&R Block, the leading tax preparation firm in
the nation, which partners with Household International on RALs, and Jackson Hewitt, which partners
with Pacific Capital Bancorp on RALs. BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 3; see also H&R BLOCK,
INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002) (revealing that H&R Block made 4.5 million RALs in 2001,
generating $133.7 million in gross revenue and $68 million in net profits); HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
CORP., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002); David Cay Johnston, New Questions About Block’s Lucrative
Tax Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at C1; Katie Kuehner-Hebert, California Bank Finds Gold in EReturns, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 2001, at 1 (adding that Bank One is also a significant maker of
RALs). Check cashers are also beginning to become directly involved in electronic tax filing. See ACE
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 53; DOLLAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 6.
231 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7.
232 Id. at 8-9.
233 Id. at 10-11.
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RAL.234 All told, an estimated $1.75 billion in EITC refunds in 1999 was
spent for tax preparation, electronic filing and tax refund loans, by those
EITC recipients who use these services.235 Check cashing fees would add a
further $120 million to the total reduction in EITC benefits reaching lowincome families without bank accounts.
Commercial tax preparers do provide an essential service to EITC
recipients who do not understand how to file for the credit, or who want to
have a professional fill out their forms.236 As well, many EITC recipients
who would otherwise be unaware of the credit may learn of it through
marketing of tax preparation services in their neighborhoods. Thus, tax
preparers may contribute to the high take-up rate for the EITC among
eligible persons. Nonetheless, a significant part of the federal
government’s EITC expenditure is used by low-income families to pay
commercial tax intermediaries for filing and refund loans. Viewed as a
cost of compliance with the EITC program, EITC claimant expenses for
tax preparation and RALs would swamp governmental costs of
administering the EITC, although the total operating costs of the EITC
program—including both taxpayer compliance and governmental
administration—would still be only about half the costs for governmental
administration alone of other major low-income programs, such as food
stamps and welfare.237 EITC compliance costs could be reduced.
234 Id. at 11-14 (listing figures by metropolitan statistical area). The percentages of EITC
recipients using RALs vary significantly by region.
235 Id. at 13. The total consists of RALs ($100 average x 39% of 19 million EITC recipients
= $750 million), tax preparation and filing ($100 average x 52% of 19 million = $1 billion). Checkcashing fees would add at least $120 million ($30 x 22% of 19 million). Most EITC claimants would
need to file a tax return even if the EITC did not exist, so one cannot attribute all of these taxpayer
costs to the need to file to claim the EITC. Nonetheless, it is the case that the refund from the EITC
and other credits is effectively reduced by the amount spent on tax preparation fees and RALs.
236 Error rates for commercially prepared EITC returns are not on average significantly
better than for other EITC returns. O’Connor, supra note 221, at 232. But there is wide variation
among commercial preparers with respect to error rates, with large national organizations performing
much better than small store-front ones. See Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 20-21 (noting
an eleven percentage point difference in error rates); Janet McCubbin, EITC Noncompliance: The
Determinants of the Misreporting of Children, 53 NAT. TAX J. 1135, at 1143 (2000); see also Olson
2001 Testimony, supra note 220 (44% of returns showing computational error and 55% of returns with
math error adjustments are commercially prepared).
237 See HOTZ & SCHOLZ, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing that the EITC is “inexpensive to
administer,” particularly when compared to food stamps, which incurred administrative costs of $3.7
billion in fiscal year 1995, and AFDC, which incurred $3.5 billion in administrative costs). The IRS’s
costs of administering the EITC, including customer service, public outreach, enforcement, and
research are projected to be $154 million in fiscal year 2003. 2002 Tax Return Filing Season and the
IRS Budget for Fiscal Year 2003: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and
Means Comm., 107th Cong. 6, 20 (2002) (testimony of Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal
Revenue Service). Holtzblatt estimates administrative costs of the EITC to be about 1% of EITC
claims, see Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 14; see also id. at 27 (noting that EITC
administrative costs of $145 million equal less than 4% of food stamp administrative costs of $4
billion). Good data do not yet exist on individual compliance costs, as opposed to governmental
administrative costs, for either the EITC or other government programs, including data on, for
example, time costs for applying to such programs, which are likely to be significant.
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Simplification of the EITC could reduce the need for tax preparation
services and should remain on the congressional agenda.238
With respect to refund loans, some portion of EITC recipients may
need their refund cash immediately to meet an emergency expenditure.
Many recipients, however, are likely unaware that they could receive their
refund within ten to 14 days if they were banked and filed electronically
through IRS Direct Deposit. The IRS could diminish demand for RALs by
speeding up refunds and advertising refund times. In addition, many EITC
recipients are probably unaware that they are receiving a loan against their
refund as opposed to an expedited refund itself.239 For example, H&R
Block was found to have used misleading advertising and to have trained
its tax preparers to focus on “rapid refunds” rather than explaining that the
products were loans.240 While H&R Block changed its practices to clarify
the nature of the refund loan transaction, some observers believe that its
advertising remained somewhat unclear,241 and most independent agents
and smaller firms may be able to escape scrutiny altogether. Enhanced
disclosure may help avoid some consumer mistakes.
In considering the role of refund loans in the marketplace, it is useful
to contrast them with payday loans. Both are an expensive short-term
source of credit, used primarily by low- and moderate-income families
with no savings. Payday loans arguably represent a product that is absent
elsewhere in the marketplace—small unsecured loans for people with
blemished credit histories. The main problem is in their structure—a shortterm balloon with high fees that often leaves consumers in a cycle of
perpetual debt. Refund loans, on the other hand, rarely turn into long-term
problems for taxpayers or credit problems for the lender; the loan is fully
collateralized by the payment due from the IRS, a reliable payor.242 By
aggressively marketing RALs, however, and—at least in some well
documented instances—disguising their nature,243 some tax preparers seem
to have capitalized on a lack of information among low-income families.
As with payday lending, RALs are offered by tax preparation firms in
partnerships with banks. IRS rules bar tax preparers from directly
238 See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, Welfare Reform’s Hidden Ally, AM. PROSPECT, Special
Supp. Summer 2002, at A35.
239 See Joan Koonce Lewis et al., Refund Anticipation Loan and the Consumer Interest: A
Preliminary Investigation, 42 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 167 (1996).
240 See JTH Tax v. H&R Block E. Tax Serv., 128 F. Supp. 2d 926, 938 (E.D. Va. 2001),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 28 Fed. Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002); Basile v. H&R Block, 777 A.2d 95,
105-06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 25-26 (listing cases); David Cay Johnston,
New Questions About Block’s Lucrative Tax Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at C1.
241 WU ET AL., supra note 225, at 22-23.
242 Refund loans, however, can cause long-term problems for borrowers when it turns out
that refunds do not come, or are smaller than anticipated because of errors or offsets. See id.
243 See, e.g., id. at 25-26 (citing a number of recent suits illustrating efforts to disguise
RALs).
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providing RALs,244 and using the bank charter, among other things,
permits tax preparers to offer RALS without needing to comply with local
usury laws.245
2.

Regulation

The IRS role in this area could be critical. The IRS ended its practice
of providing notice of anticipated refunds, and an indicator of any offsets
for child support or other federal debts, to tax preparers in 1995 in order to
reduce fraud and other problems associated with RALs.246 But the IRS
responded in 1999 to congressional electronic filing mandates by again
providing tax refund and offset information to preparers as an inducement
to expand electronic filing, and to provide the IRS with information on
their detection systems.247 The IRS also delayed EITC refunds in order to
conduct basic anti-fraud and error detection.248 These changes may have
increased the supply of tax preparers willing to prepare low-income returns
because they could be paid up front from the proceeds of a RAL. The
changes also may have increased the demand for RALs as well because
delaying refunds exacerbated low-income persons’ need for cash.249
The IRS regulates aspects of RAL transactions through its oversight
of electronic return originators (EROs). EROs are authorized by the IRS to
file returns electronically on behalf of taxpayers, and receive a number of
benefits from the IRS, including promotional material, permission to use
the IRS e-file brand name, and indirect benefit from public service
244 See infra note 253.
245 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003) (noting that the National
Bank Act pre-empts state law usury claims against national bank that had partnered with a tax
preparation firm to provide refund anticipation loans); Cades v. H&R Block, 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir.
1994) (upholding such partnerships).
246 See Ryan Donmoyer, IRS Takes Aim at RAL Fraud, Hits Preparer Profits, 66 TAX
NOTES 1750 (1995).
247 See George Guttman, IRS Reinstates Debt Indicator To Increase Electronic Filings, 85
TAX NOTES 1125 (1999); Amy Hamilton, Tax Writers Zeroing in on “Rapid Refund Loans,” 91 TAX
NOTES 189 (2001). Despite the lower risk associated with the RALs when debt indicators are provided,
evidence suggests that the re-instatement of the debt indicator only temporarily lowered rates, which
have returned to levels close to their earlier, pre-debt-indicator level. See WU ET AL., supra note 225, at
20 (describing pre-indicator RAL fees in the range of $40-$90, 2000 fees ranging $20-$60, and 2001
fees of $30-$90). But see Ernst 2001 Testimony, supra note 218, at 2 (suggesting that IRS mistakes in
implementing the debt indicator were responsible for losses to taxpayers and preparation firms in the
first year of the program).
248 The congressional mandate that 80% of all taxpayers file their income tax returns
electronically by 2007 was a major reason behind the reinstatement of the IRS “debt indicator” tool,
which facilitates not only electronic filing but also the underwriting of RALs. See BERUBE ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 17.
249 The IRS decision in 2003 to require certain EITC filers to undergo time-consuming “precertification” is likely to drive more claimants to use tax preparation services and RALs. See News
Release, I.R.S., EITC Reform Initiative (June 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/omd=110296,00.html. Similarly, the high rate of audits for EITC claimants may
increase taxpayers’ interest in using paid preparers.
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announcements advertising electronic filing.250 The IRS requires preparers
to disclose that “RALs are interest bearing loans and not substitutes for or
a faster way of receiving a refund.”251 The IRS permits RALs to be repaid
by direct deposit into special RAL accounts held by the bank partnering
with the tax preparer, rather than the taxpayer.252 The tax preparer (or
related parties) cannot make the RAL directly, nor can the tax preparer
directly cash a refund check issued to a taxpayer whose return the filer
prepared. (A preparer that is also a financial institution may cash a refund
check, but not if the preparer has made a RAL.)253 The IRS also regulates
RAL fees. Under IRS rules, authorized providers:
may not base their fees on a percentage of the refund. . . . Separate fees
may not be charged for Direct Deposits. An Authorized IRS e-file
Provider may assist a taxpayer in applying for a RAL and may charge a
flat fee for that assistance. However, the fee must not be related to the
amount of the refund or a RAL. The Provider must not accept a fee from
a financial institution for any service connected with a RAL that is
contingent upon the amount of the refund or a RAL.254

The IRS also regulates the advertising of RALs. The IRS “prohibits
the use or participation in the use of any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, unduly influencing,
coercive, or unfair statement of claim.” In addition, “a Provider must
adhere to all relevant federal, state and local consumer protection laws that
relate to advertising and soliciting.” Moreover, with respect to RALs, the
Provider and financial institution must clearly refer to or describe the
funds being advanced as a loan, not a refund. The advertisement on a RAL
must be easy to identify and in readable print. That is, it must be made
clear in the advertising that the taxpayer is borrowing against the
anticipated refund and not obtaining the refund itself from the financial
institution.255
3.

Reforms

The IRS, in responding to congressional pressure to increase e-filing
and decrease EITC errors, has helped to create the market for RALs. It
250 See generally IRS, E-FILE HANDBOOK, supra note 227.
251 Id. at 51.
252 Id.
253 Id. This aspect of the regulation, apparently designed to reduce the likelihood of EROs
taking advantage of its tax preparation clientele or seeking to inflate the refund amount, may simply
have driven the particular form of bank-ERO-check casher partnerships currently in use by major
preparers, arrangements not necessarily more beneficial to consumers than permitting tax preparers to
provide loans directly.
254 Id. at 52.
255 Id. at 74-75.
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now bears a special responsibility to help end it.
There are several steps that the Treasury Department and the IRS
could take to improve the manner in which EITC recipients receive
financial services. First, and most importantly, Treasury and the Congress
need to continue efforts to simplify the EITC, for example, by altering the
definition of qualifying children. Simplification should help to drive down
error rates, which are costly in their own right and more expensive to EITC
recipients who take out RALs incorrectly anticipating a refund, and
diminish the need for expensive tax preparation services.256
Second, the IRS should expand free tax preparation and electronic
filing availability;257 greater availability of these services would, of course,
diminish the need to take out RALs in order to pay for preparation
services. The biggest barriers to an expansion of free tax preparation
services are lack of funds, lack of sites that provide for electronic filing,
and, more critically, lack of effective ways to assure the quality of these
tax preparation services. Moreover, if Congress wants the IRS to expand efiling availability, it should pay for expanding the private sector
infrastructure necessary to implement it, rather than relying on RAL fees
paid by low- and moderate-income tax payers to cover the tax preparers’
costs of implementing e-filing. Congress could appropriate funds for the
purpose, or use an e-filing tax credit to offset the costs.
Third, since the IRS now has the technical capacity to split refunds,
the IRS should permit refunds to be direct deposited into more than one
bank account. If refunds are permitted to be split into more than one
account, tax preparers could compete by offering tax preparation services
that are paid not out of the proceeds of RALs, but paid directly to them
electronically out of tax refunds through direct deposit to them of a portion
of the refund, diminishing the risk to the preparer and eliminating one
reason to take out a RAL. If this reform is combined with public and
private sector efforts to bring EITC recipients into the banking system, the
remaining portion of the refund could be direct deposited into the client’s
own bank account. Given the large average refund size, the portion
deposited into the client’s account might serve not only for short-term
needs, but also, for some clients, as a base for savings.
256 See, e.g., IRS National Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report and IRS Oversight Board
Annual Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm.,
107th Cong. 6 (2002) (testimony of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Taxpayer Advocate
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
Service,
Internal
Revenue
Service),
legacy.asp?file=legacy/oversite/107cong/2-28-02/2-28olso.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (suggesting
further reforms to the definition of “qualifying child” in the Internal Revenue Code); Holtzblatt &
McCubbin, supra note 216, at 28. An analysis of the full costs and benefits of such legislation is
beyond the scope of this Article.
257 The IRS has a small program to provide matching grants to low-income tax clinics
although the clinics are not primarily focused on preparing returns. In fiscal year 2002, the IRS
provided $7 million to 127 organizations. Holtzblatt & McCubbin, supra note 216, at 15.

175

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

55

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 49 [2004]
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 21:121, 2004

Fourth, coupled with better error and fraud detection and prevention
efforts,258 the IRS can speed up EITC refunds,259 and do more to encourage
direct deposit of refunds into bank accounts, both directly260 and through
employers, commercial preparers, and Volunteer Income Tax Assistance
(VITA) sites. Again, if Congress believes that more efficient tax
processing, in the form of e-filing and direct deposit of refunds, is in the
government’s interest, Congress should appropriate funds or provide a
credit to pay for these improvements rather than letting them be crosssubsidized by fees from RALs and tax preparation.
Fifth, as explained in more detail below,261 EITC recipients can
become a central focus of efforts to bank the unbanked. The following
steps should be taken to accomplish this goal: Treasury should expand its
Electronic Transfer Account (ETA) program to permit use of ETAs for
EITC receipt. Congress should appropriate more funds for Treasury’s First
Accounts program to support innovative efforts to reach EITC recipients
without bank accounts. The IRS should establish partnerships with large
employers to encourage employees to open bank accounts and establish
direct deposit of paychecks and tax refunds. Moreover, the tax preparation
firms themselves should partner with banks to develop and offer
individual, low-cost, electronically based bank accounts for their clients.
Their clients could use the accounts to receive direct deposit of their
income tax refunds, to withdraw funds at ATMs and POS using debit
cards, to save, and for their other financial services needs throughout the
year. The tax preparers would gain a new marketing tool and might see
higher rates of client retention.
Sixth, the IRS can use its oversight of e-file preparers to improve the
market for EITC recipients. Towards this end, the IRS should make
enforcement of existing rules, especially regarding advertising, a priority;
provide more detailed rules regarding non-deceptive advertising, including
disclosures of how the offered product compares with the IRS’s current
anticipated refund times; and force greater transparency in pricing,
including by requiring that RAL funds be provided to EITC recipients in a
258 The Dependent Database is one such tool, launched in 2001. The database permits the
IRS to match returns with state child custody databases, potentially reducing error or fraud from
noncustodial parents. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS Announces Task Force on
Improving the Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/release/po1059.htm.
259 The IRS Taxpayer Advocate, a congressionally created position heading an independent
organization within the IRS, notes that the IRS expects to be able to speed up refunds on electronically
filed tax returns to within two to three days of filing. See Olson 2001 Testimony, supra note 220, at 3.
The IRS has had a notoriously difficult time, however, with efforts to modernize administration,
including refund processing.
260 The Taxpayer Advocate notes that the IRS and the FMS can establish bank accounts for
taxpayers who do not have one. Id.
261 See infra Subsection III.B.1.
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form that does not require an additional cost to convert to cash. For
example, funds could be transferred to debit or stored value cards that can
be used at ATMs or POS without cost.
III. The Banking Sector
A. Barriers to Banking the Poor
While changes in the AFS sector could improve the delivery of
financial services for the poor, fundamental change would be accelerated
by enhanced competition from banks, thrifts, and credit unions using
electronically based accounts to serve low- and moderate-income
customers. Mainstream providers can offer a range of services to meet the
needs of low-income communities. Today, however, while the banking
system works extraordinarily well for most Americans, many low- and
moderate-income individuals face a number of barriers to account
ownership. There are five key barriers: the structure and price of existing
accounts, prior credit problems of the unbanked, low perceived
profitability of serving the poor, lack of bank distribution systems in lowincome areas, and the need for financial education.
First, regular checking accounts may not make economic sense for
many lower-income families.262 Three main problems are high minimum
balances, monthly fees, and the risk and cost of bouncing checks.
Consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums for a checking
account at a bank often pay high monthly fees. Thirty percent of banks
offered an account requiring minimum balances for checking, with an
average minimum monthly balance of $527, and a monthly fee of $7.12
for falling below the minimum.263 Another 38% of banks offered fee-only
accounts, charging an average of $4.74 per month for checking accounts
without monthly minimum balances.264 The number of banks offering free
checking accounts appears to have jumped to 32% of banks by 2001;265
yet, most of these banks have high minimum balances that low-income
262 The Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances asked unbanked
individuals why they did not own a checking account. The most cited reasons were not writing enough
checks to make an account worthwhile, finding minimum balances and services charges to be too high,
not having enough money, and not wanting to deal with banks. See Kennickell et al., supra note 1. It is
not possible to determine from the survey whether respondents who indicated that they did not want to
deal with banks were motivated by economic reasons, such as high costs and accounts not structured to
their needs, or noneconomic motivations, such as cultural dislike of banks.
263 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 3. The Retail Fees Study excludes “tiered”
accounts with complicated balance and fee structure.
264 Id.
265 Id. But see Laura Bruce, Low Fees, More Free Accounts in 2002, BANKRATE.COM (Mar.
28, 2002) (noting that free checking accounts are provided at only 8.7% of surveyed banks), at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20020328b.asp.
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persons cannot meet. Free accounts may also be available only to
particular segments of the population, such as full-time students and the
elderly.
Nearly all banks, including those offering otherwise free accounts,
levy high charges for bounced checks or overdrafts that low-income
families with little or no savings face a high risk of paying and can illafford. Avoidance of these bounced check fees may be an important
determinant of the decision to become or remain unbanked. The average
fee for checks that “bounce” and are rejected for not-sufficient-funds
(NSF) was $20.75 in 2001, and the average fee for overdrafts was
$20.50.266 In fact, depository institutions target the fee for NSF as a “core
fee driver” in generating revenues from checking accounts.267 Consumer
organizations have become increasingly concerned about “bounce
protection” plans offered by some banks without adequate disclosure of
fees.268 In addition, a customer depositing someone else’s check endorsed
to her faces risks if the check turns out to be bad. Customers are charged
an average fee of $7.11 by 74.1% of banks for checks that the bank
customer deposits that are, in turn, returned for insufficient funds in the
check writer’s account.269 Unbanked customers may fear that a large
fraction of their income comes from parties whom they have little reason
to trust will make payment on their checks.270
Checking accounts are costly for depository institutions to offer271 and
266 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6.
267 Ralph Haberfeld, Breaking the $200 Barrier, BANKSTOCKS.COM (Sept. 25, 2001)
(suggesting
a
target
of
$140
in
NSF
fees
per
account
annually),
at
http://www.bankstocks.com/print.html?id=425; see also Joanna Stavins, Checking Accounts: What Do
Banks Offer and What Do Consumers Value?, NEW ENG. ECON. R., Mar.-Apr. 1999 (noting that NSF
fees raised bank checking account revenues while other fees studied tended to lower overall revenue),
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1999/neer299a.pdf; John Reosti, Superior of
Arkansas Growth Story: Free Checking, Overdraft Charges, AM. BANKER, Sept. 25, 2002, at 1 (noting
that Superior earned $28.4 million, mostly in NSF fees, on its 190,000 “Totally Free” checking
accounts, marketed to moderate income persons, in 2001).
268 See, e.g., National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer Federation of America,
Comments to the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Revisions to Official Staff Commentary to
Regulation Z, No. R-1136, Jan. 27, 2003 (arguing that fees for “bounce protection” plans are finance
charges
subject
to
disclosure
under
the
Truth
in
Lending
Act),
at
http:/www.consumerfed.org/frbcomments.pdf.
269 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150.
270 In fact, Banco Popular’s check cashing outfit finds that a larger portion of their fraud risk
comes not from customers cashing someone else’s check, but from instances in which businesses
knowingly provide checks to their workers that are not supported by adequate funds in the business’s
account or purport to draw on nonexistent accounts. See Banco Popular, supra note 88. As described in
the text accompanying note 75, overall losses from such risk are low.
271 The Federal Reserve Board’s 1997 Functional Cost & Profit Analysis estimates the fully
loaded cost of the average checking account to be $145. FED. RESERVE BD., FUNCTIONAL COST &
PROFIT ANALYSIS 129 (1997). Others argue that variable costs (including front and back-office step
functions) are a better measure of the costs of checking accounts; estimates of variable costs are in the
range of $48. See Ralph Haberfeld, Cognitive Dissonance, Microeconomics, and Checking Accounts,
BANKSTOCKS.COM (Mar. 4, 2002), at http://www.bankstocks.com/article.asp?id=517.
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need to be offset with sufficient revenue (from float and fees) that may not
be present in accounts that low-income customers could afford to use. In
addition to direct fees for servicing the checking account, financial
institutions may also charge high fees for money orders or other products
that their typical customers do not often use, but that lower-income
consumers use frequently. Moreover, banks hold checks that are not “on
us” for a matter of days before depositing funds, unlike check cashing
outlets; for low-income customers, the few days wait may not be practical.
In addition to fees from checking accounts, banks also usually charge
fees for savings accounts. No-fee passbook accounts are available at only
15% of institutions; no-fee statement accounts are available at 17% of
banks and savings associations. For other accounts, minimum balances to
avoid fees ranged from $157.86 for passbook accounts to $184.42 for
statement accounts. Monthly fees of $2.15 for passbook accounts and
$2.50 for statement accounts were charged for accounts falling below the
minimum required balances.272
There is wide variation in the structure and pricing of accounts and
fees across metropolitan areas and states.273 Fees for checking accounts
also vary by the nature and size of the institution. Multistate banks tend to
charge higher fees than single-state banks, including about $3 more for
NSF and overdrafts.274 Multistate banks are more than fifteen percentage
points more likely to offer free checking accounts275 but at least ten
percentage points less likely to offer free savings passbook or statement
accounts.276 Large institutions are now more likely to offer free checking
accounts, and more likely to impose higher fees than do medium and
smaller institutions, but less likely to offer free savings accounts.277 The
number of large banks reporting that they offer “free” checking jumped
twenty-two percentage points from 2000 to 2001, following significant
increases in the percentage of small and medium-sized banks offering such
accounts in the previous year.278 These free checking accounts, however,
may still be ill-suited to low-income consumers, given minimum balances
and high fees for NSF, overdraft, and deposit returns.

272 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 5 tbl.3.
273 Id. at 18-62. Empirical research testing this variation against the numbers of unbanked
households, and against the presence of alternative financial service providers, could shed light on
these relationships.
274 Id. at 8.
275 Id. at 6.
276 Id. at 7.
277 Id. at 10-15.
278 Id.
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Table 2. Fee Structure by Size of Institution
Large*
46 %
0.9-2.1 %
$21.53

Medium
37.6 %
7.8-14.3 %
$19.46

Small
26.3 %
20.7-20.5 %
$16.69

Free Checking
Free Savings**
Stop-payment
order
NSF checks
$24.70
$22.05
$19.33
Overdrafts
$25.10
$22.22
$18.56
Deposit returns***
$5.90
$7.60
$6.82
Source: BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 10-20
(2002)
* Large = > $1 billion. Medium = $100 million to $1 billion. Small < $100
million.
** The first figure in each column of this row represents passbook accounts; the
second figure represents statement accounts.
*** While nearly all banks of any size charge for stop-payment orders, NSF, and
overdrafts, only 83% of medium-sized banks and 65% of small banks charge
customers for deposit items returned.

The structure of these accounts is a key driver in keeping the
unbanked out of the banking system. As discussed above, surveys
consistently show that the price of account products and minimum account
balance requirements are important determinants of being unbanked.279
Studies have confirmed that many of the unbanked would become
“banked” if they had access to a relatively low-cost electronic account of
the type that this Article proposes. These accounts could plausibly be
offered by financial institutions with modest governmental incentives to
cover start-up costs.280 In fact, the unbanked have responded to account
products tailored to their needs. For example, in Puerto Rico, Banco
Popular introduced Acceso 24, an electronic account, with no minimum
monthly balance, free direct deposit, unlimited ATM access, and a low
monthly fee. The bank has enrolled tens of thousands of low-income
customers in the product since 1995.281
Cultural issues and reluctance to use banks may matter,282 but many
of the unbanked already use, or have used, the banking system. Nearly half
the unbanked, according to one study, use banks, thrifts, or credit unions to
279 See supra note 21 (discussing surveys of reasons for being unbanked).
280 See generally ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51.
281 See infra notes 330-44 (discussing product experimentation and providing limitations on
lessons from Puerto Rican market).
282 About 18% of unbanked respondents to surveys reported that they were not
“comfortable” dealing with banks. See CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86 (17.6%);
Kennickell et al., supra note 1 (18.5%); see also supra note 22.
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cash checks at least some of the time,283 although far fewer unbanked
households in inner city communities use such institutions.284 Between
48% and 70% of the unbanked have had an account at a financial
institution at some time in the past.285 Existing products, however, are too
costly, too risky, or not well-suited to their needs. Moreover, because bank
hours and locations may be less convenient for low-income workers than
those offered by AFS providers, and branch expansion or longer hours are
costly, I focus my proposals on expanding access to financial services
through ATMs and other electronic delivery mechanisms that can be
expanded to more locations and with longer hours less expensively than
bank branches. As discussed below,286 I propose ways in which such
electronically based accounts should be tailored to the needs of low- and
moderate-income households if they are to be brought back into the
financial services mainstream, or enter for the first time.
While high fees pose one barrier to access for the unbanked, a second
barrier comes from difficulties that many unbanked persons may have in
qualifying for conventional bank accounts because of past problems with
the banking system. The ChexSystem, a private clearinghouse used by
most banks to decide whether to open bank accounts for potential
customers, records that nearly seven million individuals have had their
accounts closed for prior problems, such as writing checks with
insufficient funds or failing to pay overdraft charges.287 Records of prior
problems are kept in the system for five years, during which time these
individuals will likely be unable to open a conventional bank account at
most banks, thrifts, and credit unions. While some individuals undoubtedly
pose undue risk for account ownership, many potential customers could
responsibly use bank accounts. Banks could obviate this concern by
working with the private clearinghouses to better distinguish among types
of past problems, by offering accounts contingent on completion of
financial counseling,288 and by offering electronically based accounts with
283 CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86.
284 Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 76 tbl.5 (noting that only 15% of surveyed unbanked
households used financial institutions to cash checks in Chicago).
285 Compare Kennickell et al., supra note 1, at 8 (48%), with CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE
REPORT, supra note 86, at 20 tbl.3 (70%).
286 See infra Section V.A.
287 Paul Beckett, Banks Are Using a National Database To Blacklist Customers for Slip-Ups,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2000, at 1. Surprisingly, in Caskey’s survey, only 9.5% of respondents cited
“banks won’t let us open an account” as a reason for being unbanked. See FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT,
supra note 86, at 20 tbl.3. This finding echoes that of the Rhine study, in which only 7.4% of
respondents cited account management or being turned down for a bank account as a reason for being
unbanked. Rhine et al., supra note 20, at 75 tbl.4. The Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer
Finance reports that only 2.7% of the unbanked reported the reason for being unbanked as prior credit
or financial problems; only 7.2% cited inability to manage or balance checking accounts. Kennickell et
al., supra note 1, at 8.
288 EFunds launched Get Checking in response to criticism of the ChexSystem, which it
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online bill payment or automatic money orders, and without check-writing
privileges, that pose little risk of overdraft.289 To date, banks have been
reluctant to take these steps because the expected returns from such
accounts are low.
Third, while many urban communities contain adequate numbers of
both banking institutions and AFS providers, in some low-income urban
and rural communities, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not as readily
accessible to potential customers as such institutions are in higher-income
areas. A 1997 Federal Reserve Board study found that low-income central
city neighborhoods have far fewer bank offices per capita than higherincome areas and those outside the central city.290 In Chicago, 40% of lowto moderate-income neighborhoods had only check cashers, 32% of lowto moderate-income areas had both check cashers and banks in about equal
proportions, and 28% of low- to moderate-income areas had only banks.
Areas in Chicago with only check cashers have a greater percentage of
minority households than other low- to moderate-income areas in
Chicago.291
Similar patterns may persist in the distribution of ATMs. In New
York and Los Angeles, there are nearly twice as many ATMs per resident
in middle-income zip codes as there are in low-income zip codes,
according to 2000 Treasury Department research.292
Location is simply one aspect of convenience, of course, and bank
branches (though not ATMs) lack the convenient hours of most AFS
providers.293 However, location may be a less important determinant of
financial service usage than is commonly thought. One study found that
operates. In its initial pilot, 90% of participants completed the education program and more than onethird opened accounts. See EFUNDS, THE UNBANKED: A HIDDEN MARKET 5 (2001), available at
http://www.efunds.com/us/en/about_efunds/whitepapers/000949.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2003).
Union Bank has a “nest egg” account in which those who are in the ChexSystem can build their way
toward a regular checking account by making regular monthly deposits into a savings account. See
Beckett, supra note 287, at 1.
289 Over the long term, the risk of overdraft from checks may be reduced by widespread
adoption of check truncation technology, allowing information to be processed and settled
electronically rather than by paper, combined with online verification of demand deposit account
balances. See, e.g., Priya Malhotra, Visa: Check Verify-Convert Service Catching On, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 20, 2002, at 7 (describing online verification system). This technology is nascent, and widespread
adoption of check truncation by merchants and of account-verification by banks would be required
before checking accounts become sufficiently risk-free as to be reasonable substitutes for online debit
card access.
290 See R. Avery et al., Changes in the Distribution of Banking Offices, 83 FED. RES. BULL.
707, 723 (1997).
291 See Rhine et al., supra note 60, at 15 (noting that areas with only check cashers have an
85% minority population, compared to a 77% minority population overall in low- to moderate-income
areas).
292 The research used MasterCard/Cirrus ATM data. Solid data on the geographic
distribution of ATMs nationwide are lacking. POS at retail locations, with cash-back, may make up for
some of this lack of ATM access, but data are not available on POS distribution.
293 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
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“proximity to the nearest branch was not a significant determinant of
whether an individual owned a checking account.”294 Another study found
that non-bank financial institutions are located closer to bank branches or
ATMs than to other non-bank providers.295
Fourth, banks doubt that accounts tailored to low-income individuals
will be profitable. As discussed more fully below,296 while a financial
institution’s recurring monthly costs for administering the account can
likely be covered by low monthly fees charged to consumers, at this early
stage in the evolution of research and development for low-income
products, banks’ up-front costs are likely to exceed what most unbanked
households are willing to pay. Financial institutions may be reluctant to
expend the resources for research, product development, training,
marketing, and education, which are necessary to expand financial services
to lower-income clientele. Financial institutions may need incentives to
pursue research and product development, to be shared widely in the
industry, with respect to accounts for low-income customers, particularly
for accounts based on electronic payments technology.297 Further market
research would help to define the product needs of low-income families
and existing products will likely need to be modified to serve this clientele.
Marketing of new products to low-income persons and training of bank
staff are both critical to the success of any new product; yet, given the
expense and the expected low returns, they are often not fully pursued
even when financial institutions decide to become involved with offering
financial services to low-income customers. If the unbanked do not know
about the availability of new products and services, they are not likely to
seek out financial services at banking institutions. If local banking
personnel are not informed about new offerings, the unbanked will find it
difficult to open accounts even where local branches are convenient and
accessible. Yet the costs of marketing, training, and education associated
with these services—at least until electronic banking services for the poor
become widespread—are likely to exceed a price that low-income
households could afford.
Fifth, at least for a segment of the low-income population, lack of
294
295
296
297

VERMILYEA & WILCOX, supra note 18, at 14.
See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2.
See infra notes 310-312.
See Sujit Chakravorti & Timothy McHugh, Why Do We Use So Many Checks?, ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Third Quarter, 2002, at 45 (“Consumers, merchants, and financial institutions may be
unwilling to invest in emerging payment technologies due to uncertainty about whether they will be
widely
accepted
in
the
marketplace.”),
available
at
http://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/economicperspectives/2002/3qepart3.pdf. It may be argued that incentives for research
and development would provide indiscriminate subsidies for the banking industry, but I believe an
incentive can be structured that benefits low- and moderate-income households even if the results have
broader applicability. In fact, broader applicability provides an incentive for participation. I discuss the
proposal infra Part V.
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financial education with respect to account ownership, budgeting, saving,
and credit management is a significant barrier to personal financial
stability. The need for financial education may be particularly acute among
immigrants and other groups unfamiliar with American banking practices.
The benefits of financial education are not likely to be fully captured by
any one financial institution or other entity offering education because an
educated consumer will shop for financial services among competing
providers. Financial education also benefits the financial system as a
whole. Thus, education at any scale will likely be under-funded without
public or philanthropic subsidy.
Lastly, immigrant communities may face difficulties regarding proper
documentation for opening an account, either because they lack such
documentation, or they fear that depositories will police immigration laws.
Nearly 40% of Hispanic immigrants without bank accounts in one survey
cited their immigration status as a major barrier to becoming banked.298
Treasury has made clear that it is up to banks and thrifts to ensure that
their identification verification is consistent with regulators’ “know your
customer” rules, which have gained heightened significance in the wake of
the USA PATRIOT Act.299 Despite congressional opposition, Treasury
indicated that such identification could include consular-issued identity
cards commonly used by Mexican residents and other immigrants in the
United States.300 Some banks have begun to accept this form of
identification for opening accounts at their institutions. Matricular cards
alone, however, will not help immigrants who are not lawfully in the U.S.
An IRS-issued individual taxpayer identification number or a social
security card is needed for interest-bearing accounts. Moreover, the IRS
will no longer guarantee that taxpayer information will not be shared with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.301

298 ROBERT SURO ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CENTER & MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND,
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, BILLIONS IN MOTION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES
AND BANKING 14 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/files/nov22b.pdf [hereinafter IADB
SURVEY]
299 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326 prescribes new requirements for
verification of identity on account opening. Two bills also address this issue. See H.R. 773, 108th
Cong. (2003) (seeking to authorize financial institutions to accept consular identification). But see H.R.
502, 108th Cong. (2003) (seeking to prohibit federal agencies from accepting anything other than U.S.issued identification, with the goal of controlling immigration).
300 After some members of Congress raised concerns over the proposal, Treasury issued a
notice of inquiry seeking comment on its earlier rule, and then reaffirmed. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Results of the Notice of Inquiry on Final Regulations Implementing
Customer Identity Verification Requirements Under Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Sept. 18,
2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/js7432.doc.
301 For a discussion of the problem of immigrant identification needed to open an account,
see SHEILA C. BAIR, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, IMPROVING ACCESS TO THE U.S. BANKING
SYSTEM AMONG RECENT LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS 7 (2003), available at
http://www.cbanet.org/Issues/documents/Unbanked.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10, 2003).
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B.

Governmental Policy and Private Sector Innovation

Despite these barriers, the 1990s witnessed a period of strong
economic growth and technological innovation that improved the
prospects for banking the poor. During the latter part of the 1990s,
governmental policy began to focus on expanding access to financial
services for low-income persons, focused initially on recipients of federal
benefits and later on low-income persons more generally. In addition,
financial institutions began to experiment, in the last two years, with
products designed to reach Hispanic consumers, primarily with new
techniques to send remittances to family members in other countries in
competition with Western Union and other wire transfer services.
Innovations in this area hold the potential to assist the unbanked more
broadly. Community development financial institutions have also
experimented with new products to reach the unbanked. Lastly, financial
institutions in other countries have made strides in serving low-income
persons. These experiments, although quite small in scope and scale—
even cumulatively—are instructive with respect to the potential for
financial innovation to help meet the needs of low-income persons.
1.

Electronic Funds Transfer ‘99 and Electronic Transfer Accounts

The Treasury Department’s efforts to increase electronic payment of
federal benefits, pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996,302 while aimed at a narrower goal—reducing the cost of making
federal benefit payments—may also have helped to spur innovation in
serving low income households. Under Treasury’s electronic funds
transfer (EFT ‘99) program, direct deposit into bank accounts has
increased as a portion of all federal benefit payments from 58% in 1996 to
77% in 2002. This increase in benefit payments reflects an increase in both
direct deposit to existing accounts and the percentage of benefit recipients
who have obtained bank accounts.
Under EFT ‘99, Treasury launched the Electronic Transfer Account
(ETA), a low-cost electronically based bank account for federal benefit
recipients.303 The ETA provides for a maximum fee of $3.00 per month
and no minimum balance, except where required by law. The ETA offers a
minimum of four cash withdrawals and four balance inquiries per month,
through any combination of ATM and/or teller access (at the discretion of
302 Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
303 ETAs are individually-owned bank accounts that accept electronic federal benefit, wage,
salary, and retirement payments, and other deposits as permitted by the offering financial institution.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, ETA: Background, at http://www.fms.treas.gov/eta/background.html (last
accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
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the financial institution), and allows access to the institution’s point-of-sale
(POS) network, if available. It provides for direct deposit of federal
benefits and, at the option of the financial institution, the ETA may cover
direct deposit and may be an interest-bearing account. Additionally, the
ETA provides the same consumer protections, including those guaranteed
under Regulation E,304 that are available to other account holders at the
financial institution. Under the program, Treasury provides financial
institutions offering ETAs with a one-time payment of $12.60 per account
to offset the costs of opening the accounts.305 Despite the relatively low
reimbursement amount, as of Spring 2002, nearly 600 banks, thrifts, and
credit unions were offering ETAs at over 18,000 locations nationwide.306
Banks may be motivated to participate for a variety of reasons: good
public relations from community service, positive consideration under the
Community Reinvestment Act, a belief that with reimbursement the
product is reasonably profitable, or a desire to reach a new customer
segment that may one day need other bank products. Nearly 64,000 benefit
recipients have opened these ETAs thus far.307
The ETA could presumably make faster progress were additional
funds made available for marketing, education, and training.308 The ETA
initiative could also be linked with state EBT programs, discussed below,
and the First Accounts pilot309 to permit a greater range of products to be
offered to low-income households, whether federal benefit recipients, state
beneficiaries, EITC-eligible taxpayers, or low- and moderate-income
families more generally.
For our purposes, the ETA project also revealed important
information about the costs of offering electronically based accounts.
Based on evidence to date, banks are likely to need subsidies to cover the
304 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2002) (limiting consumer’s liability for fraudulent transfers to $50 if
timely notice is given to the bank, and to $500 if timely notice is not given).
305 Research conducted for the Treasury Department by Dove Associates concluded that the
average cost of opening an ETA account is $12.60. Actual costs vary significantly by institution. The
$12.60 does not include costs for marketing, training, education, technology platform changes, or
research. Treasury estimates from other account products suggest that marketing ETAs would cost an
additional $9 to $11 per account. See DOVE ASSOCS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ETA
INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT 67 (1998) [hereinafter DOVE ETA REPORT].
306 The largest banks offering ETAs include Bank One, Bank of America, Fleet Bank, J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo. The top five ETA providers are Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Union Bank, and U.S. Bank. Big Banks Line Up To Offer
Spring
2002,
available
at
the
Popular ETA,
EFT EXCHANGE NEWSLETTER,
http://www.fms.treas.gov/eft/promotional/EFTSPR2002.pdf.
307 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, ETA Reports & Statistics, at
http://www.fms.treas.gov/eta/reports.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003). I was involved in a small
experiment that Treasury conducted with the U.S. Postal Service to place ATMs in post offices in
several low-income urban and rural areas.
308 Funding for the Treasury Department’s EFT 1999 public education campaign ended in
September 2001.
309 See infra Subsections IV.B.2. and V.A.1.
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cost of initiating a program but could profitably offer accounts on a
monthly recurring basis. Analysis conducted by Dove Consulting for the
Treasury Department examined cost structures for a range of accounts and
types of financial institutions.310 Although cost structures are highly
sensitive to precise features of the account and type and size of the
institution, anticipated costs for an average financial institution offering an
all-electronic account with no teller visits may be instructive. Dove
estimated that such an ETA account with a $3.00 monthly fee would
produce pre-tax profit of $0.93 per month, excluding costs of research and
product development, marketing and education, program start up, account
set up and closure, and reclamation costs.311 Average account set up costs
of $12.61 would take thirteen and a half months to recover. A more critical
expense, however, is the expense of product development for each
financial institution. Dove estimated that ETA products could cost between
$64,000 and $148,000 for each financial institution. Even if a financial
institution were to open 10,000 ETAs, product development would still
cost between $6 and $15 per account. Marketing and education expenses
are likely also to be high, as are the costs of training bank personnel about
the product.312
Anecdotally, banks are reporting to Financial Management Service
(FMS) that they are signing up customers who inquire about ETAs for
direct deposit into regular banking accounts. This may indicate that a
portion of the unbanked federal benefit recipient population can be
persuaded to open accounts once they receive minimal education about the
benefits of direct deposit. Moreover, banks are attracting these customers
without making any changes to existing account structures to induce them
to sign up. This group also apparently does not have a prior poor credit
history that would militate against a different account structure. (It is not
clear, however, that these persons signing up for direct deposit are actually
unbanked federal benefit recipients who would have been eligible to open
ETAs.)
Although EFT ‘99 seems to have spurred positive developments for
low-income financial services, some consumer advocates have argued that
the program has also spurred developments adverse to consumers. In
particular, they argue that expensive bank-AFS provider relationships have
sprung up to provide federal benefits electronically through check cashers,
effectively re-converting the electronic payment from the government to a
310 See DOVE ETA REPORT, supra note 305; DOVE ASSOCS. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, ETA INITIATIVE: OPTIONAL ACCOUNT FEATURES, ECONOMIC WATERFALL ANALYSES
(1998) [hereinafter ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES].
311 DOVE ETA REPORT, supra note 305, at 61. ETA monthly revenues were estimated at
$3.47, customer service at $1.75, transaction processing at $0.40, and ATM expenses at $0.38.
312 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 32-33 (discussing financial institutions’
reluctance to market accounts with low profitability).
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check, and then requiring holders to cash them for a fee.313 Despite the
availability of these options, and likely because of their high cost and low
benefit, there appears to be little appetite for them among consumers.314
2.

Electronic Benefits Transfer

The 1996 Welfare Reform law mandated that states convert from
paying federal welfare benefits in the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program by check to making such payments
electronically. State electronic benefit transfer programs cover not just
welfare payments, but a host of other state programs as well. A 2001
National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA) survey found
over forty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico now use
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) to make food stamp payments, and
most remaining states have plans to set up EBT programs shortly.315
Nearly 80% of food stamp benefits are now issued using EBT.316 One half
of NACHA-surveyed states also permit cash benefits to be placed on EBT
cards; one third also deliver child care benefits; 20% place SSI benefits on
EBT cards; 15% use the cards for Medicaid eligibility; and more than one
half of the surveyed states also use EBT cards for other programs.317 As
child-care subsidies have increased significantly as a percentage of TANF
spending in recent years,318 the EFT trade group has recently launched a
campaign to encourage states to deliver federal and state child-care
subsidies through EBT.319
313 See EFT Requirements of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 and the Use of
ETAs: Hearing on Implementation of EFT Requirements Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 52 (2001) (statement of Margot Saunders,
National Consumer Law Center) (detailing a number of costly bank-check casher relationships set up
for federal benefit recipients).
314 See DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. Although 87% of surveyed non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs) are aware of direct deposit products that would allow customers to access
payments deposited in a bank through the NBFI, only 27% offer such products. The typical NBFI that
offers a direct deposit product has only twenty-two direct deposit customers, whereas these NBFIs
cash an average of 700 to 3,400 checks monthly. NBFI managers told researchers that compared to
check cashing, these products are less profitable to NBFIs and are more expensive for customers. Id. at
9, 27.
315 BARBARA LEYSER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF
STATE EBT SYSTEMS (2001), at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/electronic_benefits/
content/ebt_summary_table.pdf [hereinafter LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS]; see also
NACHA, EBT IN THE STATES: SURVEY RESULTS, 2002 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND
BUYER’S GUIDE 43-44 (2002) [hereinafter NACHA EBT SURVEY].
316 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 67.
317 See NACHA EBT SURVEY, supra note 315.
318 Childcare is now the largest category of TANF expenditures after cash assistance. See
ZOE NEUBERGER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TANF SPENDING IN FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR
2001 (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-21-02tanf.pdf; GINA ADAMS & MONICA ROHACEK,
CHILD CARE AND WELFARE REFORM 2 (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 96, 2002).
319 See David Breitkopf, Trade Group To Push EBT for Subsidized Child Care, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 21, 2001, at 10.

188

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

68

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
Unfortunately, the way EBT has been set up in most states has
minimized the extent to which electronic transfer could be utilized as an
entry point to banking. Most states do not seek to establish bank accounts
for benefit recipients, but instead use a contractor to provide debit-based
access to funds held by the state government in a pooled account. Doing
this allows states to have the benefit of the “float” on benefit funds before
recipients withdraw the funds. Switching to direct deposit of benefit funds
into recipients’ accounts would require states to forego the benefit of this
float, something that they are unlikely to do at this time given the current
fiscal crises in many states. In addition, states hope to minimize
administrative costs by having a single prime contractor deliver EBT
services rather than seeking out all depositories in the state to offer EBT.
The prime contractor approach also may reduce overall costs of educating
recipients about accounts by making accounts uniform. If a variety of bank
accounts are offered by a range of financial institutions, by contrast,
education and marketing costs would presumably increase.
Although nearly all states have focused on a prime contractor model
using debit card access for delivering benefits, nineteen states now also
permit recipients to have cash benefits directly deposited into a bank
account established by the beneficiary.320 In a recent survey, only 24% of
cash benefit recipients in EBT programs had bank accounts, and only 42%
of those with bank accounts had benefits directly deposited to those
accounts.321 Perhaps because the prime contractor benefit card model
limits access to benefits to the geographic coverage of the prime
contractor’s ATMs, about a third of EBT recipients in the survey have had
some problem accessing cash, with the most common reasons being that
they could not find an ATM or POS that accepted their EBT card for cash
withdrawals.322 Most EBT recipients responding to the survey could not
withdraw all of their benefit funds without paying fees or surcharges; of
those paying for withdrawals, the most common monthly total for
accessing funds was between $2.51 and $5.00.323 Although the most
common choices for usual use of EBT cards were ATMs and POS at
grocery stores, survey respondents also frequented check cashers to access
their benefits electronically.324
States have made a variety of arrangements with respect to charges
320 LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 315. A handful of additional states are
considering the option. Id.
321 BARBARA LEYSER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST MULTISTATE SURVEY OF EBT RECIPIENTS (2001), available at http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/
electronic_benefits/multi_state.shtml. Given the small response size and limited geographic coverage,
the survey may not be representative of EBT recipients as a whole.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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for ATM and POS usage: Fifteen states permit at least four free ATM
withdrawals per month; twelve states permit two to three free ATM
withdrawals per month using EBT cards; the rest permit banks to charge
fees for any ATM usage. The most common fee for ATM withdrawals,
when such a fee is permitted to be charged, was $0.85. Most states permit
free POS withdrawals, although some states include these withdrawals in
the ATM fee-free limitations or require purchases for cash-back to be feefree.325 Most states permit banks to surcharge for ATM use but discourage
merchant POS surcharging; some states have negotiated agreements with
banks or networks to refrain from surcharging EBT recipients.326
There is a narrow window within which states could choose to
restructure contracts to use EBT to develop banking relationships.
Contracts, usually lasting five to seven years, will be up for renewal in
most states within the next three years.327 States could move towards
providing EBT through individually owned bank accounts and negotiate
with networks for surcharge-free alliances for EBT-card holders. In so
doing, states would be increasing the effectiveness of their welfare-towork strategies by bringing low-income families into the banking system
in preparation for their entry into the workforce. States should permit these
families to retain their EBT-issued bank accounts once they make the
transition to the working world. This step may decrease the likelihood that
new labor force entrants will turn to check cashing services once employed
and increase the likelihood that they will arrange for direct deposit of their
income. Given the high turnover rates of households on and off welfare,328
permitting families to retain EBT-issued bank accounts may be important
to those families’ financial stability. These initiatives could be combined
with use of TANF funds for financial education, although TANF funding
is tight in the current economic climate. Some states may wish to
experiment with using TANF funds to make lump sum deposits into new
bank accounts of those moving off welfare as an incentive to open a new
account and to begin saving.329
3.

Private Sector Innovation in Banking Products

Partly in response to increased information about the unbanked and
incentives created by EFT ‘99 and EBT, a number of banks, thrifts, and
325 LEYSER, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 315.
326 Id.
327 See id. (listing states, 85% of which will be up for renewal); NACHA EBT SURVEY,
supra note 315, at 44 (showing that 60% of surveyed states will be up for renewal).
328 See generally REBECCA BLANK & RON HASKINS, BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW WORLD
OF WELFARE (2001).
329 I take up savings policy and discuss Individual Development Accounts and other savings
strategies more fully in SHERRADEN & BARR, supra note 1.
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credit unions have begun to experiment with a variety of products
designed to serve the needs of low-income individuals.330 These efforts,
though small in scale, suggest that the type of policies that I advocate here
could plausibly be undertaken in the real world.
For example, Banco Popular has made great strides in reaching the
50% of Puerto Rican residents who are unbanked.331 Banco Popular’s
Acceso Popular account has a $1 monthly fee, no minimum balance, free
ATM transactions, and free electronic and telephone bill payment.332 To
encourage savings, Acceso Popular has a savings “pocket” into which
small sums (initially, $5 per month) are automatically transferred from the
Acceso Popular transaction account. The savings “pocket” pays modest
interest. Funds may only be withdrawn by seeing a teller and account
holders must pay a fee to see a teller more than once a month to discourage
withdrawals.333 Banco Popular opened nearly 60,000 such accounts in
2001, with half of those activating the savings “pocket” in their accounts.
Many of the account holders open an account to save for a specific
purchase, and then close the account once the purchase has been made.
Banco Popular has a relatively low cost structure and higher returns from
merchant POS fees from these accounts than would a similar institution in
the states because the bank owns about half of the ATM/POS
infrastructure in Puerto Rico. In addition, the potential market for these
products represents a larger share of Puerto Rico’s market than would
similar products in the states because such a high percentage of Puerto
Rico’s population is unbanked. Nonetheless, Banco Popular’s experience
suggests types of accounts that would prove attractive to low-income
clientele.
In the states, Banco Popular has focused not on retail banking
services but on its over 150 check-cashing outlets and over fifty mobile
check cashing vans that visit workplaces, making Banco Popular the third
largest check casher in the United States. More recently, it has pursued two
additional strategies. Banco Popular has opened a co-branded checkcashing outlet/bank branch in California to give its customers access to
other types of services, in the hope that unbanked check cashing customers
will be drawn into using banking services. Banco Popular has also offered
its Acceso Popular product in the states, as well as a debit-card based
account in which customers are given two cards, one for themselves and
330 See generally NAT’L CMTY. INV. FUND, RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES INITIATIVE: A
REPORT ON INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FOR LOW INCOME AND UNBANKED CUSTOMERS
(2002), available at http://www.ncif.org/new/RFSIhighlights0405.pdf [hereinafter NCIF REPORT].
331 Banco Popular, supra note 88 (citing FREYRE ECONOMIC FORECASTS & GAITHER INT’L,
A SURVEY OF THE UNBANKED HOUSEHOLDS IN PUERTO RICO (1996)).
332 Press Release, Banco Popular, Banco Popular Launches “Programa Accesso Popular”
and Brings it Directly to the Community and the Workplace (May 13, 2002) (on file with author).
333 Banco Popular, supra note 88.
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one to send home to relatives who can then withdraw funds without highpriced wire transfer fees. Thus far, the account is linked to remittances to
Puerto Rico and to Mexico, where Banco Popular was able to purchase
ATM access rights. In Chicago, where Acceso Popular was piloted, 500
accounts were opened, some 80% of which had savings activated, with
high average balances of $1,900.334
Bank One is experimenting with using a broader range of credit
criteria and low account minimums for opening checking accounts. Lowincome participants have managed to maintain average checking balances
of $1,100 and average savings balances of $1,600.335
ShoreBank, based in Chicago, has focused on bringing EITC
recipients into the banking system.336 In its program, ShoreBank worked
with a local voluntary income tax assistance (VITA) organization337 to
provide tax preparation advice to EITC filers in ShoreBank’s branches. By
focusing on EITC recipients, the program potentially reduces transaction
costs and increases the likelihood of encouraging account-opening and
saving. EITC recipients filing through VITA offices do not face high tax
preparation and filing fees, nor do they have an incentive to take out
expensive refund anticipation loans to pay for tax preparation services.338
EITC refunds also present an opportunity for low-income people to open
an account in order to save and earn interest, as well as for banks to open
accounts given the potential for some interest income.
In the pilot, take-up rates were low but account-holders found
participation useful for transactions, savings, or access to credit. Twenty
percent of low-income individuals who had their taxes prepared agreed to
direct deposit their refund into a savings account with debit card access; of
these, 60% of new account openers were previously unbanked.339 About
334 Ben Jackson, Popular Aims To Double in U.S., AM. BANKER, July 15, 2002, at 1.
335 Bringing More Unbanked Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 23, 24 (2002) (statement of Jaye
Morgan Williams, Senior Vice President, Managing Director of Community Investment, Bank One
Corporation).
336 See Ben Jackson, ShoreBank Courts Unbanked via Tax Service, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12,
2001, at 6. Shorebank is a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), a specialized
financial intermediary serving low-income communities. Of the 553 CDFIs certified to date by the
Treasury Department’s CDFI Fund, 159 are banks, thrifts, or credit unions offering depository
services. In a 2000 survey, 21 CDFIs provided 141,440 checking and saving accounts to low-income
customers. These accounts had balances averaging $1,815. These depository CDFIs also offered 985
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) with an average balance of $395 per account. Fiscal Year
2003 Appropriations: Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on VA, HUD, and
Independent Agencies, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Tony T. Brown, Director, CDFI Fund).
337 Nationwide, there are only enough volunteer resources at VITA sites to prepare about
one-tenth of the seventeen million returns by filers with income at or below the poverty threshold.
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 50-51 (2001).
338 See supra Section II.D.
339 See Bringing More Unbanked Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 52, 54 (May 2, 2002)
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half of participants used their accounts for savings or transactional
purposes beyond simply depositing their refunds. A follow-up study found
that 14% of account holders were “savers,” maintaining significant
balances for at least six months, while 22% were “transactors,” using the
account regularly for direct deposit of paychecks or government benefits,
and making regular withdrawals. Twenty-two percent spent funds slowly,
while 41% withdrew most of their funds in the first month.340 Customers
believed that the accounts helped them to save; they paid less for
preparation of taxes; financial transactions, including ATM use, were
“more convenient and less expensive”; and credit card companies began to
offer them credit “that might have been denied in the past.”341 Larger
refunds resulted in a greater desire to open an account; account opening at
the time of the refund was critical to interesting new customers; quick
refunds through electronic filing were important to customers signing up
for accounts; and a number of account holders signed up for direct deposit
of paychecks or government benefit checks.342 ShoreBank has experienced
low monthly costs,343 but the ShoreBank initiative is currently operating at
quite a small scale.344
Fleet is working with a nonprofit organization, Doorways to Dreams,
to create an Internet platform that non-profit providers of individual
development accounts can use to reduce the costs of providing accounts
for low-income savers. Fleet has also launched a new debit product for the
unbanked, Access Advantage, to move an estimated 8,000 employees from
payroll checks to bank accounts this year. The accounts carry no minimum
balances, no monthly fees, permit no check writing and allow free ATM
withdrawal from Fleet’s ATMs, as well as free POS withdrawal. Fleet
expects to cut the number of non-customer payroll checks processed by its
branches by 216,000 from 1.1 million this year, both to reduce lines at
branches, as well as to provide a service to its corporate clients.345
(testimony of Fran Grossman, Executive Vice President, Shorebank Advisory Services) (noting that
participants in the pilot found reduced refund times from direct deposit, with some receiving their
refund in as few as 8 days). Cf. BERUBE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7 (noting regular refund time of 14
days for direct deposit).
340 SHOREBANK & CTR. FOR LAW & HUMAN SERVS., MONEY IN THE BANK: THE EXTRA
CREDIT SAVINGS PROGRAM 7 (2002).
341 Id. at 8.
342 Id. at 9.
343 Shorebank spreadsheet on file with author; see also DOVE REPORT, supra note 2 (finding
monthly costs under $3.00).
344 Only thirty-five accounts had been opened in the Detroit pilot as of March 2003. Susan
Tompor, Small Incomes, Complex Issues: Poorer Taxpayers Need Help Maximizing Breaks,
FREE
PRESS,
Mar
24,
2003,
available
at
Minimizing
Frustration,
DET.
http://www.freep.com/money/business/tompor24_20030324.htm.
345 See David Wessel, Banking on Technology for the Poor, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at
A2; Veronica Agosta, Fleet Hopes Product Turns Unbanked into Customers, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2,
2002, at 2; see also Kevin Harlin, Banks Court Unbanked, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 28,
2002, at E1. In contrast, KeyBank started imposing a $5 fee for noncustomer payroll checks cashed at
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Other depository institutions have entered the low-income market by
partnering with check cashers or payday lenders or closely following their
business model. Union Bank of California, for example, has a check
cashing unit, Cash & Save, which charges up to 2% of the check’s face
amount for cashing checks.346 Union Bank attempts to transition some of
its check cashing customers to banking products through “transitional”
products, such as low-minimum savings accounts, and reports that 40% of
its repeat check cashing customers have become banking customers.347
Union Bank has also partnered with the non-profit Operation Hope to
provide financial education and has a partnership with Nix Check Cashing
to provide banking services through check cashing outlets. Bethex Federal
Credit Union, a CDFI in the Bronx, New York, has partnered with
RiteCheck Cashing Inc., a check cashing chain, to expand its presence in
low-income neighborhoods through RiteCheck stores.348 Other credit
union-check casher partnerships have followed suit. Harris Bank opened a
check cashing outlet in Chicago, seeking to encourage its clientele to open
accounts at the bank. A pilot moved 8-10% of customers into accounts
through financial education and partnerships with community groups.349 In
Atlanta, El Banco de Nuestra Comunidad, a bank-check-cashing
partnership provides services beyond those of a typical bank or check
cashing outlet—with a children’s playroom, Internet access, free local
phone service, an on-site IRS certifying agent, and classes on credit; the
institution seeks to function as more of a community center for its
immigrant clientele than a financial institution.350
Based on the experience to date, efforts to expand access to electronic
accounts have had positive but modest effects on account ownership and
savings. Partnerships between check cashers and banks appear to be high
cost and do not take advantage of electronic payment system or delivery
network efficiencies, but may expand the range of financial services
offerings available to low-income check cashing customers. Such
partnerships may be particularly useful for those who do not have access to
direct deposit at work. Strategies involving co-locating check cashing
operations and bank branches may be more promising in terms of
branches, in part to discourage teller use and in part to encourage new Key account holders. Id.
346 Union Bank’s Cash & Save charges 1.5% for payroll checks and 1.0% for government
checks. Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20, at 90.
347 Yolanda Brown, Big Opportunities Among Low-Income Customers, BANKSTOCKS.COM
(June 14, 2002), at http://www.bankstocks.com/article.asp?id=582.
348 David Breitkopf, Credit Union, Check Casher Try Working Together, AM. BANKER, Oct.
30, 2001, at 13.
349 Ben Jackson, Brushing Up on Its Spanish, Harris Opens Up a Store, AM. BANKER, Sept.
3, 2002, at 4.
350 Meredith Jordan, El Banco Serves the Unbanked as a “Non-Bank,” ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON.,
Feb.
3,
2003,
available
at
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2003/
02/03/newscolumn4.html.
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transitioning customers to banking relationships, but they are also
undertaken at relatively high cost. Automated check cashing through
ATMs may be a promising strategy to lower costs if anti-fraud measures
can be made effective.
4.

Remittances and the Hispanic Market

President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox have focused on
reducing the costs of the nearly $10 billion in annual U.S.-initiated
remittances to Mexico.351 Remittances serve to bolster the Mexican
economy,352 increase the purchasing power of recipients, and finance the
growth of micro-enterprises.353 Remittances from the U.S. to all of Latin
America and the Caribbean totaled $32 billion in 2002.354 While the
degree to which Hispanics in the U.S. are unbanked varies significantly by
country of origin, on average more than 40% of Hispanic immigrants lack
a bank account.355 Most Latino immigrants send remittances back to their
country of origin using wire transfer services, rather than banks.356
A growing number of banks have focused on the Hispanic market as a
new revenue source.357 For example, Bank of America has stated that it
anticipates growth near its branches from the Hispanic population.358 In
particular, banks have begun to view the market for remittances as a
potential growth area. New initiatives may have the potential to expand
access to banking services for low-income Hispanics,359 and these efforts
351 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERITY: REPORT TO
PRESIDENT VICENTE FOX & PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 3-4, 9 (Mar. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/200251420452981182.pdf [hereinafter PARTNERSHIP
FOR PROSPERITY].
352 1.7% of Mexico’s GDP come from remittances. See, e.g., Issues Regarding the Sending
of Remittances: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 41, 42 (Feb. 28, 2002) (testimony of Dr. Manuel Orozco, Project Director, Central America,
Inter-American Dialogue), available at http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/022802/orozco.htm;
CHRISTOPHER WOODRUFF & RENEE ZENTENO, REMITTANCES AND MICROENTERPRISES IN MEXICO
(UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Working Paper, 2001),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=282019; see also Ginger Thompson, Big Mexican Breadwinner:
The Migrant Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at A3.
353 See, e.g., WOODRUFF & ZENTENO, supra note 352, at 5 (reporting that 20 percent of
Mexican micro-enterprises studied were funded with remittances, constituting an additional capital
investment in these firms of about $1.85 billion).
354 Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, Remittances to Latin America and the
Caribbean
Reached
$32
Billion
in
2002
(Feb.
27,
2003),
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/Display/PRPrint.cfm?PR_Num=38_03&Language=English.
355 IADB SURVEY, supra note 298, at 7.
356 IADB SURVEY, supra note 298, at 5.
357 See, e.g., Lavonne Kuykendall, New Ideas, Familiar Barriers in Transfer Biz, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 6, 2003, at 6; Anitha Reddy, Banks Go After Money-Transfer Market, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2003, at E1.
358 David Breitkopf, B of A Card for Money Transfers to Mexico, AM. BANKER, Apr. 24,
2002, at 9.
359 See Kuykendall, supra note 357 (finding anecdotal evidence that some large banks
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may also have positive spillover effects for other low-income
communities. Banks have begun to introduce competition into the
remittance market with products such as Bank of America’s “Safesend”
card, in which ATM card holders in a dozen U.S. cities can send money to
relatives in Mexico by providing them with a debit card to access funds at
ATMs.360 Wells Fargo introduced its own product, Dinero Instante, in
which funds can be sent to certain banks and stores in Mexico, for $10 a
transfer.361 Citibank offers similar products,362 and has recently launched a
new pilot approach, “Access Accounts,” targeted at Latino immigrants in
the U.S., in which U.S. customers are offered a low-cost, all electronic
bank account with no minimum balances, and low cost debit-card based
transfers to Mexico and other locations.363 The World Council of Credit
Unions has set up International Remittance Network, through which credit
union members in the U.S. can send remittances to relatives in Mexico
using debit cards, at 33% to 50% lower cost than a Western Union
transfer.364
Enhanced competition from the banking sector has already helped to
drive down the cost of sending a Western Union wire transfer to Mexico to
about $15, from $25.365 An impediment to greater competition in this
market may be a lack of sufficient ATM and POS infrastructure to
compete with Western Union’s strong penetration in Mexico and other
recipient countries, although networks appear to be widely available in
many parts of Mexico.366 The Inter-American Development Bank has
made a grant to Mexico to improve ATM infrastructure for this purpose.367
In addition, the U.S. Postal Service offers a product for transmitting funds
from U.S. post offices to Mexico, using Bancomer’s 2,300 branches
there.368
Progress on remittances is important for three reasons: First, given the
high costs of sending remittances, the potential savings to be had from
utilizing remittance programs are converting users into customers).
360 Breitkopf, supra note 358. But see David Boraks, Safesend Starts Slow, So B of A Tries
Harder; Struggles in Drawing Mexico Transfer Biz from Noncustomers, AM. BANKER, Apr. 10, 2003,
at 1 (detailing problems Bank of America had in marketing and anticipating changes in response).
361 Wessel, supra note 345; Kuykendall, supra note 357.
362 Kuykendall, supra note 357.
363 Robert Julavits, Citi’s Access Account Targets the Unbanked, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18,
2003, at 3.
364 See World Council of Credit Unions, IRnet, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.woccu.org/prod_serv/irnet/faq.php (last accessed Dec. 10, 2003).
365 Wessel, supra note 345. Unfavorable exchange rates embedded in these transactions may
make the real cost of wire transfers significantly higher than reported.
366 Interview with Don Hammond, Fiscal Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1, 2002).
367 See PARTNERSHIP FOR PROSPERITY, supra note 351, at 4.
368 See
U.S.
Postal
Service,
Wire
Money
to
Mexico,
at
http://www.usps.com/money/sendingmoney/wiremoneytomexico/welcome.htm (last accessed on Nov.
17, 2003).
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ATM-based products is large. Second, bank remittance products also have
the potential to bring more Hispanics in the U.S. into the banking system.
Third, strategies to reduce the costs of remittances have the potential to
increase the flow of funds for development into Latin America.
Given the costs of setting up each remittance transaction as a standalone proposition, costs could be reduced by establishing a bank account
for these customers. Account ownership would let immigrants convert
income into cash, save, and pay bills—not simply send remittances.
Although problems with account opening documentation will continue to
present problems,369 a number of banks have begun to accept Mexican
consular identification documents for Mexican immigrants in the United
States seeking to open bank accounts.370 The strategies that I propose to
expand access to bank accounts more generally would help to reduce the
costs of sending remittances, and new approaches that a handful of banks
are now beginning to explore for remittances may help to open up the
banking system to the unbanked.
5.

International Experience

A survey of approaches to serving the poor in other countries is
beyond the scope of this Article, but I highlight a few here merely to
suggest ways in which other countries have addressed similar problems.
For example, South African banks were among the first to experiment with
using technology to reach the unbanked.371 More recently, one of South
Africa’s largest banks launched a bank that has fifty branches and 100,000
customers thus far, offering a savings account with an ATM card.372 South
Africa is beginning to use its post offices to offer online bill payment.
India is also experimenting in using its post offices to connect savings
account holders with bill payment and international money transfers.373 In
the U.K., banks have opened three million basic banking accounts, usually
without check-writing, for unbanked Britons, regardless of income or
credit rating, in response to the government’s 1999 report, Access to
369 See supra Section III.A.
370 See, e.g., Christian Berthelsen, Banking on Mexico, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 2002, at B1;
Risa Brim, Bilingual Banking, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Lexington, KY), June 12, 2002, at C1;
Laura Mandaro, Mexican ID Gaining Favor with U.S. Banks, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 2001, at 2; see
also Sam Quinones, Chicago S&L Rides Immigrant Wave from the Start, AM. BANKER, Mar. 4, 2003,
at 4A.
371 Standard Bank launched E Bank in 1993 to deliver basic electronically-based banking
services to South Africa’s poor. See JO ANN PAULSON & JAMES MCANDREWS, FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOR THE URBAN POOR: SOUTH AFRICA’S E PLAN (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2016, 1998).
372 See Cape Banks in Micro War, CAPE BUS. NEWS (Cape Town, S. Afr.), June 18, 2002,
available at http://www.cbn.co.za/archive/2002-mar/BOE.HTM.
373 STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., E-FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS: IS LEAPFROGGING
POSSIBLE? 35-36 (World Bank, Fin. Sector Discussion Paper No. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/banking/microfinance/smetech/pdf/Claessensetal_Efin.pdf.
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Financial Services.374 Many of the accounts offer bill payment services,
and some even allow access via mobile phones.375 The British government
also plans to use post offices to provide banking services.376
IV. Payments Systems and Distribution Networks
Expanding access to electronic payments systems and distribution
networks is critical to banking low- and moderate-income households.377
More widespread adoption of these technologies would make electronic
banking services more attractive to the unbanked and at the same time
make it less expensive and less risky for financial institutions to expand
access to banking services for the poor. With expanded electronic
networks, both the demand for and the supply of bank services through
electronic means to the poor would likely increase.
Checks are costly to process, pose the risk of being overdrafted at
high cost to consumers and financial institutions, and cause delay in the
availability of funds deposited. By contrast, direct deposit of income is
lower cost to employers and permits immediate access to funds for
consumers. Low-income persons who have access to direct deposit need
not wait for a check to clear if deposited into an account and need not visit
a check casher to get immediate access to funds. Yet many low-income
workers do not have access to or take advantage of direct deposit, in part
because many of them do not have bank accounts. Similarly, online debit
for withdrawals at ATMs, and for payment and cash-back at point of sale,
offer benefits to both low-income households and financial institutions.
Online debit could provide low-income households with a means to access
funds and purchase goods and services without the need for checking
accounts that are expensive for banks to provide and contain the risk of
overdraft. Online debit also saves time for consumers and labor costs for
banks, as it reduces the need for teller time in bank branches. If banks offer
an account with only debit-card access, low-income persons would have a
convenient means for withdrawal and payment. If ATMs are outfitted with
the ability to provide money orders, low-income people would have
another method of paying bills. In addition, expansion of automatic bill
payment through ATMs or internet access could further reduce the costs
374 Colin Cottell, Financial Exclusion: How Labour Failed To Hit the Black Spot,
OBSERVER (London), June 16, 2002, at 10.
375 See Jessica Bown, Banks Which Bar Poor Are Called To Account, SUNDAY EXPRESS
(London), June 9, 2002, at Finance 21.
376 See Press Release, eFunds, IBM Chooses eFunds To Deliver Universal Banking Services
(Mar. 27, 2002), at http://www.efunds.com/us/en/news_and_events/1001465.cnt.
377 Payments systems, such as cash, check, or electronic payment, are a means of
transferring value from one party to another. By distribution networks, such as bank branches and
ATMs, I mean physical locations for a party to initiate or receive a transaction in the payments system.
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and increase the convenience of paying bills for utilities, rent, and other
regular costs, but businesses must overcome high initial costs, customer
inertia, and lack of customer access to bank accounts in order to expand
direct bill payment. In combination, these technologies hold out the
prospect that banks could provide low-cost electronic banking services to
low- and moderate-income households.
Despite the potential of direct deposit and online debit, the
widespread availability of ATMs, and the emergence of direct bill
payment, the expansion of these technologies may be slower than is
socially optimal. At least in part, that is because payments systems are
characterized by positive network externalities.378 Private suppliers of
network services may be unwilling to pay or lack sufficient incentive to
provide the socially optimal level of services justified by those
externalities. Payments systems require both buyers and sellers to accept
the mode of payment. Sellers will not invest in the infrastructure needed to
accept a mode of payment unless many buyers use this mode. Buyers will
not choose a mode of payment not accepted by many sellers. If many
buyers and sellers adopt the payment system, all users will be better off.
But because public benefits to all users of the payment system exceed
private ones to each participant deciding whether to use the system, this
mode of payment may not be adopted or may be adopted slowly. In
general, as electronic modes of payment become more widespread, it
becomes increasingly more efficient and cheaper for others to use such
payment systems. For our purposes, as networks spread and costs come
down, low-income customers could increasingly access these modes of
income receipt and payment.
Because the type of payment and distribution system significantly
affects the cost and risk of providing financial services, the Article first
discusses the network externalities literature, then charts changes in three
areas: the processing of checks and the use of debit cards, the expansion of
ATM networks, and the potential for direct deposit and direct payment. As
payments shift away from paper and toward electronic means of transfer,
378 Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 45. For a discussion of network externalities,
see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities] (“[T]he . . . utility
that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming
the good.”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 96 [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition] (“Since social
marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits—that is, since there are adoption externalities—the
equilibrium network size is smaller than the socially optimal network size, and the perfectly
competitive equilibrium is not efficient.”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in
the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. OF POL. ECON. 822 (1986) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro,
Technology Adoption] (discussing “sponsored” network technologies). But see, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at
133 [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy] (arguing that most network externalities
do not exist, are better explained by other market failures, or are unlikely to result in market failures).
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costs and risks decrease, which could significantly benefit the poor if they
are brought into the banking system. Payment providers cannot capture the
full social benefit of network expansion, however, and so because lowincome consumers would likely benefit from network expansion to their
communities more than both the average and marginal consumer, these
payment systems and distribution networks may not be rapidly adapted to
meet the financial services needs of the poor absent the type of
governmental intervention often pursued when there are public goods and
positive social externalities.379
A. Network Externalities
Network effects occur when the value to each consumer of a product
is a function of how many other consumers buy that product.380 Network
effects fall into two categories. The telephone provides “direct network
effects” because a user’s utility increases when other people purchase
phones. A phone only has value to the extent that it can be used to
communicate with other telephone users. If consumer A possesses the only
telephone, the product is worthless. But the usefulness of that phone
increases as more of A’s friends and family make the same purchase.
Consumers are benefited by “indirect network effects,” when an additional
consumer of the good alters third-party behavior.381 For example,
consumer A, who is an Apple Computer user, will benefit if consumer B
purchases an Apple Computer because it will increase the likelihood that
computer programmers will create more software that their computers can
run. The benefit A derives from B’s purchase comes indirectly through the
incentives it provides for third parties. For both types of network effects,
the benefit of a network also increases as it becomes commonplace
because the technology becomes easier to access.382
Network effects can give rise to externalities. When B decides
whether or not to buy an Apple computer, B will not take into account the
additional benefit that A will derive from the purchase.383 Nor will the
telephone purchaser necessarily consider the benefit that others will
379 As discussed more fully below, the argument based on network externalities does not
apply with equal force across all of these areas, and it is the case that there are risks that government
intervention can exacerbate rather than overcome network externalities.
380 Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 378, at 424.
381 See id.
382 Garth Saloner & Andrea Shepard, Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An
Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines, 26 RAND J. ECON. 479, 480
(1995).
383 The literature assumes that the transaction costs of negotiations among individual
consumers are too high for such negotiations to occur. With respect to the example, it assumes that A is
unable to pay B to purchase an Apple computer. If such negotiation occurred, consumers could
internalize the network effect.

200

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

80

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
receive from being able to call him. When network effects are positive,
consumers may also base their purchasing decisions on what their peers
are consuming regardless of the quality of the good. This presents the
possibility that an inferior product may become an industry standard,
deviation from which becomes costly to the individual.384
Network externality analysis has been employed in antitrust law,385
and gained prominence in the antitrust suit against Microsoft.386 The
government argued that network effects tend to produce standardization on
one format because monopoly profits accrue to the firm that can establish
its product as the standard. Firms have incentives to “tip” the market
toward an equilibrium corresponding to its product.387 Once a monopolist
is established, network effects pose barriers for new entrants.
Yet network effects may be more benign than this analysis
suggests.388 First, lock-in on an inferior standard is less likely because
early adopters will have an incentive to adopt the best technology in order
to attract others needed for a network.389 Moreover, the owner of a
superior standard will have a strong incentive to provide subsidies to early
adopters because such an owner stands to earn high profits if he
monopolizes the market.390 Second, network effects are posited in high
technology industries such as computer operating systems391 and video
players, which feature high rates of technological advancement. As an
established network standard becomes out-dated, the market becomes
prone to tipping toward the newer, better standard.392 Third, just as the
network effect creates a barrier to entry, the possibility of tipping the
384 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985). The oft-cited example is the QWERTY
keyboard, which some have argued is not the best design but became locked-in as the industry
standard. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS &
PROC. OF THE 97TH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS’N, May 1985, at 332. But see S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (disputing claim
that QWERTY represents an inefficient equilibrium).
385 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-63
(1992).
386 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
387 Some argued that this occurred when the VCR industry tipped from Beta to VHS. VCRs
exhibit direct network effects because users of the same format can exchange tapes, and indirect
network effects because ownership of a VCR encourages third parties to open tape-rental outlets
featuring that VCR’s format, substantially increasing the value of that format to other owners. See
Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 378, at 147-48 (disputing such claims).
388 See generally William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 577, 578 (1999).
389 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 215 (1995).
390 Id. at 217-18.
391 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34.
392 Consider, for example, how the VCR market tipped toward DVD in the late 1990s and
the video-game market tipped from Atari to Nintendo in the late 1980s.
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market towards a different standard and reaping monopoly profits makes
entry more tempting to those with a superior standard. Adherence to the
inferior technology represents lost profit to those suppliers with higher
quality products, which implies an opportunity for a shift to the superior
standard.393 The greater the difference in quality between the locked-in,
inferior standard and the superior new entrant, the greater the gains to be
had from entry.394 Fourth, network effects may experience diminishing
marginal returns to scale after a critical mass is reached. For example, the
addition of the first few telephones to the network dramatically increased
its value. But now that the technology is widespread, the network effect of
each additional telephone sold is negligible. As the full economies to scale
of one network are realized, and the market continues to grow, it may thus
be possible for more than one standard to coexist if the market is
sufficiently large.395
Application of the network externality arguments to card-based
payment systems requires that there be incentives for the three relevant
parties to adopt it. Banks must decide to issue the card; consumers must
decide to use it; and retailers must decide to accept it. This interaction is
exacerbated (or enhanced) by network effects. When any individual
decides to enter the card network, the network becomes more attractive to
potential future entrants. Each additional consumer who uses a card-based
payment increases the incentive for retailers to accept that form of
payment. The more retailers that accept the form of payment, the more
advantageous it is for a consumer to carry it. The more consumers who
want to carry the card, the more advantageous it is for a bank to issue it.
The network only has substantial value when it reaches a critical mass of
participants, however, so consumers and merchants lack sufficient
incentives for initial entry into the network.396
In many networks, this momentary inertia is overcome by one party
sponsoring the format. Katz and Shapiro have demonstrated that when a
firm owns the property rights to a technology, or when there are barriers to
entry, a supplier will be willing to make an investment in the form of
reduced pricing to establish the technology as the industry standard. When
one form of technology is sponsored and another is not, however, the
sponsored technology may be adopted too much from the perspective of
social welfare. Katz and Shapiro demonstrated that a rival, non-sponsored

393 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 217-18.
394 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 4 (1990) (“The greater the gap in
performance between two standards, the greater are these profit opportunities, and the more likely that
a move to the efficient standard will take place.”).
395 Consider, for example, the coexistence of Apple computers and PCs.
396 See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2002).
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technology may fail even when all consumers agree that it is superior.397
B.

Checks and Debit Cards

Because payments systems produce network externalities, they often
rely on a sponsoring entity to subsidize entry and set uniform rules and
prices for network participants.398 With respect to checks, the Federal
Reserve Board sponsored and subsidized the check clearance process,
beginning at the turn of the last century, helping to establish a nationwide
means for transferring funds and ensuring the dominance for decades of
check payments.399 Although they remain the dominant form of retail
payment, checks declined from 85% of non-cash payments in 1979 to 59%
in 2001.400 In 2001, there were seventy-two billion non-cash retail
payments, of which over forty-two billion were by check, and nearly thirty
billion were by electronic payment.401
A significant portion of these checks could readily be converted to
electronic payment. Some 30% of checks that are processed each year are
cashed by the bank that issued them (“on-us”).402 A portion of these on-us
checks represent presentment of payroll checks by workers at their
employer’s bank,403 checks that could be readily converted to direct
deposit with same day availability for workers—and with a concomitant
decline in use of expensive bank teller time—as part of a strategy to bank
unbanked workers. Some on-us checks, however, represent payment for
informal sector or part-time employment that would be more difficult to
convert to direct deposit and some of which may persist even if those who
deposit them become banked. Nearly 20% of all checks are categorized as
income payments from businesses or the government to individuals. These
397 See Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 378; see also Carl Shapiro,
Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 676 (2001).
398 See Robert M. Hunt, An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Networks, 2
REV. NETWORK ECON. 80 (2003).
399 See Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve’s Key Policies for the Provision of Financial
Services, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.htm (last modified July 3,
2003).
400 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 21. Still, U.S. use of electronic payments
as a percentage of all non-cash payments is low by international standards. The U.S. has the lowest use
of cash and the largest number of non-cash transactions per person per year among the U.S., Canada,
Japan, and Europe, but with electronic payments at fewer than 40% of non-cash payments, far lower
use of electronic payment than Canada or Europe (where electronic payments make up 67% and 79%
of non-cash payments, respectively). DAVID B. HUMPHREY, U.S. CASH AND CARD PAYMENTS OVER
25 YEARS 5 (Conference on Innovation in Financial Services and Payments, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 2002), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/innovations/Humphrey.pdf.
401 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 15. These figures exclude non-purchase
transactions, such as wholesale wire transfers, ACH settlement transactions, and ATM withdrawals.
402 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 12.
403 Some banks have recently begun to charge non-account-holders for cashing checks, even
those drawn on the bank cashing them. See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Bank Adds a $5 Fee To Cash
Paychecks, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2003, at E1.
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checks could be converted to direct deposit for those who now have
accounts or are brought into the banking system.
Among paperless, electronic forms of payment, credit cards
predominate. In 2001, there were fifteen billion credit card transactions, or
about 50% of all electronic transactions; 8.3 billion debit card transactions,
or 28%; and 5.6 billion Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) payments, or
19%.404 The growth rate for debit cards is faster than that of credit cards,405
and retail transactions using debit cards grew faster than those using credit
cards in 2001.406 The Nilson Report predicts that debit card transactions
will surpass credit card transactions in the next decade.407 In 2001, there
were nearly as many online and offline debit transactions as there were
ATM transactions.408
Online debit—because it is low cost and low risk—holds out the most
promise for expanding bank services to low-income households. Online
debit cards can be used at an ATM, or at retail merchants with POS PIN
pads for purchases or cash back. Online debit, which is routed through
EFT networks, provides real-time settlement. Sales made with online debit
result in a transfer of funds instantly, while offline debit presents a risk that
the consumer will overdraft and requires the merchant to float the cost of
sale for days. Online debit fees paid by the merchant to the card issuer are
significantly lower than offline debit.409 Moreover, because a PIN is
required for online debit, fraud rates may be lower than for signature-based
cards. By contrast, offline debit cards can be used for purchases at
checkouts where Visa or MasterCard are accepted by signing a receipt, do
not allow cash back, are routed through Visa and MasterCard networks,
use ACH settlement in one-to-three days, and carry fees paid to issuers
that are much higher.
Despite the advantages of online debit, offline debit makes up two
404 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19. ACH specializes in higher dollaramount transactions than the other payment forms and carries three-quarters of the value of all
electronic transactions. Id. ACH is a batch-processed, electronic inter-bank system for transferring
RESERVE
FIN.
SERVS.,
FEDACH,
available
at
value.
See
FED.
http://www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/FedACH-FACT.pdf (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
405 See, e.g., David Breitkopf, MasterCard To Provide Debit Settlement for Pulse, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 8, 2002, at 16 (citing MasterCard estimate that growth of debit is twice as fast as growth
of credit).
406 Calmetta Coleman, Debit Cards Look To Give Credit Cards a Run for Consumers’
Money, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at B1.
407 W.A. Lee, Debating, and Preparing for, the Payments Future, AM. BANKER, Apr. 29,
2002, at 8.
408 TONY HAYES ET AL., DOVE CONSULTING GROUP & NYCE CORP., 2002 ATM DEPLOYER
STUDY 56 (2002) [hereinafter DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY]; see also Meyer, supra note 69 (describing
rapid growth of debit card transactions).
409 See SUJIT CHAKRAVORTI & ALPA SHAH, A STUDY OF THE INTERRELATED BILATERAL
TRANSACTIONS IN CREDIT CARD NETWORKS 40 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Emerging Payments
Occasional Paper Series EPS-2001-2, 2001); John R. Wilke, Visa, MasterCard Face Huge Potential
Damages in Suit, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at B1.

204

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

84

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
thirds of debit transaction volume.410 Moreover, less than one-third of
merchants have online debit capacity.411 Offline debit is dominant in the
United States, even though other countries generally utilize the more
efficient online debit.412 Why?
The answer lies in the history of credit and debit cards in the United
States. Banks first issued debit cards in the late 1970s, long after credit
cards had become common,413 and debit cards were slow to catch on
because relatively few merchants accepted them.414 A major impediment
was that, to accept debit cards, a merchant had to purchase POS terminals
to conduct transactions.415 Visa and MasterCard first resisted offering
debit, then in the late 1980s created a joint online debit venture. The
project was challenged on antitrust grounds, and the firms settled by
ending the venture.416 By the mid-1990s, Visa and MasterCard began to
focus their attention on using the widespread availability of their credit
card infrastructure to offer offline debit. Visa and MasterCard
implemented “honor-all-cards” rules that required merchants who accepted
Visa and MasterCard credit cards also to accept their debit cards. In
addition, Visa and MasterCard imposed a “one price” policy that
prohibited merchants from charging a fee to customers for using their
more costly, offline debit. Lastly, the firms each made their debit and
credit cards physically indistinguishable. Because the higher interchange
fees for offline debit could not be passed on to customers, consumers were
indifferent to the form of payment, and use of offline debit increased at an
inefficient rate.
Because most retailers already accepted credit cards, the
infrastructure for accepting offline debit was in place years before online
debit became viable. Offline debit, because it did not require a new
infrastructure, enjoyed a first-mover advantage over online debit, which
410 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19.
411 See David Balto, Creating a Payment System Network: The Tie That Binds or an
Honorable Peace?, 55 BUS. LAW 1391, 1395 (2000); Steve Bills, Can Banks’ Clout Break Momentum
of PIN Debit?, AM. BANKER, June 10, 2002, at 1.
412 Plastic Pricing —-Visa and MasterCard Settle with Retailers, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2003,
(reporting that between 54% and 70% of Canadian merchants have POS terminals, compared to only
28% of American merchants).
413 See Balto, supra note 411, at 1392.
414 Because a payment card network can arise only with concurrent
participation by three groups of entities, the institutional environment that will
support the deployment of payment cards must be one that includes favorable
conditions . . . for participation by financial institutions that issue the cards, by
merchants that accept the cards, and by consumers that carry them.
Mann, supra note 396, at 1063.
415 See, e.g., Barbara Grondin Francella, Money Market: Debit-Savvy Consumers Ask for
Cash Back at the Checkout, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS, July 14, 2003, at 57 (“[B]usiness needs in
the past haven’t always justified having the PIN pad.”) (quoting a retailer).
416 See New York v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,016, 1990 WL 75047
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1990).
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required installation of POS terminals. Moreover, even though offline
debit was less efficient, consumers did not face any price differential for
using offline debit, meaning that true economic costs were not being
correctly allocated.417 Although consumers increasingly had access to
cards that could be used for both ATMs and online debit, retailers faced
higher capital costs for online debit and had lower incentives to purchase
POS terminals because customers were indifferent to the payment
method.418
Competition between Visa and MasterCard, and between offline and
online debit, actually results in higher, not lower interchange fees, for both
products. Because they do not directly pay them, individual consumers are
indifferent to the interchange fee charged by either Visa or MasterCard.
Banks, however, which receive revenue from interchange fees, strongly
prefer a high interchange fee and will base the decision whether to issue
online or offline debit in part on which allows them to charge merchants
higher fees. Visa and MasterCard have repeatedly responded to each
other’s interchange increases by themselves increasing fees.419 Merchants
cannot respond by discouraging consumers from using these costlier forms
of payment by providing a discount to whichever card association
provided the lower interchange fee, because, consistent with network
theory, the association agreements prohibit them from doing so.420
As the interchange fees for offline debit increase, the profit a card
issuer can make from an online-debit transaction appears small by
comparison.421 Consequently, some issuers who offer cards with both
online and offline capabilities charge the consumer a fee for PIN usage,
actually promoting use of the more inefficient payment format.422
Merchants counter by promoting the consumer’s ability to receive cash
417 See David B. Humphrey & Allen N. Berger, Market Failure and Resource Use:
Economic Incentives To Use Different Payment Instruments, in THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM:
EFFICIENCY, RISK AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45, 45-46 (David B. Humphrey ed.,
1990).
418 See generally Dennis C. Mueller, First-Mover Advantages and Path Dependence, 15
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 827 (1997).
419 For example, in 1998, Visa announced that it was increasing its interchange fee by about
20%. In response, MasterCard increased its rate by 9%. Visa answered by raising its fee an additional
5%, and MasterCard responded with another increase. See David A. Balto, The Problem of
Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 215, 216 (2000); Pete Hisey,
How High Can You Go?, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr. 1, 1999, at 105.
420 The Reserve Bank of Australia has responded by reversing Visa and MasterCard’s ban on
surcharging customers and requiring a 40% cut in interchange fees. See Robin Arnfield, A Shakeup in
Australia’s Card Market, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Feb. 27, 2003, at 16.
421 See Jeffrey Green, Offline vs. Online Debit, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Nov. 1, 1998, at 17
(stating that offline debit is “cannibalizing” online debit, not because it is more efficient, but because
banks prefer to issue offline debit cards to reap higher interchange rates).
422 See Burney Simpson, Debit Makes It a Horse Race; Once a Minor Player, the Debit
Card Is Now Challenging Credit as Americans’ Preferred Payment Card; What’s Ahead on the
Rapidly Evolving Debit Scene?, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Feb. 27, 2003, at 38.
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back with PIN usage.423 For online debit networks to compete for card
issuers, online interchange fees had to rise along with Visa and
MasterCard’s offline rates.424 Thus, competition between online and
offline debit in attracting card issuers drove up rates for both products.
As the advantages of online debit became more apparent, however,
and debit usage increased, offline debit’s position as the industry standard
became more tenuous. As debit use became more widespread, the potential
savings from the installation of a POS terminal increased dramatically. At
some point, the savings from accepting online debit would exceed the
costs of installing the terminal.425 The market was prone to tip.
The resulting honor-all-cards rules and the prohibition of surcharging
offline debit usage can largely be understood as an effort by Visa and
MasterCard to “sponsor” offline debit to extend their market power. The
prohibition on surcharges prevented retailers from forcing consumers to
internalize the cost of their offline debit usage, thereby dampening
consumer demand for POS terminals.426 The honor-all-cards rules, which
effectively tied offline debit acceptance to credit card acceptance,427
effectively blocked retailers, whose customers demanded the availability
of credit card usage, from refusing to accept offline debit. By maintaining
a large base of retailers who accept the offline payment format, the
incentive for a consumer to demand online debit was maintained at a low
level. Visa and MasterCard essentially sought to postpone “tipping” to the
more efficient online standard for as long as possible.428
This tension came to a head with the recent antitrust suit led by WalMart against Visa and MasterCard. Merchants banded together in a classaction lawsuit (now settled), alleging that the card companies’ “honor all
423 Online Double-Digit Growth Loses Its Luster, BANK NETWORK NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, at
1 (reporting that Wal-Mart is encouraging consumers to use PIN debit by asking them “if they would
like to receive up to $100 cash back”).
424 Compare Robert A. Bennett, The Retailers’ Home Run, CREDIT CARD MGMT., June 26,
2003, at 24 (reporting that, in June 2003, the typical online-debit interchange fee for a $40 sale was
$0.34), with Richard Mitchell, The Debit Card Balancing Act, CREDIT CARD MGMT, Dec. 1, 1995, at
14 (reporting that, in 1995, online interchange fees typically were $0.02 to $0.08 for a $100 purchase).
425 This is especially true for retailers who deal with a high volume of transactions. For these
retailers, only a small percentage of their customers need use online debit for the savings to become
substantial.
426 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 389, at 3-4. Liebowitz and Margolis state, “There
is no possibility of excess inertia in their model if all participants can communicate perfectly.” The
prohibition on surcharging offline debit is really a prohibition on a form of negotiation between
consumers and retailers and thereby preserves offline debit’s excess inertia.
427 Tying in this context is somewhat different to the traditional usage of the term. Tying the
purchase of one product to another is anti-competitive because consumers are thereby prevented from
purchasing competing products that substitute for the tied good. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Merchants, on the other hand, are still able to purchase, and still have some use for,
POS terminals even if they accept offline debit. The tying of offline debit cards to credit cards, instead
of directly preventing the consumption of a substitute good, prevented retailers from removing
themselves from the offline debit network.
428 For a discussion of tipping, see Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 378.

207

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

87

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 49 [2004]
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 21:121, 2004

cards” policy violated the antitrust laws.429 The plaintiffs argued that the
rules constituted impermissible tying of products and that Visa and
MasterCard conspired to monopolize the debit-card market.430
The “honor all cards” policy reduced the negotiating power of the
merchants with respect to interchange fees because the merchants could
not decline to offer offline cards if they wanted to accept credit cards. To
keep card issuers in the offline network, Visa and MasterCard increased
interchange fees and retailers were in a weaker position to resist. As
offline fees increased, online fees increased as well because EFT networks
had to compete with offline firms for card issuer share. Industry observers
believed that Visa and MasterCard’s “honor all cards” and “one price”
policies would have driven out debit cards even though debit cards are less
expensive and pose less risk to merchants and customers.431 Setting
network fees within a network for the same product is generally thought of
as important to establishing a network. Letting one network set prices in
another, however, may drive the market toward a sub-optimal outcome.
This instance of path dependence would have done more than created an
inefficient standard; an added cost would have been borne by low- and
middle-income consumers, for whom offline debit is a particularly poor
substitute for online debit.
The parties ultimately settled the suit on the eve of trial. Both Visa
and MasterCard agreed to eliminate the honor-all-card rules and to pay
several billion dollars in damages. The settlement has the potential to
benefit the poor in several regards. The untying of credit and offline debit
is likely to result in fewer retailers accepting offline debit and lower
interchange fees as Visa and MasterCard seek to preserve their market
share.432 The settlement may lead to the diminution of offline debit and
faster growth of its online counterpart.433
For low-income customers, the dispute between merchants and the
credit card companies had the potential to affect the cost, risk, and
availability of financial services. A strong surge to offline debit rather than
429 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2027 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting class action certification), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). The
parties reached a settlement under which Visa and Mastercard will pay merchants $3 billion over 10
years and reduce their signature-debit fees. Jennifer Bayot, Visa Reaches Settlement in Debit Card
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at C1.
430 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 192 F.R.D. at 71.
431 See Balto, supra note 411, at 1391; Bills, supra note 411, at 1. For the problem of
inefficient outcomes from sponsored technologies in the context of network externalities, see Katz &
Shapiro, Technology Adoption, supra note 378, at 825.
432 David A. Balto, Life After the Wal-Mart Case, CREDIT CARD MGMT, Aug. 2003, at 48
(stating that interchange fees for offline debit are likely to decline by one third).
433 But see Frederick H. Lowe, A Lift for Recurring Payments, CREDIT CARD MGMT., July
25, 2003, at 30 (reporting that Visa is predicting that the end of the honor-all-cards rules will boost
offline debit acceptance with utilities, who would like to accept electronic payments for recurring bills
but do not want to accept credit cards because of their even higher interchange fees).
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online debit means higher prices for all consumers (whether embedded in
goods and services or, less likely, explicitly priced for debit card usage),
including those least able to afford them. By contrast, most banks do not
charge their bank customers for using an online debit card at POS.434
Moreover, many retailers permit customers to get cash back using their
online debit cards; these transactions are surcharge-free, cost the merchant
no more than a standard online debit transaction, and reduce merchant
cash-handling costs.435 Cash-back transactions constitute 20% of online
debit transactions, or one billion cash withdrawals.436 Merchants benefit
from the ability of customers to withdraw funds as well. Because the
transfer into their account is instantaneous, they lose no interest income
due to the float and, unlike a credit card, the customer cannot revoke the
transaction.437
A shift to signature-based debit would also increase low-income
consumers’ risk of overdraft. Offline debit is settled offline—debiting of
the cardholder’s bank account occurs one to three days later using ACH
networks. Online debit is settled online in real time—settlement occurs
instantly when the PIN is entered. Online transactions are lower risk to the
merchant, issuer, and customer because overdrafts are essentially not
possible. By contrast, offline debits can cause overdrafts and result in fees
for insufficient funds. The possibility of high overdraft fees make offline
debit a potentially worse product for the poor, who, with the risk of
overdraft, would need to manage their finances quite carefully.438
Governmental and private sector initiatives to increase the provision
of accounts and online debit to the unbanked could aid in overcoming the
excess inertia that is impeding the collective switch from offline debt to
the more efficient online standard.439 With a growing number of welfare
434 Eighty-five percent of banks do not charge for POS use, up from 77% in 1999. Laura
Bruce, Consumers Losing the Fight Against ATM Surcharges, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2002). The
banks that do charge for POS do so to drive their customers to use signature debit on which they earn
higher interchange fees from merchants.
435 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 57; see also Francella, supra note 415
(stating that many online debit withdrawals from merchants are free, and those that are not are
generally only thirty-five to fifty cents). To the extent that this feature competes with ATMs, online
debit may discourage the deployment of additional ATMs. Although this effect will somewhat reduce
convenient ATMs access, the added convenience of being able to make withdrawals at most merchants
who accept online debit will likely compensate for this loss.
436 Id.
437 See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 117 (1999). Also, merchants’ cash handling costs are reduced by
cash back transactions.
438 This comparison may be somewhat overstated, because offline debit could work well
with stored value cards as an access mechanism; stored value cards may be an effective alternative
payment mechanism for large employers. Still, stored value cards themselves would not increase
access to the banking system.
439 See generally Farrell & Saloner, supra note 384 (discussing problem of switching
standards).
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recipients receiving payments via electronic benefits transfer programs, a
merchant with a POS terminal can accept those EBT cards for payment. A
similar effect could result from a greater portion of employers paying their
workforce through debit cards that could be used at POS terminals. A
larger scale initiative to move low-income households into the banking
system with bank accounts providing for online debit access could help to
push the payment system towards the more efficient online standard.
Similarly, governmental initiatives to move the payments system towards
online debit could help lower the cost and risk of providing bank accounts
to low-income households. Banked households could take advantage of a
more extensive POS and ATM network to access funds. The more
extensive the network, the lower the unit costs of transactions, and the
higher the utility of having a debit card.
One drawback of debit cards—both offline and online—is that
existing consumer protection laws expose debit transactions to greater risk
than using checks or credit cards. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)440 and
Regulation Z441 provide consumer protections for credit card consumers.
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA)442 and Regulation E443 govern
ACH or debit card transactions. TILA and Regulation Z provide much
greater protection to credit transactions than EFTA and Regulation E do
for debit and ACH transactions. TILA and Regulation Z require the
creditor to advocate for a consumer in a dispute with a merchant over
items purchased by credit, and the consumer may withhold payment on
disputed items; no similar protections exist for debit or ACH. Under TILA
and Regulation Z, credit card holders’ liability for unauthorized use is
limited to $50; the test is more complicated for unauthorized use of debit
cards and depends on when the consumer notifies the card issuer. Visa and
MasterCard have instituted their own policies holding cardholders
harmless for unauthorized use of both credit and debit cards.444 Congress
may wish to consider updating these consumer protection laws as online
debit and ACH retail transactions become more prevalent.
C.

ATMs

Transactions at ATMs are significantly less expensive than
transactions with tellers, and the costs of ATMs are significantly lower
than the costs of a bank branch. ATMs thus offer an opportunity to deliver
440 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
441 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2003).
442 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2000).
443 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003).
444 See generally Ann H. Spiotto, Credit, Debit, or ACH: Consequences & Liabilities, ABA
BANK COMPLIANCE, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 4.
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financial services to the poor at lower cost than “bricks and mortar”
branches. Rapid expansion of ATM deployment in the late 1990s has
dramatically increased the availability of ATMs.445 That growth is unlikely
to continue as the market matures, but widespread ATM networks present
possible distribution channels for expanded access to banking services for
the poor. Given the economics of ATM placement and operation, which
require high volumes of transactions, a strategy for expanding access to
banking for the poor using ATMs or POS, or with advanced functions such
as bill payment, will likely require some governmental incentives to be
viable in some low-income areas with low penetration of these
technologies. Moreover, further expansion of ATMs may be contingent on
surcharge income, but surcharging would significantly increase the cost of
using ATMs for low-income persons.
Bank accounts and ATMs are complementary products that exhibit
indirect network externalities. Increasing the penetration of bank accounts
will increase the number of ATM users, giving banks a greater incentive to
deploy more ATMs. Each individual ATM user is, therefore, benefited by
the demand created by other ATM users.446 Studies indicate that increasing
the number of depositors increases the likelihood that a bank will adopt
ATMs.447 Although ATM dispersal is quite broad now, and network
effects from additional users are likely to be low, additional account
holders from low-income communities with low ATM penetration would
increase incentives to place ATMs in those locations.
ATMs have become increasingly available as a potential source for
the delivery of financial services. By 2001, nearly 91% of banks and thrifts
were offering ATM services.448 The number of ATMs off-premises of
banks, whether deployed by banks themselves or by independent service
operators (ISOs), increased dramatically in the late-1990s when Cirrus and
Plus ATM networks permitted ATM owners linked to their networks to
collect surcharges from ATM users.449 As of June 2001, there were
approximately 324,000 ATMs deployed nationwide,450 compared with
445 ATMs exhibited network externalities in the early period of their growth that diminished
rapidly once networks achieved scale. See Saloner & Shepard, supra note 382, at 480.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 500.
448 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6.
449 See TIMOTHY H. HANNAN ET AL., TO SURCHARGE OR NOT TO SURCHARGE: AN
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF ATM PRICING 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance & Economics Discussion
2001-38,
2000),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001/
Series
200138/200138pap.pdf; DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 1 (“In 1996 the national adoption
of surcharging . . . single handedly altered the nature of the ATM industry.”); id. at 31 (noting that offpremises ATMs increased at an average rate of 32% between 1999 and 2001); ROBERT E. LITAN, ATM
FEES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1999) (arguing that surcharging permitted ATM owners to cover
expenses of off-premises ATMs, which have lower volumes and higher serving costs than ATMs on
bank premises), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/PDF_Files/GR_atmfees.pdf.
450 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 7; see also Press Release, Dove Consulting,
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86,055 offices of the nation’s 9,757 banks, thrifts, and credit unions.451
After the post-surcharging rush to deploy large numbers of ATMs,
deployment has now matured, with net ATM levels expected to remain flat
for some time.452 In fact, banks and ISOs plan to rationalize ATM fleets in
the near term by eliminating low-transaction volume ATMs and adding
new ATMs in retail locations with “high foot traffic” and where
“consumers have a need for cash.”453 Both banks and ISOs intend to
continue modest growth in total numbers.454
Over the last decade, ATM cards increased in number from 200
million to 263 million, while transaction volume more than doubled, to
13.6 billion.455 With 288% growth in ATM deployment,456 however,
transaction volume per ATM has dropped significantly, calling into
question the continued ability of revenue to support this extent of
deployment.457
ATM fees, which drive deployment strategies, have increased steadily
over time. Bank fees for its own customer’s use of other banks’ or ISO
deployer’s ATMs (“on others” fees) averaged $1.17 per transaction in
2001.458 Surcharges, or fees charged to a non-customer user of a bank’s (or
ISO’s) ATM, grew dramatically in the late 1990s459 and were charged by
88.5% of institutions by 2001. Surcharge fees continue to increase,
averaging $1.32 in 2001.460 Rates are highest in the Midwest and Southeast
New Study Details an Industry Returning to Equilibrium (Mar. 4, 2002), at
http://www.consultdove.com/PR-2003-03-04atmdeployer.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter
Dove Press Release]; David Breitkopf, Retail ATMs Said Losing Money, But Still Find Fans, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 7, 2002, at 11.
451 FDIC, Offices of FDIC-Insured Institutions, at http://www3.fdic.gov/sod/pdf/
dnum_2001.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
452 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 2; see also Dove Press Release, supra note
450.
453 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 45.
454 Id. at 33.
455 Id. at 47.
456 Id. at 48.
457 Id. at 7-8. Average bank monthly transaction volume has held steady at 3,584, while ISO
average volume held steady at 600 per month. Industry average transaction volume has nonetheless
declined, because ISOs are deploying at a much faster rate than banks, lowering the industry average.
Id. at 49-51.
458 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6. “On others” fees are charged by 78.5% of
institutions. In contrast, “on us” transactions, by a bank’s customer at the bank’s own ATMs, are
generally not subject to fees. Similarly, most banks do not charge an annual fee for debit or ATM
cards. Id.
459 Timothy H. Hannan, Retail Fees of Depository Institutions, 1994-1999, 87 FED. RES.
BULL. 1 (2001).
460 RETAIL FEES STUDY, supra note 150, at 6. Bankrate.com’s Spring 2002 Checking
Account Pricing Study, which samples the 10 largest institutions in each of the 35 largest markets,
finds higher fees for “on others” ($1.38) and for surcharges ($1.47). See Laura Bruce, Highlights of the
Spring 2002 Checking Account Pricing Study, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2001), at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20020328f.asp. Consumers paid $2.2 billion in surcharges in
2002. Bankrate’s Checking Account Price Study, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 28, 2002), at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20020328a.asp. Dove estimates surcharges in 2001 ranging
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and lowest in New England.461
Where there is intense competition among ATM deployers,
surcharging is more difficult to maintain because non-customers are more
likely to be relatively close to an ATM owned by their own bank. Thus,
surcharging is less prevalent in areas with higher ATM densities.462
Pointedly, ATM densities are lower and surcharging more prevalent in
counties and metropolitan statistical areas with higher concentrations of
ethnic or racial minorities and in areas with higher concentrations of
persons age 60 and older,463 although data on ATM deployment has not
been collected on the neighborhood level.
To avoid costly surcharging, low-income persons would need to
establish bank accounts with banks that have high penetration of ATMs in
communities near where they live or work. The need to use a bank with a
strong local ATM presence would complicate efforts to bank the unbanked
on a national, rather than local or regional, scale.464 More importantly, the
goal of avoiding surcharging conflicts with the goal of expanding
deployment. Both on- and off-premises ATMs require significant
surcharge income to support themselves.465 The additional security costs
associated with deployment of ATMs in high-crime areas would also
complicate efforts to serve the poor.
The cost of ATM deployment and operation is a key barrier to using
ATMs to serve the poor. Dove reports average monthly costs to own and
operate an off-premises machine to be $1,090—or $1,298 once expenses
and back office costs are included—although these costs vary widely by
from $1.65 for an off-premises ATM of a large bank to $1.09 for off-premises ATMs of non-large
credit unions; average surcharges were $1.48. DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 12.
461 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 81.
462 HANNAN ET AL., supra note 449, at 2 (“[T]he probability of surcharging increases with
both the institution’s share of market ATMs and the length of time period since surcharging was first
permitted in the state, and decreases with the local number of ATMs per square mile in the market.”).
463 [O]ther things being equal, financial institutions are more likely to impose
surcharges in markets where people over the age of 59 or belonging to minority
groups comprise a greater share of the population. This may reflect a greater
willingness to pay for convenient access to cash among these population groups,
perhaps due to higher costs of traveling to avoid surcharges or differences in
overall cash usage.
Id. at 22.
464 Some small banks and credit unions are overcoming small ATM footprints by forming
no-surcharging alliances with networks, each other, and larger firms. As of 1999, 8,000 ATMs were
covered in such alliances. Litan argues that some pre-1996 state laws and network anti-discrimination
rules hindered growth of suballiances. LITAN, supra note 449, at 19, 25. By 2001, Dove reported that
about 20,000 ATMs owned by 2,000 financial institutions participated in selective surcharging
networks. DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 78. No-surcharge alliances are most prevalent
in the Pacific region and in New England. Id. at 77. For example, NYCE set up a surcharge-free
cooperative in the northeastern U.S., including 456 depositories and 2,726 ATMs. David Breitkopf,
Fee-Free ATM Venture Draws Doubt from EFT Community, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 2001, at 7.
465 Surcharging represents two-thirds of income; interchange fees one-third. DOVE
DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 88.
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type of deployer and machine.466 Off-premises machines generate only
$1,075 in revenue.467 On-premises machines at banks cost $1,254 and
generate revenues of $1,277.468 These average numbers mask strong
variation, with ISO deployers using lower-cost, lower-technology, lowerrent strategies than their bank counterparts but generating lower volumes
and lower revenues.469 For large banks, on-premises machines generate
revenue of $1,360, cost $1,349, and thus have a profit of $11 per month.
Large bank-owned off-premises ATMs generate revenue of $1,835, cost
$1,534, and have a profit of $301 per month.470 ATM revenue, particularly
for off-premises ATMs, is likely to decrease in the future. The volume of
transactions from individuals who are not customers of the bank that owns
the ATM (“foreign volume”) at both on- and off-premises ATMs has been
dropping, from 35% in 1999 to 32% in 2002. For off-premises ATMs,
foreign volume dropped from 57% of transactions in 1999 to 48% in
2002.471 Most deployers now lose money on off-premises ATMs, and
credit unions, because of the prevalence of no-surcharge alliances, lose
money on both on- and off-premises ATMs.472
Income from surcharging and interchange fees, however, is only part
of the profit picture for banks. Banks also use ATMs to provide convenient
service to customers, to market the bank’s services to attract new
customers, and to migrate its existing customers away from using highcost branch services towards lower cost ATM services.473 Banks view onus transactions as worth $0.55 per transaction in cost savings in reduced
branch time and revenue gains from customer retention and attraction.474
Thus, the value to banks of ATMs depends on whether the ATM draws
customers away from lower-return bank services and retains or attracts
customers who provide opportunities to the bank for higher-return
services.
In addition to the basic functions of income deposit and withdrawal,
ATMs could be used to provide electronic services of broader potential use
to low- and moderate-income individuals. For example, 7-Eleven is
466 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 14. Large credit union costs are much
higher, at $1624 per month; small ISOs’ costs average $732 per month. Id. at 15.
467 Id. at 87.
468 Id.
469 Id. at 97. ISOs tend to deploy lower functionality machines costing $5,000, while banks
deploy higher functionality machines costing $15,000-$20,000. With five-year depreciation, this
results in monthly expenses of $375 for an on-premises ATM, $279 for an off-premises ATM for
banks, and $100 for ISOs.
470 Id. at 105.
471 Id. at 8.
472 Id.
473 See id. at 3, 108. While banks value these benefits, ISOs, without any customers of their
own, do not benefit from these ATM functions. See also HANNAN ET AL., supra note 449
(documenting surcharge as strategy for customer retention and attraction).
474 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 108.
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piloting ATMs that cash checks, issue money orders, and wire funds, and
7-Eleven plans to expand the machines to allow customers to shop
online.475 Fleet is adding automatic bill payment to its ATMs; Wachovia’s
machines allow customers to buy stamps or add long distance phone
time.476 Two firms have announced plans to launch programs to allow
customers to recharge prepaid cell phone accounts through ATMs, and one
is considering adding bill payment, money orders, and money transfer
functionality.477 Another firm is beginning to sell ATMs designed for lowto medium-volume locations that will be able to cash checks, transfer
money, and replenish prepaid cell phones.478 These advanced functions
could help position ATMs as competitors to both bank tellers and check
cashers in providing financial services to low- and moderate-income
customers.
Despite the potential for advanced functions, however, more than
three-quarters of all ATM transactions remain withdrawals.479 Moreover,
while nearly 80% of banks offer deposit taking at their on-premises ATMs,
only 17% offer deposit taking at most of their off-premises ATMs, and
fully one third do not offer such services at any of their off-premises
machines.480 The cost of deposit taking at off-premises machines at present
is prohibitively expensive, largely due to the need to physically pick up
deposited checks daily for processing and settlement. Now that Congress
has enacted the Check Clearing for the Twenty-First Century Act,481
ATMs with check truncation technology permitting them to capture check
information electronically could process checks without daily physical

475 Dave Anderton, 7-Eleven, More Than Food, DESERT NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Jan.
15, 2003, at C1; David Breitkopf, 7-11, NCR Extend Kiosk Work, AM. BANKER, July 15, 2002, at 8;
Michelle Higgins, ATMs To Go Far Beyond Cash, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at D1.
476 Higgins, supra note 475, at D1.
477 See Chris Costanzo, Next on ATM Option List, AM. BANKER, Aug. 12, 2003, at 1. The
market for prepaid cell phones is disproportionately composed of the unbanked. See By the Numbers,
BANK TECH. NEWS, July 2003, at 22.
478 See David Breitkopf, Triton Making Inroads with New In-Wall ATMs, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 8, 2003, at 5.
479 Withdrawals constitute 77% of transactions. Other services are mostly traditional banking
ones, including deposits (9%), inquiries (11%), transfers (2%), and “other” (1%). DOVE DEPLOYER
STUDY, supra note 408, at 9, 59.
480 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 104.
481 Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (2003). Under prior law, banks must physically
process and transport the check through the clearing and settlement system unless the bank depositing
the check obtains a prior agreement from the other banks individually. Given the large number of
banks in the U.S., it is infeasible for most banks to obtain such an agreement. The Check Clearing Act
permits check information to be captured, stored, and transmitted electronically, with a substitute
check printed if the customer desires. See Check Clearing for the Twenty-First Century Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong.
(Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030408/default.htm.
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transfers, dramatically reducing the cost of providing deposit-taking
capacity at off-premises machines.482
While advanced functions could one day prove useful to low-income
ATM users, current practice suggests that day is a long way off. Ministatements and postage stamps currently lead the field in deployment,
offered by between one quarter and one third of financial institutions.483
Only 6% of all deployers offer check cashing; 1% print money orders; and
1% permit bill payment to third parties.484 Some 12% of ISO deployers
dispense phone cards, a device often used by low-income customers, while
essentially no financial institutions offer this service.485 ATM deployers’
stated interest in adding new functionality focuses on marketing, but there
is some interest in cash transfers (to compete with wire transfers), check
cashing, money order printing, bill presentment and bill payment to third
parties.486 Only 5% of financial institution deployers currently use webenabled ATMs that would permit wide scale, efficient re-programming to
support new functions, such as bill payment, although about a third of
financial institution deployers plan to upgrade to web-enabled technology
within the next two years.487 Large financial institutions were twice as
likely to see marketing and customer satisfaction as business opportunities
than to see advanced functionality as an opportunity.488 Citibank, which
had piloted ATM bill payment, discontinued its services in 2001, “citing a
lack of customer interest.”489 In the near term, increased ATM
functionality is unlikely to benefit the poor absent significant incentives—
governmental or market—to include these services.490 Yet expanding
access to bank accounts for low-income persons may stimulate demand for
some alternate ATM services.
In sum, the rapid growth in deployment of ATMs in the 1990s
presents a real opportunity for the delivery of financial services to lowand moderate-income consumers. ATMs are far less expensive than bank
branches and teller time. ATMs could potentially be used to make deposits
of income, convert income to cash, and pay bills electronically or through
disbursement of money orders. These three functions are critical financial
482 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 104. The banking regulators would need to
consider how such deposit-taking ATMs should be considered for purposes of delineation of the
bank’s assessment areas for purposes of the CRA. See also infra Subsection V.A.2 (discussing CRA).
483 DOVE DEPLOYER STUDY, supra note 408, at 10.
484 Id. at 63.
485 Id. at 64.
486 Id. at 66.
487 Id. at 10, 66-67.
488 Id. at 18 (reporting that 50% identified an opportunity in marketing, while 25% saw one
in advanced functionality).
489 Id. at 71.
490 See, e.g., Banks Once Again Turn to ATMs To Reduce Costs, ATM & DEBIT NEWS, Apr.
10, 2003, at 1.
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services for the poor. Absent governmental incentives, however, banks are
unlikely to view expansion of ATM availability in low-income areas, and
increased ATM functionality useful to low-income consumers, as
sufficiently profitable.
D. Direct Deposit and Bill Payment
Advances in the ACH system can gradually make it easier and
cheaper to offer banking products, such as direct deposit and bill payment,
that could reduce reliance on more expensive comparable transactions
conducted by low- and moderate-income households, such as cashing
payroll checks and buying money orders. These ACH transactions
generally require a bank account.491 Expansion of ACH (and lowering its
price) would make electronically based bank accounts more attractive to
and useful for low- and moderate-income households.
While ACH is only the third most commonly used form of electronic
payment as measured by transaction volume, ACH carries more than three
quarters of all retail electronic payment value ($5.67 trillion).492 ACH
activity consists mostly of direct deposit of payroll, and also of
preauthorized bill payment.493 Direct deposit is already used by more than
100 million individuals in the U.S. and is offered by more than 80% of
firms with more than 100 employees. Seventy-one percent of employees
who have direct deposit available to them at their work use it.494 Direct
deposits grew by 11.6% from 2000 to 2001, from 3.3 billion to 3.7 billion
payments.495
The challenge is to bring direct deposit to more workplaces
employing low-income workers and to more low-wage workers—
including part-time or temporary workers—wherever they work. Direct
deposit is cheaper (to banks, employers, and employees) than processing
paychecks,496 involves no risk of bounced, lost, or stolen checks, facilitates
491 For payroll cards, employers set up a pooled account so no individualized account is
required.
492 RETAIL PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 134, at 19.
493 See NACHA, 2002 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS REVIEW AND BUYER’S GUIDE:
UNDERSTANDING THE ACH NETWORK, available at http://www.roialliance.com/Acrobat/
BG_ACH_Primer.pdf. ACH credit occurs when an originator moves its funds into a receiver’s account,
for example, in a direct deposit of payroll or a home-based Internet-directed bill payment. ACH debit
occurs when an originator, having been pre-authorized to do so, transfers funds from a receiver’s
account to an originator’s account, for example, in a mortgage payment.
494 Id. at 45.
495 Press Release, NACHA, ACH Payment Growth Accelerates to 16.2 Percent in 2001,
NACHA Announces (Apr. 15, 2002), at http://www.nacha.org/news/news/pressreleases/
2002/PR041502_1/pr041502_1.htm.
496 NACHA estimates ACH transactions cost 25-30% less than paper transactions for banks
to process. Id. at 2. For employers, NACHA argues that ACH can help to reduce administrative and
operating expenses, employee time lost cashing checks, and time and cost for paper handling
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saving, and provides same day availability for workers. Banks that
currently issue payroll checks for employers and switch to direct deposit
services may see reduced lines at tellers on paydays as employees no
longer wait to cash their employer’s check “on us” at the issuing bank.497
Payroll cards are designed for just that purpose. For most banked middleand upper-income customers, however, checks remain relatively cheap and
convenient, and electronic technology for bill payment may appear
uncertain, effectively delaying deployment of the necessary infrastructure
to reduce costs and increase availability of electronic payments.498
Electronic bill payment could be more widely used by consumers—
and in particular low-income consumers—at lower cost and risk than
checks or money orders. Direct payments totaled $2.6 billion in 2001, a
17.6% increase from 2000.499 Direct bill payment eliminates postage
expense, the risk of late payment fees and interest charges, and charges for
checks. NACHA estimates that consumers saved $1 billion in such costs
by using direct payment. Direct payment is advantageous for the billing
company as well, as it reduces the risk of non-payment and late
payment.500 Moreover, one study found that consumers using direct
payments tend to maintain higher balances in their bank accounts and that
consumers who use direct payment to put aside funds for saving or
investment save $140 more per month on average than consumers who do
not use it.501 Using direct payment may be correlated with a propensity to
save, however, so it is difficult to determine whether the institutional
mechanism of direct payment bolsters, or simply reflects, savings
behavior. Direct bill payment may also increase one’s ability to establish a
sound credit history because, unlike information about the payment of bills
with cash or money orders, the bank processing the payment regularly
captures information about direct bill payment.502
As currently structured, direct payment is used by higher income
households and direct deposit is offered by large firms. A recent survey of
consumers and businesses sheds some light on barriers to expanding direct
(predicting an average of $0.115 per payment saved). Id. at 2. See also PAUL W. BAUER & PATRICK
HIGGINS, POST CONSOLIDATION ESTIMATES OF ACH SCALE ECONOMIES, TECHNICAL CHANGE, AND
COST EFFICIENCY (Innovation in Financial Services and Payments Conference, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, 2002), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/innovations/bauer_higgins.pdf.
497 Recall that 30% of check volume is currently processed “on us.” See supra text
accompanying note 402.
498 Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 44-45.
499 Press Release, NACHA, supra note 495.
500 DirectPayment.org, Key Benefits, at http://www.directpayment.org/consumers_1_1.cfm
(last visited Dec. 5, 2003). NACHA estimates that companies on average save 11.5 cents on reduced
processing costs per payment when consumers use direct payment. DirectPayment.org, How To Get
Started, at http://www.directpayment.org/companies_2_1.cfm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003).
501 DirectPayment.org, For Consumers, at http://www.directpayment.org/consumers_1.cfm
(last visited Dec. 11, 2003).
502 See supra note 56.
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deposit and direct bill payment more broadly, including to low- and
moderate-income households.503 Fifty-five percent of consumers use direct
deposit, while 37% use direct payment.504 Direct deposit users cite
convenience as the most important reason for using direct deposit (71%),
followed by reliability (31%), and safety (30%).505 Those not using direct
deposit feared not knowing how much or when deposits were made, the
possibility of mistakes, and security concerns. Non-users did not find
direct deposit convenient, because they would still need to go to a bank to
get cash. Of the nonusers, 63% do not have direct deposit available from
their employer.506 Of these, 35% said they would definitely or probably
sign up for direct deposit if it were made available at work, and another
30% indicated that they might sign up.507
With respect to bill payment, 37% of consumer respondents use direct
payment for one or more recurring payments.508 Direct payment has higher
penetration for insurance (29%) and securities (35%) than for mortgages
(19%), utilities (13%), telephone (10%), cable TV (5%) or other services,
suggesting that use of automatic bill payment is linked to income as well
as market sector.509 Of direct payment users, the potential benefits cited
were related to time savings and reduced worry of late payment, while
non-users cited concerns that direct payment would not be reliable, would
take control away from them with respect to the timing of payments, might
diminish their privacy, and might increase the risk of fraud.
On the business side, only 32% of business respondents offer direct
deposit to employees.510 Direct deposit is offered by 84% of larger
companies with 100 or more employees; 61% of those with between fifty
and ninety-nine employees, and only 31% of small employers with fewer
than fifty employees.511 Only 13% of businesses offer direct payment
options to customers, although most utility companies offer direct payment
to their customers.512
Low-income persons are more likely to work in smaller firms and to
have sporadic, part-time, and/or multiple employment, which would
complicate efforts to provide for direct deposit. One study found that
among the low-income banked population in New York and Los Angeles,
503 FED. RESERVE BANK, A SUMMARY OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS ATTITUDES ON DIRECT
DEPOSIT AND DIRECT PAYMENT, A NATIONAL ACH MARKET RESEARCH STUDY (1998), available at
http://www.stls.frb.org/financial/assets/pdf/summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2003).
504 Id. at 3.
505 Id. at 5.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Id. at 12.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 8.
511 Id.
512 Id. at 16.
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40% used direct deposit, some fifteen percentage points below the usage
rates for the general public found in the Federal Reserve Board study,
while 52% of these respondents received income checks and 8% received
cash.513 Of course, none of the unbanked had direct deposit. Moreover,
low-income persons may have a heightened need to control the timing of
their bill payment—delaying payment on the phone bill to pay the rent, for
example—given their low levels of liquidity. Thus, direct bill payment
may make sense for only some low-income persons, or with respect to
only some critical monthly bills, with discretion retained as to the timing
in paying other bills.
More widespread use of direct deposit and electronic bill payment
would not only lower payment systems costs overall, but also remove
some key reasons why low-income people need to frequent high-cost
alternative financial service providers. Given the positive externalities
from adoption of ACH, there is some evidence that ACH is priced higher
than is socially optimal by the Federal Reserve Board (which despite the
presence of private sector competitors, handles 80% of ACH
transactions).514 Although ACH prices have been declining, data from
2000 shows that ACH services were still priced at least twenty-four
percentage points too high relative to check services,515 if one simply
measures the relative price to cost ratios. This rather crude gauge does not
take into account, on the one hand, the positive externalities from moving
towards wider dispersion of ACH networks or, on the other, the difficulty
of assessing price-cost ratios in two-sided networks and the concern that if
the Board charged less for ACH services, private sector participants would
likely lose the small market share they now have.
In sum, increased efficiency in the payments environment may make
it easier to reach unbanked households. Direct deposit holds out the
513 Dunham, supra note 19, at 52 fig.4.
514 Fed. Reserve Bd., Automated Clearing House Operations: About, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach/default.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003); see
also GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN & JOANNA STAVINS, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
ADOPTION: LESSONS FROM ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8943, 2002) (“[There] may be a need for policy interventions such as aggressive marketing
efforts or pricing below marginal cost.”); Chakravorti & McHugh, supra note 297, at 44 (“[T]he
provision and usage of payment services exhibit network effects.”); Katz & Shapiro, Technology
Adoption, supra note 378, at 840 (noting that, given network externalities, “[p]ricing at the marginal
cost of production in each period may not be socially optimal”). But see Katz & Shapiro, Systems
Competition, supra note 378, at 113 (noting that given informational asymmetries, the presence of
network externalities does not imply “a general theory of when governmental intervention is preferable
to the unregulated market outcome”).
515 The unit cost for checks is 150% higher than for ACH (4.0 cents compared to 1.6 cents),
and the unit price is 126% higher (4.3 cents compared to 1.9 cents). Press Release, Michael Herd,
NACHA, Federal Reserve Check Volume Decreases, ACH Volume Continues To Rise (Aug. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.nacha.org/news/news/pressreleases/2003/PR060903/pr060903.htm; see also
BAUER & HIGGINS, supra note 496, at 3 (calculating a 12.3% reduction in ACH unit costs annually
over the last decade).
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promise of reduced reliance on check cashers and the possibility of
increased involvement by employers in offering bank accounts to their
workers. Efforts should be focused on how to bring direct deposit to a
broader range of workers. Payroll cards, through which the employee can
access her funds in a pooled account, may prove to be a useful bridge to
direct deposit. Given the ubiquitous need to pay utility companies, lowincome persons may be well positioned to use direct payment. Expanding
the availability of direct bill payment, at least for some common
transactions conducted by low-income persons, may reduce the need for
cash or money orders. Positive network externalities associated with
technological innovation in payments systems suggest that it may be
desirable to provide governmental subsidies to financial institutions or to
third party providers to increase the speed with which these technologies
are widely adopted. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board should review
its pricing for ACH and check clearing services. Given the network
externalities of payments systems, the Federal Reserve Board’s historic
sponsorship of check clearance systems, and the positive externalities
derived from ACH payments, the Board should consider reducing ACH
pricing further in order to stimulate accelerated use of direct deposit and
direct bill payment, although a full analysis of ACH pricing is beyond the
scope of this Article.
V. Transforming Financial Services for the Poor
In Parts I through IV, the Article developed specific policy
recommendations with respect to the alternative financial services sector,
the banking sector, and the payments system and distribution networks. In
this Part, the Article focuses on a cohesive strategy to increase bank
account ownership among low- and moderate-income households: First,
development of electronically based banking products should be
accelerated with a tax credit to financial institutions and the providers of
network technologies. Second, the Community Reinvestment Act could
shed light on bank and thrift performance in meeting the financial services
needs of low-income households. Third, workplace-based and communitybased financial education could help to change the financial services and
savings behavior of low- and moderate-income households if they are
linked to new products and services for the unbanked.
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A. Bank Accounts
1.

First Accounts Tax Credit
a.

Background

Treasury’s First Accounts pilot initiative, and similar efforts by
philanthropic sources, could play an important role in fostering innovation
by the financial services sector.516 With the government or non-profit
funders helping to serve as a catalyst, banks could harness technology to
reduce costs, lower risk, and democratize access to financial services for
low-income families. Transaction accounts with debit cards but no checks
could reduce risk to banks and account holders by preventing accounts
from being overdrawn; lower the cost of processing each transaction and
increase the efficiency of the payments system by reducing paper checks;
expand distribution networks for financial services much more cheaply
than branches; and decrease the safety risk to low-income customers who
cash their regular payroll or benefit checks and carry large sums of cash.
The First Accounts initiative grew out of Treasury’s research on the
financial services needs of the unbanked for EFT ‘99. Treasury estimated
that at least half of the ten million unbanked households do not receive
federal benefit payments and thus would be ineligible to open ETAs. In
addition, banks participating in the ETA program reported that significant
numbers of unbanked persons who were not federal benefit recipients had
sought to open ETAs; these persons are part of the likely target market for
First Accounts. Treasury research suggests that unbanked persons who do
not receive federal benefit payments are, on average, younger, more urban,
more likely to be from a minority community, have larger families, and are
more likely to be receptive to signing up for electronically based accounts
than the unbanked federal-benefit-recipient population.517
As initially conceived, the First Accounts initiative had four main
components. First, Treasury would help to offset the costs financial
institutions incurred in offering low-cost, electronic banking accounts to
low-income individuals. Second, Treasury would help to defray the costs
of expanding access to ATMs, POS, Internet, or other distribution points in
516 Congress provided $10 million for First Accounts in 2001, with no restriction on the year
in which funds were to be expended. This Section is derived from Bringing More Unbanked
Americans into the Financial Mainstream: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs 107th Cong. 42 (May 2, 2002) (statement of Michael S. Barr), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/02_05hrg/050202/barr.htm (last accessed Dec. 11. 2003). The author
developed this program while serving at the Treasury Department.
517 Compare DOVE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25-29, with CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra
note 6; Caskey, Reaching Out, supra note 20; Greene et al., supra note 20; Hogarth & O’Donnell,
supra note 20; Rhine et al., supra note 20; and Hogarth et al., supra note 20.
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low-income neighborhoods with low access. Third, Treasury would
support financial institution and non-profit initiatives to provide financial
education and counseling to low-income households. Fourth, Treasury
would fund research into the financial services needs of low-income
individuals and development of financial products designed to meet these
needs. The First Accounts initiative focuses on the need for incentives to
get financial institutions started in serving low-income households. As
discussed above, the costs of research and development, new account
opening, expanded distribution, and financial education are serious barriers
today to expansion of account ownership. The First Accounts initiative
could help to accelerate improvements in this market.
Treasury launched the First Accounts program in December 2001.518
The Department received 231 responses seeking nearly $130 million in
funding from a wide variety of organizations: banks, thrifts, and credit
unions; employers and labor and employer organizations; community
based organizations; state and local governments; and others. Treasury
provided $8.35 million to fifteen projects seeking to bring over 35,000
individuals from twenty-five states into the banking system.519 Credit
unions make up one third of the awardees, and other non-profits more than
one half, while only two banks were awardees. Awardees focus on
providing financial education and low-cost electronic accounts to the
unbanked. A number of awardees will work with employers to expand
banking access. Some of the funds are ear-marked for capital expenditures
on ATMs, or, in one case, new branches, in low-income areas. In this
initial round, funding per account appears high, although strategies, cost
structures, other funding sources, the extent to which capital outlays are
included, and the intensiveness of financial education vary significantly
across chosen programs. The average award per account forecasted to be
opened is $237.78, with wide variation among awardees, ranging from a
remarkably low $23.13 to an astonishingly high $1,468.32.520 Given the
small amount of funding available and the large number of organizations
funded, Treasury will have difficulty determining from this pilot phase
whether a given strategy is sustainable at scale. A more focused effort in a
handful of metropolitan areas might have led to adoption of new
technologies by major firms, not to mention more useful data.
518 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) Inviting Applications
for the First Accounts Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,975 (Dec. 17, 2001).
519 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, First Accounts Program, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
domestic-finance/financial-institution/fin-education/firstaccounts/grantsummary.html (last visited Dec.
11, 2003).
520 Author’s calculations based on data from the Treasury website, available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/fin-education/firstaccounts/
grantawards.html (last accessed Dec. 11, 2003). It is difficult to assess whether awardees’ forecasts of
numbers of accounts to be opened are likely to be accurate.
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First Accounts Tax Credit

A challenge going forward is to fund First Accounts at sufficient
levels and for a sufficient time to help transform the market for lowincome financial services and drive down costs. Only a sustained
commitment to funding the First Accounts initiative, or other
governmental or foundation support, would provide financial institutions
with sufficient incentive to make the necessary investments in research,
technology platform changes, training, marketing, and education to serve
low-income unbanked and underbanked households. Over time, as
financial institutions become expert at serving the low-income customer
segment, the need for governmental incentives may become less
important.
First Accounts, private-sector efforts to expand banking services, and
employer-driven strategies to serve the unbanked could be brought to scale
by developing a tax incentive for financial institutions to offer low-cost
electronic accounts for low-income persons.521 Financial institutions could
receive a tax credit equal to a fixed amount per account opened. Roughly
speaking, the amount of the credit would be calculated to cover the
average administrative cost to an average bank of offering the account,
taking into consideration research and product development, account
opening and closing costs, marketing and financial education, and the
training of bank personnel. Banks would report quarterly to the Treasury
Department on the number of accounts geared to low- and moderateincome persons that the banks had opened and would receive a
corresponding credit to their quarterly estimated taxes. Using the Dove
analysis conducted for ETAs522 would suggest that the tax credit be set at
an amount between $20 and $50 per account opened. If the initiative
reached three million households, or about one third of the low-income
unbanked, a reasonable goal for at least the first five years of the program,
the tax credits would cost only $60 to $150 million.
Banks, thrifts, and credit unions could, under the First Accounts Tax
Credit, experiment with a wide variety of techniques to expand access to
the unbanked and to provide an increasing range of services to the

521 See MICHAEL STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS OF
ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999). Credit unions, which are not-for-profit corporations, could not directly
take advantage of tax credits. It is possible to structure the tax credit so that for-profit subsidiaries or
credit union service organizations could receive the tax credit for their services on behalf of the credit
unions in offering the accounts. It would also be reasonable, however, to take the position that credit
unions, which are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to serve “people of
modest means,” 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000), should be able to pass on the benefits of tax exemption to
low-income persons by offering accounts tailored to their needs.
522 See supra note 305.
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underbanked.523 Low-cost electronic transaction accounts can be attractive
to the unbanked and can be offered at reasonable cost.524 Banks may wish
to experiment with accounts with savings features, including payment of
interest or separate savings “buckets” within accounts; these features are
also likely to be low-cost and attractive to the unbanked.525 Similarly, lowincome individuals need a convenient and low-cost means of paying bills;
automated money orders,526 online bill payment, debit-card-based foreign
country remittance, and other low-cost payment methods can help to
reduce the cost of transactional services to the poor. Dove estimated that
adding a savings feature to an electronic account would cost approximately
$0.06 per month. Adding ACH bill payment would cost $0.65 per month.
Adding the ability to accept additional direct deposits beyond federal
benefit payments would decrease net costs by $0.11 per month because of
added float income.527 Financial institutions could also seek to expand
ATM availability in low-income neighborhoods, including by co-locating
with post offices.
In addition, the First Accounts Tax Credit has the potential to help
spur “leapfrogging” in technology for low-income financial services,
adopting low-cost, high-technology solutions without using older, more
expensive institutions.528 To offer a few examples that could be subjected
to the test of market feasibility: With sufficient incentives, the
infrastructure for financial transactions may be induced to explore ways
that low-income customers could be served by financial institutions on
shared technological platforms, reducing research and development costs
and technology platform change costs for each firm.529 As access to the
Internet expands in low-income communities through efforts to bridge the
523 Treasury’s notice of funds availability (NOFA) issued in December 2001 barred using
First Accounts funds for IDA matches or to increase services to those with bank accounts, see U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 518. In my view, neither prohibition is required by the congressional
appropriations, and neither serves an important program interest.
524 See ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51; ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note
310.
525 See ETA CONJOINT RESEARCH, supra note 51; ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note
310. Savings features boosted take up rates by up to one-third and accounted for one-quarter of the
reasons why an individual might sign up for electronically-based accounts.
526 CASKEY, FILENE INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 86, found that 69% of surveyed
unbanked persons used ten money orders per year, and 39% used more than thirty money orders per
year to pay bills.
527 ETA WATERFALL ANALYSES, supra note 310, at 4.
528 Another example of leapfrogging is the developing world’s adoption of cell phones
without installing a widespread wire-based phone network. See CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 373, at
12 (“Mobile phones have made telecommunications available even to the world’s poor, partly because
of the widespread creation of telecenters and public call offices.”); Simon Romero, A Cell Phone Surge
Among the World’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at C1.
529 The Doorways to Dreams demonstration project, which has developed an Internet
platform for data management in IDA programs, is one such example. See Doorways to Dreams, What
Is D2D Fund?, at http://www.d2dfund.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2003).
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“digital divide,” e-finance can increasingly be made available to the poor
at Internet or other kiosks.530 Companies that are exploring ways to expand
the use of cellular phones to transact financial services for high-income
clientele could be encouraged to focus attention on expanding bank
account access through pre-paid cellular phones commonly used by lowincome persons, perhaps with pre-authorized debit for cell phone fees.531
Smart cards can be used even by unbanked customers to conduct an
increasing array of bank-like transactions at relatively low cost.532
Similarly, payroll cards might serve as a useful starting point in the U.S.
towards providing an increasing range of financial services—including bill
payment and savings—to low-income persons.
A First Accounts Tax Credit could also help to spur employer-driven
(or union-driven) strategies to expand access to banking services.
Employer-driven strategies to bank the unbanked have three potential
strengths: large-scale, consistent access to workers, a structure for
providing regular savings through direct deposit, and the ability to offer
financial education. Large employers can reap significant benefits from
moving more of their workers to direct deposit. Direct deposit would drive
down their payroll processing costs, increase the effective take-home pay
of their workers, and reduce problems from theft or fraud associated with
checks. Employers can help to reduce costs for reaching their unbanked
employees with financial education regarding new products.
Many employers have already become active in educating their
workers about advanced payments under the EITC, or have become
involved in wide scale efforts to hire former welfare recipients as part of a
national welfare-to-work strategy.533 At the same time, financial
institutions already provide important payroll and other banking services
for employers, and some have been experimenting with employer-focused,
debit-card or stored-value card-based payroll systems for their clients’
530 See, e.g., Value Transfer System for Unbanked Customers, U.S. Patent Application No.
20020082962 (June 27, 2002).
531 Perhaps the Open Mobile Alliance could serve as a forum for this purpose. See Open
Mobile Alliance, Homepage, at http://www.wapforum.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2003).
532 For example, South Africa is using stored value cards to expand banking services in
remote areas. The cards can be used to receive income, transfer payments, or establish savings for
particular purposes. CLAESSENS ET AL., supra note 373, at 36. Mondex e-cash, being used in the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, permits individuals to transfer value between cards
and to download value using a phone. Visa Horizon, being used in Ghana, is an offline payment card.
Visa Cash in South Africa is being used for transit fares in South Africa. Modex e-cash will be offered
through South Africa’s post office savings banks, with bill payment and savings pools. In Indonesia,
MasterCard, Cirrus, and BCA are issuing an on-line debit card. Visa Cash in the Philippines can be
loaded with value or used to make payments over the Internet or through mobile phones. The
CashCard in Singapore permits loading value through mobile phones; the cards are expected to permit
bill payment by mobile phone in the future. Id. at 65-69.
533 UPS, Bank of America, and Hewlett-Packard are among those U.S. corporations actively
and successfully participating in the welfare-to-work program. See generally The Welfare to Work
Partnership, Homepage, at http://www.welfaretowork.org (last visited Dec. 8, 2003).

226

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art49

106

Barr:
C:\Documents and Settings\johnloyd\My Documents\attach\Banking the Poor JREG FINAL PRINTER PROOF (March 7, 2004).doc

Banking the Poor
employees. These employment relationships may provide a solid
foundation for encouraging direct deposit into low-cost electronic banking
accounts and systematic savings programs for low-income workers.
Employers are increasingly moving towards the provision of
electronically based payroll services. In one model, employees are given a
smart card that can be used at ATMs or POS by banked or unbanked
employees. Banked employees can direct deposit funds from their smart
cards to their personal accounts; unbanked employees can simply
withdraw funds through an ATM or POS.534 By 2002, 10% of unbanked
workers used payroll cards.535 Employers could work with banks to make
available all-electronic bank accounts through which they could use their
payroll cards.
In sum, tax credits should also be used to foster employer-based
strategies to reach the unbanked through payroll-based accounts.
Employers already have some incentives to shift workers from check or
cash payment to payroll cards or direct deposit. Payroll cards themselves
will help to reduce transaction costs associated with converting income to
cash and, if linked to bank accounts, these cards could open up access to
depository institutions for low-income workers. These accounts could then
be used to meet other core financial services needs, including savings and
bill payment. These efforts, given employers’ economies of scale and
institutional strength, may present the greatest opportunity to shift large
numbers of low-income workers to account ownership. Yet there are
reasons to suggest that employers are unlikely to capture the full benefit of
their employees shifting to bank account ownership with direct deposit.
Subsidies to such employers would help them to internalize more of those
benefits.
c.

Objections and Responses

The tax credit proposal could be criticized in two layers. The top layer
of potential criticism follows from the subsidy being a supply-side rather
than demand-side mechanism to reach the poor with banking services.
Supply-side approaches are preferable to demand-side efforts only under
conditions in which efficiency in provision outweighs potential windfalls
534 See, e.g., Press Release, Ceridian, Washington Inventory Service Picks Ceridian for Pay
Card Services (June 14, 2002), at http://www.ceridian.com/corp/article/1,2868,10963-52751,00.html;
COMDATA, How To Use It: Comchek eCash Cardholder User Guide, at
http://www.ecash.comdata.com/ec-howtouseit.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2003). A drawback of this
card is that account balances must be checked prior to using ATM or POS using a Voice Response
Unit (VRU) reached through a “1-800” number; if a withdrawal is requested when funds are not
sufficient, a fee is assessed.
535 SAMUEL FROMKIN ET AL., PAYROLL CARDS; AN INNOVATIVE PRODUCT FOR REACHING
THE UNBANKDED AND UNDERBANKED 2 (2003), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/payrollcards.pdf (last
visited Dec. 11, 2003).
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to suppliers and the costs of the mechanism. In the other layer of potential
criticism, the tax credit proposed must be judged as an in-kind mechanism
as opposed to a direct cash transfer. An in-kind approach will be warranted
if consumption externalities outweigh the deadweight costs from
substitution effects and the costs of administrating the program.536 I
address the costs and benefits of a supply-side, in-kind subsidy,
particularly drawing attention to the conditions for optimality of such a
program as compared to a demand-side program or direct cash transfers.
A demand-side, in-kind program is typically manifested in voucher
programs.537 The tradeoff between demand and supply approaches builds
on three issues. First, the relative efficiencies of demand compared with
supply programs depend on the elasticity of supply in the sector. If supply
is inelastic,538 a voucher program will raise the price of the good provided
to those not holding vouchers, thereby reducing welfare.539 In the case of
low-cost electronic banking accounts, it is reasonable to think that the
supply of accounts is characterized by a single fixed cost for start-up and
low marginal costs for additional accounts. Thus, supply is likely to be
highly elastic. If supply is perfectly elastic, there is no welfare difference
in a supply-side subsidy or a demand voucher.
Second, there is a danger that subsidies for the provision of low-cost
banking accounts could provide a windfall to financial institutions who
would offer such accounts without the tax credit.540 It is difficult to know
the extent of this problem without more empirical evidence. There are
some small-scale private sector initiatives in serving low-income
customers, but it is difficult to assess the motivation for them. Some of
these may have been undertaken in response to government programs
(EFT ‘99, EBT, First Accounts) or regulation (CRA). Others have been
underwritten by philanthropic contributions. The remaining may have been
motivated by perceived future profits, either from the customers served
themselves, or perhaps from providing positive public relations about the
bank that attract other, more lucrative, customers. I have suggested that
network externalities may slow the adoption of technologies that would
better serve the poor; to the extent that these technologies are employed for
that end, the tax credits are less likely to result in windfalls rather than in
536

See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 397-403 (3d ed.

2000).
537 For example, the Section 8 program, established by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, provides vouchers to low-income residents that can be used to rent
apartments from private landlords. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2003).
538 Inelastic supply implies that the quantity suppliers are willing to provide does not change
when the equilibrium price in the market changes. This is often considered a short term effect.
539 STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 400-01.
540 On this problem more generally, see, for example, Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to
the Theory of Tax Expenditure: The Case of Charitable Giving, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (H.J.
Aaron & M.J. Boskin eds., 1980) (showing that government spending may decrease private spending).
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internalizing some of those externalities. An extreme form of misallocation
of subsidy may result in over-supply of services.541 Conversely, demand
voucher programs can also exhibit unwanted windfalls. Individuals may
qualify for vouchers who would otherwise not be target audiences for
supply-driven mechanisms.542
Third, one must consider the costs of demand compared with supply
programs.543 I have proposed a supply-side subsidy rather than a demandside subsidy because I believe that it is more likely to induce a change in
the nature of financial services offered to low-income consumers at lower
cost. If low-income consumers were given a voucher for financial services,
they would need to invest in sufficient, costly information-gathering to be
able to find an adequate banking product for their needs, and financial
services are notoriously difficult for most people (poor and non-poor) to
understand. Since the voucher would offset some of the costs of existing
services, financial products might not evolve to meet the needs of other
low-income persons. Significant collective action and free rider problems
would further hinder the ability of consumers to appeal for innovation.
Without the development of new low-cost electronic banking accounts, the
demand vouchers’ value would be limited to its face value. Of course,
financial institutions, knowing that low-income consumers had a financial
services voucher, may invest more in learning about low-income
consumers and developing products for that segment of the market. It is
possible that a similar result to a demand-side subsidy could be obtained,
but the administrative costs of delivering the financial services voucher to
millions of low-income households are likely to be much higher than the
administrative costs of tracking account opening by financial institutions
who already have established relationships for reporting to the IRS (and
many of whom have such relationships for reporting to the FMS).
The subsidy is administered through the tax code, rather than as a
grant program. Tax expenditures have been criticized as complicating the
tax code, reducing the base in ways that require increasing tax rates that
541 See STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 128.
542 Consider the job training market. Holland suggests that one key advantage of a subsidy to
employers over a tax credit for individuals for education expense is that in the tax credit program, it is
impossible to disentangle the target audience, as the “price” to everyone is the same. This creates an
excess cost for providing training to those in need. See Daniel M. Holland, An Evaluation of Tax
Incentives for On-the-Job Training of the Disadvantaged, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 293 (1971). The
realization of benefits only to target individuals is important for both supply and demand side
programs. Since the in-kind approaches are essentially symmetrical, identification of the “subsidy
base,” i.e., the target group of individuals whom the program seeks to benefit, is tantamount to
identification of the “negative income tax base.” See A.B. Atkinson & Joseph Stiglitz, The Design of
Tax Structure, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 74 (1976). Thus, the incidence of the program is the essential trait to
gauge.
543 Holland’s empirical estimates of the job training market find little difference between the
administrative costs of job training tax credits for individuals and those of subsidies to employers for
training programs. Holland, supra note 542, at 301-02.
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are themselves distortionary and as costly to administer.544 Tax
expenditures are not necessarily more or less efficient than grant programs.
However, the fixed cost of tax administration by the IRS and of tax
compliance by corporations is already in place and is unlikely to be
affected in any significant way by the additional tax expenditure. I am
proposing that the Treasury Department’s Financial Management Service
compute the amount of the tax reduction owed to each financial institution
and administer the program because the FMS already has developed a
system for tracking ETA accounts opened by financial institutions for
federal benefit recipients under the EFT ‘99 program. This aspect of the
tax expenditure, which replicates core functions of a grant program, is
unlikely to be significantly different were the financial institutions to be
given a grant instead of a tax credit. Raising funds to pay for a grant
program (through tax increases, borrowing, or other spending reductions)
would produce similar distortions to those required to run the program
through the tax system.
The alternative to some form of in-kind program is a direct cash
transfer.545 There are three main critiques that have been raised regarding
in-kind transfers versus cash transfers. I will describe the critiques and
then offer a theoretically motivated response to why the costs of the inkind program should not be greater than the benefits. First, generally
speaking, in-kind subsidies are thought of as less efficient than cash
subsidies because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for
specified purposes.546 To the extent that the recipient undertakes the
specified actions to the same degree as the recipient would have if given a
cash grant, the in-kind subsidy does not change behavior but costs more to
administer, it is argued, than a cash transfer. To the extent that the subsidy
changes behavior, the subsidy does not increase the welfare of the
recipient to the same degree as if the recipient had been able to use the
funds that the in-kind subsidy represents to pursue her own preferences. A
typical approach to quantifying the benefit of an in-kind program is
through the Hicksian measure of what an equivalent cash grant would have
to be to equal the in-kind subsidy. For example, one study of public tenant
houses calculated that 16-20% of the mean subsidy value was lost in
544 On the tax expenditure debate, see, for example, STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO
TAX REFORM (1973); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budget: A
Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
545 Over 70% of U.S. welfare benefits are allocated through in-kind programs. STIGLITZ,
supra note 536, at 397.
546 See, e.g., id. at 254-65 (presenting arguments concerning the substitution versus income
effect).
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benefit to the recipients.547
The second criticism of in-kind plans over cash transfers is simply
that they are paternalistic in telling the heterogeneous recipients that they
should derive utility in particular from the provision of the service for
which the in-kind benefit is intended.548 In-kind mechanisms are
disparaged for passing judgment that individuals should value the
particular benefit more than they might value other benefits with which
they could have spent an equivalent cash transfer.
Third, in-kind programs are often more administratively costly than
direct transfers.549 The marginal cost to the government of increasing the
dollar amount of income transfers to the poor is low.
As I will argue below, however, we must consider the externality of
banking services on the cost differential between the value of the
government’s check and the realized benefit to the individual.550 The
process of converting the government check to cash (or stored value)
reduces the income transfer. However, to make this argument fully, I first
establish the theoretical basis for when an in-kind program can compete
with cash transfers.
There are primarily two arguments that an in-kind benefit may be
larger than an equivalent cash transfer, even taking account of added costs
and substitution effects. First, in-kind programs may generate
“consumption externalities.”551 Consumption externalities are benefits
accruing because the in-kind program exists. Here, the externality is the
fixed investment leading to a new form of permanent low-cost electronic
banking accounts. If it were possible to transfer “cash” to each individual,
the recipients would have the benefit of the cash instantaneously. The tax
credit program proposed would establish permanent access to low-cost
banking, however, which would reduce the consumer’s costs of cashing
checks, storing value, and paying bills into the future. Moreover, banking
services help other government programs work more effectively.
More pointedly, the argument in favor of income transfers as
compared with in-kind subsidies breaks down when one analyzes how
“income” gets transferred.552 The federal government does not transfer
547 Michael P. Murray, The Distribution of Tenant Benefits in Public Housing, 43
ECONOMETRICA 771, 783 (1975).
548 See generally Edgar K. Browning, A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers, 19 ECON.
INQUIRY 579 (1981).
549 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 536, at 349.
550 Income can be a bad reference point for evaluating utility of the poor since utility comes
from consumption and not the cash transfer. See Daniel T. Slesnick, Consumption and Poverty, 106
ECON. J. 1527, 1528 (1996). In the case here, the income transfer is not even a fair assessment of the
cash received, since it is conveyed to the individual in a form that requires it to be converted to cash,
extending this divergence of utility measurement.
551 See, e.g., Browning, supra note 548, at 579.
552 The public finance literature tends to assume that recipients of income transfers bear no
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income as cash. Nor, for that matter, do states. Income can be transferred
as a direct deposit to a bank account, to a debit or stored value card, or as a
check. Transferring income to low-income persons through a government
check not only costs the government more than an electronic transfer,553
but also transfers less value to low-income persons than a direct deposit of
that income into the recipient’s bank account. Electronic bank accounts
lower the cost of redistributing wealth. If such accounts are subsidized for
low-income households, the resultant savings may outweigh the cost of the
subsidy. Moreover, once established, these accounts provide a repository
for the receipt of other federal or state government income transfers and
private earnings in the future. Further, as I have argued, the accounts, once
provided, may increase opportunities for low-income families to pay their
bills automatically, to budget and save, and to build positive credit
histories and obtain access to credit.
The second situation in which a cash transfer would be less efficient
relative to an in-kind program involves screening and targeting. In-kind
transfers have been shown both theoretically and in practice to be effective
at screening the target service provided, and thus reaching the target
recipient base.554 Criteria for the in-kind efficiency outcome are worth
considering in the context of banking. The ability of an in-kind program to
screen in the optimal potential beneficiaries may require that the good
provided be in some ways an “inferior good,” a good to which a higherincome individual would not immediately be drawn.555 In the current
market, such a goal would be achieved by offering a product that does not
permit check writing. This result runs contrary to the claims by some that
in-kind redistribution programs increase or distort the quality of the goods
that low income individuals might choose for themselves. Along these
lines, the greater the divergence in goods that can be provided to
differentiate the target audience, the greater the effectiveness of the
program will be.
In sum, there are grounds for believing that the tax credit proposal
suggested here would be more efficient than a grant program, a demandside voucher, or a cash transfer. An additional reason for favoring a tax
credit to financial institutions for providing financial services, over the
alternatives is, of course, that tax incentives for such purposes are more
cost on converting income checks into cash. See, e.g., ROBERT H. HAVEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 59-60 (1970).
553 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Proposal Would Implement
1996 Law Requiring Payment for Federal Salaries, Social Security, Veterans, and Other Benefits
(Sept. 11, 1997), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/rr1922.htm.
554 See, e.g., Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, Cash Versus Kind, Self-Selection and
Efficient Transfers, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1988); Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1982).
555 See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 554, at 375.
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likely to be politically feasible to enact in today’s environment, than cash
assistance. Political feasibility, like other forms of feasibility, ought to be
considered in weighing policy options.
2.

The Community Reinvestment Act

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could also help to focus
banks and thrifts on opportunities to provide bank accounts to low-income
persons. Under CRA,556 federal regulators evaluate bank and thrift
performance in serving their communities.557 Given the high up-front costs
associated with the accounts, and the low expected returns, however, CRA
by itself is unlikely to change behavior. CRA has arguably helped to
expand access to credit for homeownership in low-income communities.558
The CRA service test, however, which evaluates bank and thrift
performance in meeting transaction, savings, and other community needs,
has received inadequate attention from bank regulators in CRA
examinations. Michael Stegman has documented that banks rarely receive
“needs to improve” ratings on the service test, and the service test is often
used to increase the overall score of borderline banks.559 Examiners should
focus on the extent to which banks and thrifts are actually attracting lowincome customers with innovative retail products and services. Given the
importance of technology in serving low-income clients in a cost-effective
manner, service examinations should move away from an overwhelming
focus on bank branches towards a more quantitative and qualitative
assessment of the extent to which technology-based products are
expanding access for low-income persons.560
The 1995 regulations provide sufficient flexibility for analysis of an
556 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2003).
557 For purposes of this Article, I take as given the existence of CRA and ask how it could
better evaluate performance in meeting basic financial services needs. CRA itself has been subjected to
withering criticism. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993). But see ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A
FINAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/finalrpt.pdf (last
visited Dec. 11, 2003). I take up this debate in a work in progress. See BARR, supra note 1.
558 See LITAN ET AL., supra note 557, at ES-3.
559 See MICHAEL STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, CREATING A SCORECARD FOR THE CRA
SERVICE TEST (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 96, 2002) (revealing that only fifteen CRA
examinations out of nearly 2,000 conducted over the last five years have resulted in a rating of “needs
to improve” on the service test, and no bank has ever earned a “substantial noncompliance” rating on
service activities).
560 See Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 447, 452 (2002); see also Michael S. Barr, Comment Letter of October 26, 2001,
Community Reinvestment Act Joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (OCC Docket No. 0116, Board Docket No. R-1112, FDIC Re: 12 CFR 345, OTS Docket No. 2001-49), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/95338.pdf.
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institution’s performance, but agency examination procedures provide
insufficient guidance as to how to measure an institution’s activities in
ways that actually matter to low-income consumers. The service test, in
practice, has received perfunctory attention from examiners, with public
evaluations containing little or no analysis of whether low-income
consumers actually use bank or thrift products or services. Examinations
under the service test could be vastly improved by taking three steps.
First, examiners should evaluate the extent to which institutions offer
low-cost accounts and other products designed to meet the account needs
of low-income individuals. Low-cost electronic accounts with direct
deposit, little or no risk of overdraft, the opportunity for the accumulation
of savings, and bill payments or electronic money orders may hold special
promise in this regard. Some institutions have gone further, by providing
financial education and matching funds for Individual Development
Accounts. Regardless of the form of the account, examiners should attempt
to make a qualitative judgment about the range of product offerings of the
institutions, based on the existing state of research into low-income
consumer needs, and taking into account the costs to institutions of
providing accounts and the requirements of sound banking practice. Such
qualitative assessments are, however, difficult to apply consistently across
examiners and agencies.
Second, banks and thrifts should be evaluated based on the number of
low- and moderate-income account holders at their institution, whether in
a traditional, or more innovative, account. Quantitative measures of usage
should provide a portrait of an institution’s performance under the service
test, and data collection on the numbers of accounts provided should not in
and of itself be burdensome. Requiring data collection and reporting with
respect to the income of account holders could become significant burdens
on some banks and thrifts. Banking agencies might consider permitting
institutions to use certain assumptions about their customers’ incomes
based on the accounts offered. For example, for reporting purposes, a
holder of a specialized banking account with no checking privileges might
be presumed to be low-income. In addition, bank accounts opened at
branches in low- or moderate-income areas, or held by individuals residing
in low- or moderate-income areas since statement information is readily
kept by most institutions, might be presumed to be held by individuals of
low- or moderate-income. A formula based on the percentage of lowincome population in the census tract could also be used. For other
institutions that already collect information on income of account holders
for other purposes, such as cross-marketing, reporting of income might not
be more burdensome than geographic-coding of accounts. Information on
account usage is critical to meeting the financial services needs of lowincome communities, and the agencies should work closely with banks and
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thrifts to determine the least burdensome way to collect this essential
information.
Third, the agencies should give negative consideration to activities
that undermine the provision of quality services to the poor. For example,
participation by banks or thrifts in arrangements with affiliates or other
parties that do not provide adequate consumer protection, or raise
compliance, operational, or other risks, should receive negative
consideration as part of the performance context under the service test.561
Agencies should ensure that banks and thrifts are not merely “renting”
their names or charters to these firms, but are engaged in appropriate
monitoring and supervision of practices, and that the practices comply
with applicable law. This may require targeted, risk-based examination of
these parties or affiliates, as has been conducted by the OCC with respect
to national bank relationships with payday lenders.562
3.

State Policies and Welfare Reform

As discussed above,563 states should integrate access to financial
services as a core element of welfare-to-work strategies. High cost
alternative financial services undermine efforts to improve workforce
participation by reducing effective take-home pay. Lack of structured
savings mechanisms makes it less likely that new entrants into the
workforce will save against liquidity crises from job loss, injury, or other
family emergencies, and makes it more likely that such crises will push
families back onto the welfare rolls.564 Over the longer term, lack of access
to bank accounts and savings mechanisms will reduce the ability of lowincome families to save for homeownership, skills development, or their
children’s education.565 As a first step, states (and other workforce
development providers) should encourage account ownership. First, states
561 For example, OTS gave Crusader Bank a “needs to improve” rating in 2000 in part
because of its payday lending operations; Crusader abandoned its payday lending relationship in 2001.
CFA/PIRG REPORT, supra note 40, at 20, 24.
562 See OCC, Third-Party Relationships, supra note 172 (advising national banks on risk
management in dealing with third parties); OCC CONSENT ORDER, supra note 178 (ordering bank to
cease making payday loans through third party).
563 See supra Subsection III.B.2.
564 Social insurance (unemployment insurance, for example) could also be used to serve this
function, spreading the costs of those risks from those least able to afford them to society at large, but
increasing and widening the scope of social insurance at this time seems politically infeasible.
Moreover, social insurance may crowd out private savings. See, e.g., COURTNEY COILE & JONATHAN
GRUBER, SOCIAL SECURITY INCENTIVES FOR RETIREMENT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7651, 2000), available at http://dsl.nber.org/papers/w7651.pdf (last accessed Dec. 11, 2003).
565 The lack of savings may also contribute to borrowing constraints, leading to
underinvestment in education that perpetrates inter-generational persistence of poverty. See Bhash
Mazumder, Analyzing Income Mobility over Generations, CHICAGO FED LETTER, Sept. 2002, available
at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/2002/cflsept2002_181.pdf (last accessed Dec. 11,
2003).
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should shift EBT to individually owned accounts and permit former
welfare recipients to retain accounts after they move into the workforce.
Although such a shift might prove costly to states in the short-run (because
of lost “float” income), over the long term it is likely to further welfare-towork goals. Second, states should assist former welfare recipients with
having EITC returns directly deposited into a bank account. Third, state
welfare initiatives should increasingly include Individual Development
Account (IDA) programs.566 As part of the federal reauthorization of the
1996 Welfare Reform law, Congress should make funds available to states
for these financial services initiatives.
B.

Financial Education

Studies find that financial education can sometimes help to change
the financial behavior of individuals, particularly low-income persons.567
Financial education can increase participation in saving plans and increase
the level of saving. However, financial education conducted apart from
changes in the availability of product offerings is unlikely to be
successful.568 Moreover, financial education can be costly, and education
focused on low-income persons is unlikely to be undertaken in a
significant way absent governmental and nonprofit support. The Treasury
Department could expand existing efforts to financial literacy569 by
supporting community-based financial education focused on account
ownership and savings. Education is most successful when it focuses on
life decisions that the individual is facing: for example, how to improve
credit standing to purchase a home, or how to save for college. America
Saves, sponsored by the Consumer Federation of America, which
combines financial education with low-income savings plans building on
self-identified savings goals, might serve as a model for increasing savings
566 Some states have linked financial services access goals to state fiscal management needs.
For example, New York enacted a law under which banks that open new branches in designated lowand moderate-income neighborhoods receive property tax abatements as well as the potential for
deposits of state funds. Thus far, eight banks have opened branches in these areas. See Amanda Fung,
N.Y. Development Program Gains Traction, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 2001, at 6. For other state asset
building strategies, see generally CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., STATE ASSET DEVELOPMENT REPORT CARD
(2002).
567 See, e.g., E. Thomas Garman et al., Workplace Financial Education Improves Financial
Wellness, 10 ASS’N FOR FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING EDUC. 79, 80-84 (1999); Jeanne M. Hogarth
& Marianne A. Hilgert, Financial Knowledge, Experience, and Learning Preferences, 48 CONSUMER
INT. ANN. (2002).
568 See JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: PLAN RULES,
PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8655, 2001) (noting that one third of self-reported undersavers said that they
intended to increase their savings but almost none of them did so).
569 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill,
Keynote Address to Jumpstart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy (Apr. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3035.htm.
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among low- to moderate-income families.570 Non-profit and faith-based
organizations can play important roles in partnering with financial
institutions to expand financial education to low-income households. In
addition, workplace financial education could be funded as part of tax
credits covering the administrative costs of setting up payroll direct deposit
and savings plans for low- and moderate-income workers.571
VI. Conclusion
Low- and moderate-income households who use alternative financial
service providers pay a high price to convert their income into cash, pay
their bills, and obtain credit, and they lack a regular means to save. The
high cost of alternative financial services undermines key income
redistribution policies for the poor, including the EITC. Existing banking
products are often not well designed to meet the needs of the poor, and few
banks compete with alternative financial services providers for lowincome customers, particularly in low-income neighborhoods. The cost to
individual financial institutions of research, product development, account
administration, staff training, marketing and financial education with
respect to new financial products for the poor, relative to their expected
financial return, means that the market is unlikely to change quickly on its
own. In addition, network externalities in electronic payments systems and
distribution networks suggest that net social benefit could be obtained
through further expansion.
Financial and technological innovation has been a hallmark of U.S.
financial markets. Financial institutions can harness that innovation to
meet the needs of low-income Americans. Governmental incentives appear
to be important to catalyze private sector efforts to use financial and
technological progress to expand access to financial services for low- and
moderate-income families. By helping these families to enter the financial
services mainstream, the policies outlined here can help to transform
financial services for low-income persons. Such a transformation is a key
to promoting greater economic opportunities for low-income households.

570 See Ben Jackson, Programs Tout Financial Literacy for All Ages, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5,
2002, at 5.
571 This approach builds on SIMPLE 401(k) plans, savings plans offered by small
employers, which include a small credit offset for plan administration.
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